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Abstract 
The issue of development in emerging markets has moved on from the 
polarized debates along ideological lines about the state vs. markets, to focusing 
mainly on economic indicators. Increasingly, as knowledge becomes the main focus 
of development, it is acknowledged that the state can play a positive role in promoting 
its growth. To try and analyse these developments, it is imperative that we appreciate 
the role of differing business systems that impose constraints on development, 
especially in influencing capital allocation in the system. The emergence of cyber- 
cities in impoverished developing countries like India need to be analysed to 
appreciate the factors that will influence the trends in development 
- 
the success of 
such cities can be attributed to the positive role played by the state and the clustering 
of software industries around centres of knowledge. 
We develop frameworks to analyse to compare the existing forms of corporate 
governance, and a third system for emerging economies such as Asia or Europe. We 
also develop frameworks to analyse market exchange and alternative frameworks 
from modern and pre-modern societies, in order to understand the nature of exchange 
in intangible and inalienable assets such as knowledge. We apply these frameworks to 
Indian software industry to give us an insight into how India has managed to emerge 
as a significant player in the software industry. We conclude that the political 
embeddedness of the various institutions and organisations are playing a critical role 
in shaping its business systems which is at the crossroads between a pluralist 
shareholder and corporatist stakeholder system. Also, these factors are forcing the 
Indian software industry to focus on the lower end of the value chain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A substantial amount of social science research that has been carried out in the 
last few decades has been unprepared for the major turbulence, change, and the nature 
of competitiveness in today's global environment. The past decade has been 
characterised by social and ideological upheavals that have transformed the political 
and economic landscape, with most nation-states attempting to embrace a liberal 
democratic market structure. Although recent political and economic developments, 
especially in South East Asia and Latin America, have tempered the unrealistic 
expectations and optimism, it is useful to highlight the distinctive features of the 
extant global economy which are changing the sources of advantage of firms and 
countries and the economics of industries in new and often unpredictable ways. These 
include competitive deregulation between countries, less protectionism, formation of 
regional trade blocs, structural changes in industries because of technological changes, 
excess capacity and customer expectations, environmental concerns, and 
interorganizational collaborative arrangements (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). 
These changes have led to an urgent need to reassess the traditional 
frameworks of development and international business. Thus, the main purpose of this 
thesis is to problematize the enduring value of existing views on development and 
international business, and to further explore an alternative perspective on 
development and international business systems. In doing so, we do not claim to have 
covered the vast array of diverse literature on the nature and impact of development, 
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nor to have captured the infinitely complex details of economic and management 
issues. 
Studies of change and success in economics have tended to focus on two areas. 
The first is the analyses of the evolution of dynamic markets, over time, which 
originated from Schumpeter and the Austrian economists. This area has traditionally 
merited more than a footnote in textbooks and is only now been revived as an 
important approach for economics, institutions and management (Kogut, 1991,1993; 
North, 1990). The second is the study of the history of certain economies and certain 
industries, conducted with a view to identifying the key variables explaining why 
those entities develop and change (North, 1990; Langlois, 1992). This thesis is 
conceptually located in this genre of social science research and explores the "grey" 
areas that are common to research in international business and development 
economics. More specifically it focuses on two factors that have dominated the debate 
in the literature in both streams of research, i. e., the role of allocation of financial 
capital within a business system and the role of knowledge as a source of competitive 
advantage for countries, industries and firms. 
Extant literature in international business, tends to discuss global competition 
with reference to the triad framework, thus, leaving out the "emerging markets" and 
the rest of the world as developing countries. Even the extensive literature on 
comparative institutions and culture seems to share the same world view both in their 
implicit theoretical assumptions and in the scope of their empirical investigation. 
However, the dramatic changes in global markets and the resultant complications in 
global competition have undermined the validity of this traditional framework; the 
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continuing success of these emerging market economies and their firms challenge the 
validity of the traditional framework of global competition. 
We suggest that the business system of a country or a group of countries 
consisting of various institutional and cultural factors are a crucial determinant in 
analyzing the differential modes of organization and strategy as well as differential 
rates of performance in today's global competition. Unlike the mature markets in the 
referred to in the traditional triad, the emerging markets have yet to formulate and 
institutionalize their own business system or distinct form of capitalism since they 
cannot exactly replicate the mature business systems. Different countries and regions 
are experimenting with different systems that involves a choice between Anglo-Saxon 
and Communitarian systems mixed with the elements of emerging market 
characteristics. 
Common to debates in economics and international business is the issue of 
capital allocation and economic success 
- 
this has been one that has been argued for at 
least most of the 20`e century. Prominent economists such as John Hicks argued that 
the financial markets of the United Kingdom allowed rapid industrialization in 
England, through the mobilization of capital and overcoming of risk for the 
development of immense, major industrial projects (Hicks 1969). In contrast, Joseph 
Schumpeter argued that banks rather than financial markets were fundamental to 
economic success, because banks would identify and fund the key entrepreneurs to 
develop technological innovations (1934). The academic debate on the relationship 
between financial factors and economic growth has been discussed in detail recently 
by Levine (1997); King and Levine (1993); Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Empirical 
research has shown that although countries with larger banks and more active 
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financial markets tend to also have higher economic growth rates, it is not certain 
which particular financial allocation mechanism, or which mix of banks and financial 
markets helps to create the greater economic success (Levine 1997; Albert 1991; Stern 
1989). We feel that there is the need to analyse the role of the system of allocation of 
financial capital in the recent economic crisis in Asia (using the framework of the 
"new" triad of competing business systems based on the constraints imposed by 
domestic institutions and organisations and their role in influencing financial capital 
allocation), and its implications for economic development in the "emerging" 
markets. To highlight the issues of the role played by domestic institutions and 
organisations in shaping the business system and the allocation of financial capital, it 
useful to analyse how the political economy of India has shaped the business system 
in India and highlight the significant factors in its system of allocating financial 
capital that helped it avoid being caught up in the recent crisis. 
An organisation's and country's ability to create and exchange knowledge 
within a network of social and technological relationships has become crucial to 
success in today's world of globalisation, uncertainty and turbulence. Most of the vast 
past research on knowledge based competition has tended to rely primarily on 
transaction cost analysis, and to neglect the salient features of the nature of knowledge 
as an intangible resource and the difficulties of assessing its value. Recent exceptions 
include Grant (1996); Choi and Lee (1997); Spender (1996). We believe that the 
intangible nature of knowledge especially in today's constantly turbulent world, shifts 
the focus away from knowledge products or services being exchanged in the market, 
towards how the market identifies certain firms and certifies their knowledge 
resources and value in the market. The intangibility of knowledge also raises the 
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fundamental question of the effectiveness of knowledge based market exchange, and 
we suggest possible alternatives that exist to such market based exchange. Also, due 
to the tacit characteristic of knowledge, effective transmission of tacit knowledge 
requires proximity, especially for continuous innovation, and this creates the potential 
agglomeration economies. In the thesis we explore the factors that will enhance or 
inhibit the creation of industrial clusters and then analyse the factors that led to the 
emergence of such clusters in the software sector in India. 
Thus, as seen in the flow chart below, the dissertation is divided into two 
broad streams, i. e., business systems and capital allocation, and knowledge. Given the 
plethora of issues involved and the complexity of each, it is obvious that we will at 
best be able to present a macro-perspective of the broadly emerging trends. 
Development & 
International 
Business 
Business System 
Capital allocation 
Capital allocation 
in India 
Knowledge 
oftware industry 
in India 
Fig 1.1: Framework for analysis of development & international business 
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METHODOLOGY: 
In each stream we propose to first develop an appropriate conceptual 
framework that will help us analyse the role of various institutions and organisations, 
and the distinctive nature of exchange and growth in knowledge industries in 
emerging markets. The first framework revolves around the political embeddedness of 
"new" triad of competing business systems and analyses their influence on the 
allocation of financial capital and knowledge as a resource for economic development. 
The second framework revolves around the distinctive nature of knowledge, i. e. being 
intangible and inalienable, which makes the nature of exchange in knowledge 
industries different from manufacturing industries, thereby, very often, leading to 
clustering of knowledge industries (as it is easier to exchange tacit information which 
is critical for innovation). After developing each framework we will apply these to the 
Indian economy so as to give us a greater appreciation of the challenges that India 
faces in developing knowledge based industry in a complex socio-economic and 
political milieu. We then develop the notion of dynamic identity, which helps us find 
a link between the two frameworks mentioned earlier 
- 
this is in the context of 
overcoming measurement costs which are common to knowledge industries and 
stakeholder business systems. Thus the thesis is mainly conceptual and exploratory 
in nature, with the study of the Indian political economy, system of financial 
allocation, and software industry serving mainly to highlight some of the conceptual 
issues that have been raised. Given the qualitative nature of the thesis and the issues 
raised, the approach is multi-disciplinary covering economics, international business, 
political science, sociology, anthropology, and law. The approach is holistic, with the 
attempt being primarily to highlight the limitations of the extant dominant approaches 
to examine the issues raised and tentatively propose alternate frameworks of analysis. 
Qualitative research is defined as "an array of interpretative techniques which 
seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not 
the frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social 
world" (Van Maanen, 1983). Because the qualitative method refers to the what 
question while the quantitative approach refers to the how much question, the 
qualitative research is likely to provide much insights into an understanding of 
complex phenomenon (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). In addition, owing to the potential 
difficulties and the possible misrepresentation which may arise as a result of the 
quantification of data, the qualitative research is likely to be most appropriate in 
helping us understand. Furthermore, the qualitative method is envisaged to provide us 
with the greater depth and flexibility of information (Van Maanen, 1982). 
There are various types of qualitative research methods available. They 
include action research, ethnography, grounded theory, and case study research 
(Myers, 1997). Action research examines the practical concerns of the subjects in any 
particular environment by emphasising on the collaborative aspects and the ethical 
framework. It leads to an enlargement of knowledge, rather than the simple 
application of knowledge. The action research leans toward the phenomenological 
approach because it assumes that any phenomenon is a constantly changing, rather 
than a static process (Easterby-Smith, et. al., 1991). As a result, a research process 
becomes involved with the changes. Another type of qualitative research method is 
the ethnographic research which is primarily used in the social and cultural 
anthropology disciplines (Myers, 1997). The phenomenon are explained in the context 
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resulting from the researcher's involvement in the subjects of the study (Lewis, 1985). 
As a result, the researcher typically spends much time in the field observing the 
subjects and the phenomenon. The other type of qualitative research method is the 
grounded theory which refers to a "theory discovery methodology that allows the 
researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while 
simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observation or data" (Martin and 
Turner, 1986). It emphasises specifically on the theory development and the 
systematic way of collecting and analysing the data. 
Lastly, the case study research is one of the most common qualitative research 
methods. We now discuss some of the aspects relevant to our adoption of the 
qualitative case study approach. Although, the qualitative case study approach has 
been increasingly used in academic research, it is recognised that there are a number 
of arguments against both the qualitative, as well as the case study approach. Firstly, it 
is said that the qualitative researchers have a tendency to collect selective data which 
lead to a non or misrepresentation of data. However, Bogdan & Taylor (1975) argue 
that by forcing data into the set structure, the quantitative method is also subject to a 
potential bias or misrepresentation of data. This view is also supported by Sutton 
(1997) who suggests that even some weak qualitative data may lead to good insights 
of the subjects. Secondly, many of the concerns regarding the use of case study 
approach appear to lie with the data collected leading to the potential problems 
regarding the validity and generalisability of the findings and conclusion (Bryman, 
1989). However, Yin (1994) argues that "case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes". In other 
words, case studies approach the phenomenon by analytically generalising the 
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theories, rather than statistically generalising them. This thesis is the beginning of an 
attempt at developing a grounded theory about issues in development and 
international business using the case study of India to highlight some of the issues 
raised. 
Why India? 
India is an interesting choice to highlight some of the issues raised. Over the 
past fifty years, India has been a puzzle for students of comparative democratic 
politics. Its success in maintaining democratic rule since independence in 1947, given 
the religious, cultural and linguistic differences of the large population, has 
confounded most political scientists (Weiner 1989, Dahl, 1989). Whilst the prolonged 
stability of the political system has been remarkable, it is the economic changes that is 
now attracting attention, more specifically the growth of the Indian software sector. 
After having moved at a snail's pace, referred to as the Hindu growth rate of 3-5%, 
India started emerging from the economic wilderness since the early nineties. More 
importantly, it started making a significant impact on the world software industry - 
from 1990 to 1997, there has been no other country expect India wherein the software 
exports have consistently grown at 50% annual growth rate. The significance of this is 
primarily in the context of the fact that India has consistently been at the bottom of 
league when most social indicators like education, health, poverty are measured. 
Thus India is representative of a big "emerging" market which has because of the 
idiosyncrasies of the political economy ( developed through the "second" best 
compromises in the constant tussle between various institutions and organisations) has 
a mixed system of financial capital allocation with a stakeholder bank driven business 
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system coexisting with a vibrant stock market which is one of the oldest in Asia. At 
the same time it is unique amongst impoverished developing countries that can boast 
of a globally competitive software industry. 
The case studies will examine how the role of government regulation, 
domestic institutions and organisations and has shaped the Indian political economy, 
especially the allocation of financial capital and the factors that are responsible for the 
emergence of India as a significant player in the software industry. 
Development & 
International Business 
Chapter 1 
Business System & Knowledge 
Capital allocation Exchange & Eco. geog. Chapters 2&3 Chapters 5&6 
All Dynamic 
Identity 
Chapter 8 
Pol. Economy & Capital Software Industry 
Allocation in India in India 
Chapter 4 Chapter 7 
Fig. 1.2: Dissertation Flow Chart 
Figure 1.2 shows the layout of the dissertation and the links to various 
chapters. As shown in the figure above, in chapter 2 we highlight the role of political 
embeddedness in comparative business systems research and its potential implications 
for governance systems in emerging economies, taking into account the non-economic 
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forces that influence firm capabilities and behaviour. In chapter 3 we use these 
concepts and frameworks to analyse the recent economic crisis in emerging markets, 
especially those in Asia. The focus in this chapter is mainly on distinctive nature of 
financial capital allocation and knowledge dissemination in these markets, which 
were, till recently, useful in promoting economic growth, but in our analysis proved to 
be the Achilles heel for these countries. In chapter 4 we use the same concepts and 
framework to analyse the factors that helped India avoid the recent economic crisis. In 
doing this we examine the role of institutions and organisations in shaping the Indian 
political economy and more specifically the system of allocation of financial capital. 
In chapter 5, given the intangible and inalienable nature of knowledge, we 
highlight the need to develop different conceptual frameworks by which knowledge 
assets, unlike tangible goods, are exchanged. We suggest alternative frameworks 
based on reciprocity and redistribution, exchange systems more traditionally 
associated with pre-modern societies. In chapter 6, we try to integrate the literature in 
new economics geography, which includes international trade, growth theory, and 
development economics, into the literature in international business. We apply some 
of the concepts in this literature to the economic developments in India, focusing 
primarily on labour mobility, which has political, social and psychological 
foundations, could work in opposite directions to the economic effects of geography. 
In chapter 7, we explore this theme in greater detail, by analysing the factors that has 
led to the phenomenal growth on the Indian software industry and more specifically of 
cyber-cities like Bangalore. The analysis in this chapter is based primarily on semi- 
structured interviews of executives from India's leading software companies to get 
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insight into the evolution and strategic challenges facing the industry in India and the 
future for growth in the cyber-city of Bangalore 
In chapter 8, we try to "marry" the two streams of research, by analysing the 
role of measurement costs in the stakeholder system (arising mainly due to diversity 
of stakeholder interests) and in knowledge-based industries (arising mainly due to the 
intangibility of product and service). We develop the notion of "dynamic identity" 
using indices for certification of performance which we propose can be used in 
stakeholder systems and knowledge based industries. 
The thesis is divided into three sections; section I revolving mainly around the 
central role of the state and other non-market institutions and organisations in 
economic development and international business (chapters 2,3,4); section II 
revolving around the role of knowledge in economic development and international 
business (chapters 5,6,7). Section III as mentioned earlier tries to bridge the gap 
between the two broad streams of research in development and international business 
(Chapter 8). In the following sections we briefly discuss the centrality of the state in 
any discussion on development and international business, and then discuss the issues 
raised in each chapter. 
SECTIONI : ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS & ORGANISATIONS INECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
Development and the role of the state: 
The debate about the role of the state lies at the heart of development 
economics. Till the beginning of this decade this debate about the role of markets and 
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governments in guiding the economy was conducted mainly along ideological lines. 
On one end of the ideological spectrum, there were the advocates of `minimalist' state 
(Nozick, 1974) and on the other end were those who advocated the central role of the 
state in development. Much of this debate has been and continues to be dominated by 
the idea of `market failure'. The early development theorists (Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943; Nurske, 1953; Scitovsky, 1954; Hirschman, 1958) pointed to market failure as a 
reason for comprehensive planning. The actual experiences of the developing 
countries like India in the context of problems associated with government % 
intervention, and theoretical arguments against the role of the state led to the 
recognition of `government failure' as an impediment to development ( von Hayek, 
1967,1986; Bauer, 1971,1984, Little et al., 1970). Thus, unlike the early 40s and 50s, 
disenchantment about the planning increased through the next three decades, which 
formed a central part of what Little (1982) called the `neo-classical resurgence'. The 
criticism about the deficiencies of planning focused mainly on price distortions, 
associated with protectionist and import substitution policies, which have usually 
accompanied planning (Balassa, 1971; Bruno, 1972; Kreuger, 1972; Dasgupta et al, 
1972, Little and Mirrlees, 1974). 
This debate about the role of markets and governments was challenged from a 
different direction by the phenomenal growth in the East and South East Asian 
markets. For example South Korea which went on to become a member of the OECD 
in quarter of a century, has grown quickly with an outward orientation but with 
substantial government intervention in the investment process and import substitution 
(Wade, 1985; Jacobs, 1985; Kim and Yun, 1988). Over the last two decades, China 
has shown rapid growth through a number of different planning regimes, with no 
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claims to being a free trading country with minimalist government (Riskin, 1987; 
Perkins, 1988). 
Until very recently, straddling the development debate has been the World 
Bank, arguably one of the most powerful producers of international development 
knowledge. In the beginning, the Bank thinking and policies were clearly guided by 
Keynesian consensus and cold war liberalism 
- 
liberal developmentalism or classical 
modernisation theory (Berger & Beeson, 1998). The main focus was on alleviation of 
poverty to stem the tide of communism with a firm belief in emulating the approach to 
economic modernization believed to have been adopted by North America and 
Western Europe; the state was to play a significant role in poverty alleviation. In the 
early eighties, the emergence of neoliberal governments in a number of Western 
industrialised countries and changes in the overall context of the international political 
economy, led to neoliberalism emerging as the dominant narrative on development. It 
led to poverty alleviation being demoted as a priority for the Bank, with structural 
adjustment polices taking its place. The Bank's prescriptions for development called 
for a greatly reduced role for the state in the economy and with much greater reliance 
on the market as a means of accelerating economic activity (World Bank, 1981). The 
fall of state socialism by the end of the 1980s, had in the opinion of the Bank, led to a 
new international consensus on development thinking which has replaced the 
ideological conflict 
-a consensus based on a balance between the private sector and 
government. But the Bank still had a problem in coming to terms with what was 
increasingly being viewed as the miraculous industrialisation of East Asia. The Bank 
had tried to depict the East Asian experience as essentially a normal part of capitalist 
development in accordance with neoclassical economics. It was only in 1993, in a 
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Japanese government funded study, that for the first time in a major Bank publication, 
it conceded that government intervention had played some role in the economic 
development of most of East Asia (World Bank, 1993; Wade, 1996). But even in this 
and later reports, the role of the state or government institutions was seen as being 
relevant to particular times, and not to the overall understanding of successful 
capitalist development. The reinvention of liberalism, in which the Bank gives the 
state a prominent role was complete with the publication of The State in a Changing 
World (World Bank, 1997). The entire report is premised on the idea that the state is 
not simply a important determinant of national economic welfare, but that `its 
capability 
- 
defined as the ability to undertake and promote collective actions 
effectively 
- 
must be increased ' and the state is not merely capable of laying the 
foundations of industrial development but actually accelerating it. 
Thus, in the debate on development, we have seen the entrenchment of what 
Stephen Gill describes as `market civilisation' 
- 
coupled to this is the grudging 
recognition of the potential efficacy of state intervention. In conceptual terms it 
throws up a range of options in terms of the role of the government, banks, and capital 
market, and other institutions in development, producing the differing business 
systems that compete in the global economy. 
International business & the role of the state: 
The globalised marketplace, which is the terrain in which international 
business is conducted, is constantly influenced by a host of dynamic factors. "The 
fundamental distinction between domestic and international business is the existence 
of interventions by Governments in inter-country business activity, which lead to 
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business reactions" (Grosse & Behram, 1992: 94). Thus the study of international 
business has to, primarily, focus on firms that undertake business activities that cross 
its' national borders and on the policies of host governments that regulate them. 
Avoiding the study of governmental policies and politics eliminates the international 
component of international business (Boddewyn, 1988). Of factors which are 
transforming the global marketplace only some of them are directly influenced by the 
policy prescriptions of the respective host government and thereby have a direct 
impact on international business. These include deregulation of economic and 
business activity, less protectionism, and the emergence of trading blocs. 
The study of international business is therefore essentially an attempt to 
understand the changing dynamics of the interaction between governments and firms 
that are interested in exploiting the comparative advantages of the respective nation- 
state. Notwithstanding the regular diatribes of the votaries of free markets against the 
distortions of the market by governments, the fact remains that governments are not 
going to surrender the "sovereign" right to influence the behaviour of markets so as to 
meet its' perceived political and socio-economic objectives. In practice, the strategies 
of transnational corporations and Government policies, each arise from the decision- 
makers views of their bargaining strengths and those of other relevant actors, as well 
as their assessments of opportunity costs and willingness to forego any dealings with 
the other party. While the specific bargaining strengths of the government and 
transnational corporations in the context of international business varies, contingent 
on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the respective country and firm, there are some 
factors that are common in most cases. 
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Chapter 2: Global Triad: National Business Systems Approach to Emer2in2 
Markets: 
Recent comparative international business research has shown the importance 
of distinguishing between the contractual and individualist approach of Anglo-Saxon 
societies, such as the United States and United Kingdom and the collectivist and 
relationship based approach of communitarian societies such as Japan and Germany. 
We compare the two existing successful systems of corporate governance, and analyse 
which aspects of both systems may provide helpful to the formation of governance 
systems in a "third system", the system for emerging economies such as Asia or 
Eastern Europe. 
This chapter has two major objectives. The first is to use various concepts and 
develop frameworks to analyse and compare the different approaches to governance 
and national business systems, that exist successfully today in the broader context of 
political embeddedness (Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990) and the important interaction 
between institutions and organisations (North 1990). We are thus further extending 
the earlier research of Roe (1994,1997); Albert (1991); Whitley (1990); Brewer 
(1993), who helped to show the importance of the political and the firm's 
environmental dimension in comparative business system research. It is a relatively 
simple, and broad generalisation to categorise various countries into such two 
groupings; however, we believe this helps emerging economies to clarify which broad 
aspects of these two systems can be incorporated into their own economies. 
The second is to analyse what implications and lessons there are from the 
highly successful systems of the United States and United Kingdom and the equally 
successful but different business systems of Germany and Japan. Many of the 
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emerging economies of the world, especially in Asia and Eastern Europe are 
developing and refining the nature of governance in their business systems (Olson 
1991,1992; Lecraw 1989; Elster 1989; Madhok 1995; Choi 1994; Choi, et al. 1996; 
Buckley 1990), requiring further research of their national business systems from 
international business researchers; the Asian economic and business crisis that began 
in 1997 has shown the further need to study the workings of national business 
systems. Our approach in this chapter is to analyse broad social, economic, political, 
international business trends which seem to categorise certain groupings of countries, 
and which can in turn provide guidelines for emerging economies in the global 
environment. 
This chapter provides a new framework for understanding global competition. 
It is based on a, "new triad" of national business systems: Anglo-Saxon, 
Communitarian and Emerging Market, which complements the traditional triad of 
United States, Europe and Japan. 
Chapter 3: Financial Capital Allocation and Development 
The issue of capital allocation and economic success has been one that has 
been argued for at least most of the 20' century. The allocation of financial capital, 
within the financial systems literature is an immense area covering international 
economics, economic development and corporate finance (Giovannini and Melo 1993; 
Caprio, et al. 1994; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Fry 1995). Fundamentally, 
financial systems serve major functions including: allocating resources; monitoring 
management performance; mobilizing savings; providing information about prices; 
facilitating exchange in the economy (Merton and Bodie 1995; Levine 1997). The 
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effectiveness of financial systems in leading to economic success has been analyzed in 
two major types of models. In the first type of economics and finance model, the 
financial system affects the rate of capital formation through savings rates changes 
and reallocations (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Rebelo 1991). In the second type of 
economics and finance model, the financial system helps to encourage new 
technology and production processes (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt 1992). 
The economics and financial literature behind these two major models of 
economic success have not provided conclusive theoretical or empirical conclusions 
in three major areas. First, there is very little research on the role played by 
institutional factors such as legal traditions or political systems in influencing 
effective financial capital allocation; recent exceptions include Choi, et. al. (1996); 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1996). Second, although both effective banking and 
financial markets are seen to be crucial to economic success (Levine 1997), there are 
few conclusions on which mix of these financial instruments such as banking, 
insurance, equity markets, bond markets are optimal for a particular economy or 
region. Third, there is very little evidence on the linkage between financial capital 
allocation systems, and the level of economic maturity (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1996). For example, it is not certain whether particular capital allocation 
mechanisms uch as banking, equity or bond markets, derivatives which may enhance 
economic success in mature economies such as the United States or United Kingdom, 
are appropriate for more emerging economies such as in regions of Asia, Latin 
America or Eastern Europe (Choi, et, al. 1996). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to show that a framework for analyzing the 
crisis needs to take into account the decades of success up till the crisis: we believe 
that this can be done by incorporate "knowledge" and "capital" allocation in 
international business research. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly to 
provide an interdisciplinary analysis to the role of knowledge and financial capital 
allocation in international business and related disciplines such as international 
economics and development. Secondly, to analyse why the knowledge and financial 
capital allocation systems which were fundamental to the past economic success in 
Asia, have helped to create the present economic crisis. 
Chapter 4: Indian Political Economy and Financial Capital Allocation 
From a predominantly agrarian economy, with about 55% of GDP in 1950-51 
coming from agriculture, India has done fairly well, achieving a compound annual 
growth (CAGR) in GDP of 4% in the past 40 years. This was largely due to sustained 
industrial and service sector growth, and in the process reduced dependence on 
agriculture. Therefore, in 1991-92, only 31% of GDP originated from the agriculture 
sector, with industry contributing 29% (against 16.1% in 1950-51) and services 40% 
(against 28.4% in 1950-51). During this period, agriculture grew at a CAGR of only 
2.5%, while in contrast, industry grew by 5.5% and services by 4.8%. Some of this 
growth has been achieved because of the robust growth in the domestic savings rate, 
which is currently over 24% of the GDP 
- 
one of the highest in the world. 
But the main pillars of on which the revival of Indian economic growth was 
founded since the budget of 1991, i. e., industrial production and exports have revealed 
their vulnerability. In addition, both industrial and agricultural growth have slowed 
down considerably, and the fiscal deficit has risen. In this chapter we shall try to lay 
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out a broad overview of the Indian political economy, and highlight the various 
institutional and organisational constraints that shape the economy. 
We shall then analyst the nature of financial capital allocation in India in the 
context of the shareholder/stakeholder framework that we developed in the earlier 
chapter. We shall examine whether the overall business and financial capital 
allocation system have helped India avoid the recent crisis in Asia. 
SECTION II: ROLE OFKNOWLEDGEINDEVELOPMENT 
Knowledge, Economic Development & International Business: 
We believe the area of economics literature which have relevance for 
international business has only occurred in the mid-1990's, with the increased interest 
in economic development, partly driven by the issues economies in transition in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The study of emerging economies in Eastern Europe, 
along with the numerous earlier studies of Asia (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990) helped to 
raise the following types of issues, that have especial relevance to future international 
business research. Firstly, that knowledge as a resource has to be analysed from the 
traditional economic growth theorists that have included it as part of human capital 
and seen education policy s the answer to its development (Romer 1986). Secondly, 
fundamental questions of markets, institutions and organizations have to be adjusted 
in the context of emerging economy environments (Lall 1992,1994; Choi 1994). 
Thirdly, knowledge about generic technology, which tends to be standardised need to 
be separated from knowledge about the quality or attributes of goods and services. 
All these factors have fundamentally raised knowledge in a different context in 
economics research in the late 1990's, combining the analysis of not only 
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development economics, economic growth with the earlier literature on economics of 
information. 
In this section, we will briefly provide a summary of the broad economics 
literature and how the past research can shed light on knowledge for international 
business research. The definition of knowledge in management or international 
business research has tended to rely on Polyani's (1944,1966,1971) distinctions 
between explicit or codifiable versus implicit or tacit characteristics (Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Kogut and Zander 1993,1995). This led to the view that what could be 
traditionally seen as effective market mechanisms working under perfect information 
may be relatively ineffective in terms of knowledge transfer and exchange. Thus, 
alternative transfer mechanisms, such as the multinational enterprise and other 
interorganizational transfers such as strategic alliances have been given as alternatives 
to the market (Choi and Lee 1997; Beamish and Inkpen 1997; Kogut and Zander 
1993). There is an implicit assumption made in this line of reasoning towards 
knowledge in international business. The assumption is that although markets are 
effective towards non-knowledge assets such as capital, equipment, markets are 
ineffective towards the exchange and transfer of intangible assets such as knowledge. 
Past economics research on intangible resources have been in the context of 
the new economic growth theory (Romer 1986; Krugman 1991). In this strand of 
literature, knowledge has been treated as an addition to the traditional economic 
resources of capital, land and labour; knowledge has tended to be seen in the context 
of human capital, and education policies (Aghion and Bolton 1997; Akerlof and 
Romer 1993; Bardhan and Rudra 1986). Thus, this past economics literature based 
firmly in traditional neoclassical frameworks and assumptions, did not fully address 
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the nature of knowledge and its implicit and intangible nature and again used the 
effectiveness of market mechanisms for the creation, development of such human 
capital as a resource (Levine 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; 
Stiglitz 1996). This strand of economics literature although addressing human capital 
and knowledge like resources, has less relevance to international business research. 
Although the economics of information has an extremely broad and deep 
literature in economics starting from Akerlof (1970), Schelling (1969) and Spence 
(1973), the focus of this research has been on the nature of markets under imperfect 
and asymmetric information. Issues such as moral hazard, adverse selection, along 
with the explosive growth in game theoretic models throughout the 1970's and 1980's 
in economics research has analysed the nature of markets under imperfect and 
asymmetric information (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Like the more recent literature 
on economic growth mentioned earlier, the economics of information again has 
tangential linkages to knowledge research in international business but did not overlap 
sufficiently to provide cross-fertilisation potential. 
Chapter 5: Knowledge Based Exchange: Inalienability & Reciprocity 
The growing management and social science literature on knowledge 
invariantly tends to mention Polyani (1957,1966,1971) and the distinction between 
explicit information and implicit knowledge. Past research however has not analysed 
in sufficient detail the nature of knowledge based, "exchange. " In turn, although 
knowledge is seen not to be readily exchanged through the markets of modem society, 
the existing literature does not address sufficiently alternative frameworks. The 
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purpose of this chapter is to analyse market exchange and alternative frameworks 
from modem and premodern societies, in order to understand the nature of exchange 
in intangible and inalienable assets such as knowledge. 
An organisation's ability to create and exchange knowledge within a network 
of social and technological relationships has become crucial to success in today's 
world of globalisation, uncertainty and turbulence. Most of the vast past research on 
knowledge based competition has tended to rely primarily on transaction cost 
analysis, and to neglect the salient features of the nature of knowledge as an intangible 
resource and the difficulties of assessing its value. Recent exceptions include Grant 
(1996); Choi and Lee (1997); Spender (1996). We believe that the intangible nature 
of knowledge especially in today's constantly turbulent world, shifts the focus away 
from knowledge products or services being exchanged in the market, towards how the 
market identifies certain firms and certifies their knowledge resources and value in the 
market. The intangibility of knowledge also raises the fundamental question of the 
effectiveness of knowledge based market exchange, and what possible alternatives 
exist to such market based exchange. 
Our theory in this chapter is rooted in the concept of, "exchange" (Simmel, 
1978; Sahlins, 1972; Bourdieu, 1977; Levi-Strauss, 1969; Mauss, 1955; Durkheim, 
1951). The objective of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, the intangibility of 
knowledge in exchange, raises North's (1990) important point on measurement and 
enforcement costs, which Williamson (1985) has taken as exogenously given (Hirsch 
and Lounsbury, 1996). We analyse the importance of intangibility and, 
"inalienability" in understanding the nature of knowledge as an asset. We believe that 
this characteristic of knowledge requires us to develop different conceptual 
33 
frameworks by which knowledge assets are exchanged. Knowledge based assets tend 
to be inalienable, whereas commodity type assets, which can be freely exchanged in 
the market are alienable. 
Secondly, although existing research views the accumulation of knowledge as 
a positive attribute, the process of exchange whereby knowledge is acquired or lost is 
not sufficiently analysed; plus, if knowledge is tacit, informal, how can it have a 
transparent market valuation? The premise in this chapter is that because the 
intangibility and inalienability of knowledge requires a more informal system of 
exchange and co-ordination, we can learn from the social anthropological literature 
(Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978) which has studied the nature of exchange in, primitive, 
premodern, social systems. These systems developed effective exchange mechanisms 
without formal systems of law or contracts (Mauss, 1955; Bourdieu, 1990; Sahlin, 
1972; Casson, 1996), however they also studied in depth the difference between 
exchange of commodities, versus exchange of inalienable assets (Gregory, 1992). We 
believe that the exchange of tacit, informal assets such as knowledge (Polyani, 1957, 
1966) requires analogous frameworks of analysis. The growing management and 
social science literature on knowledge invariantly tends to mention Polyani (1957, 
1966,1971) and the distinction between explicit information and implicit knowledge. 
Past research however has not analysed in sufficient detail the nature of knowledge 
based, "exchange. " In turn, although knowledge is seen not to be readily exchanged 
through the markets of modem society, the existing literature does not address 
sufficiently alternative frameworks. Thus in the chapter we analyse market exchange 
and alternative frameworks from modem and premodern societies, in order to 
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understand the nature of exchange in intangible and inalienable assets such as, 
knowledge. 
Chapter 6: Economic Geography and International Business 
The location of business and economic activity could become a fundamental 
topic of international business research. Several strands of literature have brought 
together this revival of interest in what has been called, "economic geography" within 
the economic literature, but we believe also have implications for international 
business research. In terms of the influence of international economics or 
international business research, it has included various aspects of trade theory, foreign 
direct investment (Dunning 1996; Buckley and Casson 1998). But the issue of 
location brings together various economics as well as non-economics literature 
including: geography, complexity theory, history and path dependence. The purpose 
of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to analyse the developments in these various 
disciplines and their relevance for international business research. Secondly, to apply 
these frameworks to analyse the economic developments in India. 
The location of corporations has become a crucial factor in economics and 
business success for cities, countries and regions. Krugman (1991a, 1991b, 1998a, 
1998b) has been the researcher most responsible within international economics for 
advocating a branch of research known as the, "new economic geography". This 
relatively interdisciplinary area of research incorporating complexity theory, 
international economics and economic growth theories, and geography have begun to 
show how historical accidents and certain underlying factors can lead to dramatic 
creations or disintegration of economic activity. This research has not only relied on 
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the latest developments in economic theory, but also the earlier European works in 
geography and regional science of Weber (1909); Christaller (1933); Losch (1940). 
Although there has been a certain interest within international business on the 
existence of clustering of industries (Porter 1990), the existence of such networks and 
clusters have not been fully integrated into the growing research in the new economic 
geography, which have begun to provide the underlying reasons for the process that 
such networks and clusters can help to create cities, countries and regions. 
As the pace of globalization increases and most activities become increasingly 
mobile, firms can make split their production choices among locations, as well as 
being able to supply more distant markets and customers. Competition between the 
various states for attracting investments within India has further added to the urgency 
of further research on such issues of the new economic geography (Sapir 1996; 
Krugman and Venables 1995; Krugman 1998). The fact that a particular firm's 
location decision may in turn be determined by the location decisions of other firms, 
and the aggregated benefits of the location make it potentially a crucial area of 
international business research. This is especially the case, because if indeed such 
geographical factors are driving foreign direct investment and firm decisions towards 
location and strategy, this has substantial implications for public policy and the role of 
the state towards such firm decisions (Lenway and Murtha 1991). 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we hope to integrate the 
rapidly expanding literature in the new economics geography, which includes 
developments in international trade (Krugman 1991 a); growth theory (Romer 1986); 
economic development (Stiglitz 1994) with the research agenda of international 
business. These developments in several areas of economics have moved away from 
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traditional neoclassical economics of perfect information and perfect market 
mechanisms, towards imperfect information, imperfect competition and complex 
interactions among the state, markets, and society. Thus, the substantial results of this 
economics research needs to be more closely intertwined with international business 
frameworks. 
Secondly, we focuses on how the results and frameworks of this new economic 
geography can be applied to the economic developments in India. We analyse how the 
results of economic geography need to take into account the issues of "labour 
mobility" in order to fully comprehend the relevance for international business 
research. The lack of labour mobility, which has political, social and psychological 
foundations could work in opposite directions as the economic effects of geography, 
agglomeration and increasing returns. 
Chapter 7: Indian software industry 
The policies of liberalisation adopted by the Indian government over the past 
decade and the ongoing globalization of the information technology industry are 
having a great impact on the business opportunities available in the IT sector in India. 
A enormous pool of skilled and relatively cheap software professionals located in a 
stable parliamentary democracy with an established legal system, vibrant capital 
market and mature financial system, increasingly, makes India the preferred location 
for software development. There are over 700 firms in the IT sector in India, 
employing more than 1,40,000 people. Of these firms, a number of companies have 
matured and they have started implementing major software projects which involve 
more that 250 man-years. Amongst the software professionals, there is in line with the 
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hardware used, a wealth of expertise in India on contemporary, open software 
environments, as well as older, proprietary software. Increasingly, a host of 
multinationals are setting up their own training establishments in India. For example, 
the Indian Institute of Information Technology near Hyderabad, houses training 
establishments set up by IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle. 
As highlighted in the earlier chapter, knowledge can be broadly classified into 
technological and non-technological streams. The software industry exemplifies 
technological knowledge 
- 
we shall analyse the Indian industry as a case study of the 
successful implementation of technological knowledge. We shall also examine the 
phenomenal success of Bangalore in emerging as a Cybercity 
- 
this would serve as a 
case study of clustering of industries discussed in the earlier chapter. 
SECTIONIII: STAKEHOLDER SYSTEMS & KNOWLEDGE INDUSTRIES 
Role of dynamic identity in stakeholder systems & knowledge industries: 
Although in the literature it is generally taken for granted that stakeholders are 
capable of measuring a firm's performance and accordingly adjust their attitudes, in 
reality it is not at all clear how stakeholders discern and value tangible, but more 
importantly, intangible and invisible assets. In other words, much of the existing 
research has eschewed from analyzing the issue of performance measurement, 
confident that this is transparent o stakeholders. Thus, what is fundamental to our 
analysis is the role of measurement costs (North, 1990) inadvertently arising from 
measurement problems which stem from the diversity of stakeholder interests. 
Apart from stakeholder systems, similar measurement difficulties arise in 
knowledge-based industries due to the inherent intangibility of product and service 
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quality in these industries (Spender, 1997; Hosmer, 1995), although the major focus in 
this chapter is on such issues in stakeholder systems. Grant & Spender (1997) provide 
a comprehensive review of recent developments in knowledge based industries. 
Knowledge-based industries seem to be increasingly entangled as firms continuously 
forge links with actors from a range of diverse industries. This leads to dilution of 
traditional industry boundaries and acceleration of the rate of change and innovation, 
resulting in an absolutely volatile and complex environment. 
We analyze the importance of institutional certification and indirect 
measurement indicators, which we define as "indices", to develop a dynamic 
framework capable of evaluating performance in stakeholder systems. Our 
framework, based on the notion of "dynamic identity", integrates these external 
measurement indices with stakeholder theory, and suggests some rules for analyzing 
success in the complex stakeholder environment. 
Thus our research effort is essentially directed towards appreciating the role of 
business systems, capital allocation and knowledge in the development of emerging 
markets. To do this we propose to refine existing frameworks and develop new 
frameworks for analysing the various issues raised. 
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SECTION I: 
COMPETING BUSINESS SYSTEMS, DEVELOPMENT & 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
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GLOBAL TRIAD: NATIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS APPROACH 
TO EMERGING MARKETS 
Introduction: 
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the ideological rhetoric that 
dominated the debate amongst policy makers, academics, and the media, has been 
replaced by speculation about the opportunities and threats created by the radical 
changes. Predictably the debate is becoming vitriolic and politicised. On the one hand 
there are those who highlight the opportunities that the economic growth, in some 
cases spectacular, in these "emerging markets" offer to companies from developed 
countries, especially given the disappointing performance of the advanced nations 
over the past twenty years. On the other hand, influential writers from developed 
countries have repeatedly emphasised the threat posed by both the success and failure 
of the reforms 
- 
if the reforms are successful then in the context of a zero-sum game, it 
has to be at the expense of the developed countries of the western world; if the 
reforms fail, the economic and social consequences of such an eventuality is 
highlighted. Despite the self-righteousness of both sides, arguably, most of what is 
being written is based on half-truths, speculation, or a premeditated agenda. In such an 
environment, it is not surprising that companies that seek to exploit the opportunities, 
are either upbeat about their prospects, or perceive their investments in terms of 
Russian roulette. In our opinion, for companies to make an informed judgement about 
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investing in "emerging markets" it is imperative that they appreciate the common and 
distinctive features of these markets. 
In spite of the dominant rhetoric of interlinked economy and global market 
homogenisation, the compelling need to explain the differential rates of organisational 
performance on the basis of different modes of co-ordination and transaction 
governance over the past two decades has prompted many strands of international and 
comparative research on national business systems (Olson 1991,1992; Boisot and 
Child 1988; Choi, et al. 1996; Choi 1994; North 1990). According to Nelson (1992), 
there are three clusters of analysis concerning the determinants of "national 
competitiveness". Firstly, viewing firms as the main competitive unit; secondly, the 
macroeconomic performance of national economies; thirdly, microeconomic policies 
at the level of industries. Research in comparative governance and business systems 
needs of course needs to take into account all three levels of analysis and also include 
the importance of the interactions between institutions and organisations. 
Dunning (1996), in his reexamination of the eclectic paradigm, recognizes that 
the socio-institutional structure of market-based capitalism is undergoing changes 
characterized principally by innovation-led growth, a "voice" (Hirschman 1970) 
reaction to market failure, and cooperation as competitiveness enhancing measure. 
These catalysts for the structural economic changes and the blurring of national 
boundaries as well as their various consequences on firm activities and performance 
have led to an urgent need to reassess the traditional frameworks of international 
business and strategy for global competition. A key issue is the role of political, 
social, institutional factors driving today's successful business system, and how such 
systems can be emulated by other countries. Roe (1994,1997); Boddewyn and 
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Brewer (1994); Kogut (1993); Albert (1991); Toyne (1988), have analyzed in depth 
the importance of the socio-economic environments of firms' home environment, or 
home market constraints on their competitiveness, which other researchers have 
generally treated as exogenous to the autonomous market system. In this chapter, we 
develop this approach by showing the importance of the governance systems within 
countries, especially the political embeddedness (Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990), or the 
nonmarket effects on national competitiveness. We extend the various works of 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994); Hillman and Keim (1995), which have shown the 
importance of the political dimension and its interactions in international business 
research, to include various non-economic aspects of a national business system. We 
propose that groupings of countries can share such "non-economic", social, political 
foundations and that the borders across countries within the same grouping or 
business system. 
In terms of research on comparative management and societal institutions, one 
area that has received vast academic attention in recent years, has been in the area of 
comparative corporate governance; corporate governance has been defined as, 
"the relationship among a firm's shareholders, its board of directors, and its senior 
managers" (Roe 1994, pg. 1). 
The growing literature on comparative corporate governance provides 
important preliminary comparisons between successful business systems. 
Comparative successful business systems research needs to take into account the 
nature of corporate governance, as well as the broader social, cultural, political issues 
such as the relationships between business and government, an issue that has been 
highlighted in international business research (Lenway and Murtha 1991; Hill 1995; 
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Shan and Hamilton 1991; Choi 1994; Choi and Lee 1997; Kogut 1991; Brewer 1993; 
Buckley 1996). We believe that the vast amount of academic research recently 
undertaken within comparative corporate governance highlights the importance of 
studying national business systems and the role of social and political aspects of 
capitalism (Dunning 1996; Boddewyn and Brewer 1994). 
In terms of recent comparative corporate governance research, recent works 
such as Gerlach (1992); Franks and Mayer (1997); Roe (1994,1997) compare the 
legalistic, stock market driven approaches of the United States and the United 
Kingdom with the more informal cross share holding system adopted in Japan and 
Germany. Legal contracts with ultimate redress to courts is fundamental to the 
operation of Anglo-Saxon business culture, especially in providing protection to 
widely dispersed minority shareholders (Roe 1994,1997); this shows the general 
importance of the formal, legal institutions in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the 
United States and United Kingdom. In contrast, in countries such as Japan and 
Germany, major banks and insurance companies, act as external stakeholders by 
holding major shares in firms, exercising governance and control over internal 
management, through a more informal, relationship based exchange. This 
"communitarian" approach is also evident in other continental European countries 
such as Holland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries (Sorge 1991; Lenway and 
Murtha 1991; Nooteboom 1996; Noorderhaven 1995; Albert 1991). The contrast 
between these groups of country is also reflected in the political dimension (Sorge 
1991; Hillman and Keim 1995), for example between United States system and the 
parliamentary system in European countries such as Germany. 
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Although the United States continues to be the dominant capitalist system, 
there are several countries with highly successful governance systems, or systems of 
exchange with structures of corporate governance and relationships distinct from 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Albert, 1991; Franks and Mayer 1997) such as the United 
States or United Kingdom. This difference, with its apparently concomitant success, 
raises important issues for comparative governance research (North 1990; Kaplan 
1997; Franks and Mayer 1997; Nooteboom 1996), but also provides important hints 
for the newly emerging market economies of Eastern Europe and Asia which are in 
the process of determining their governance systems. Should countries emulate 
systems driven by the dynamic but short term requirements of efficient stock markets 
as is the case in the United States and United Kingdom or should they look to the 
apparently more stable bank financed systems prevalent in the communitarian 
countries such as Germany and Japan. The fact that the success of Germany and 
Japan in the 1980's and early 1990's seems to have been replaced by slow growth, 
and the renewed economic success of the United States and United Kingdom in the 
latter 1990's (Roe 1994,1997) has created a continuing academic and policy debate 
concerning the relative merits and weaknesses of the two systems. 
This chapter has two major objectives. The first is to use the above range of 
concepts and frameworks to analyse and compare the different approaches to 
governance and national business systems, that exist successfully today in the broader 
context of political embeddedness (Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990) and the important 
interaction between institutions and organisations (North 1990). We are thus further 
extending the earlier research of Roe (1994,1997); Albert (1991); Whitley (1990); 
Brewer (1993), who helped to show the importance of the political and the firm's 
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environmental dimension in comparative business system research. It is a relatively 
simple, and broad generalisation to category various countries into such two 
groupings, however, we believe this helps emerging economies to clarify which broad 
aspects of these two systems can be incorporated into their own economies. 
The second is to analyse what implications and lessons there are from the 
highly successful systems of the United States and United Kingdom and the equally 
successful but different business systems of Germany and Japan. Many of the 
emerging economies of the world, especially in Asia and Eastern Europe are 
developing and refining the nature of governance in their business systems (Olson 
1991,1992; Lecraw 1989; Elster 1989; Madhok 1995; Choi 1994; Choi, et al. 1996; 
Buckley 1990), requiring further research of their national business systems from 
international business researchers; the Asian economic and business crisis that began 
in 1997 has shown the further need to study the workings of national business 
systems. Our approach in this chapter is to analyse broad social, economic, political, 
international business trends which seem to categorise certain groupings of countries, 
and which can in turn provide guidelines for emerging economies in the global 
environment. 
International Business and Society: 
In the public policy domain, there has also been an intense debate on the role of 
state and national competitiveness in the age of global competition. Acknowledging 
the growing force of globalization, Reich (1991) discusses the reduced role of the 
state in enhancing the competitiveness of national industries. But more importantly, 
as discussed by various researchers such as Boddewyn (1988); Choi (1994); Choi et 
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al. (1996); Kogut (1993); Yarborough and Yarborough (1992); Hill (1995), there is an 
increasing movement towards the appreciation of political, cultural and socio- 
institutions aspects of capitalism. In contrast to the purely neoclassical driven 
economics models of markets, there is an important need to analyze the role of 
business in society and the role of politics in international business (Boddewyn and 
Brewer 1994; Kogut 1991; Hillman and Keim 1995): 
"... political behavior does not develop in a vacuum; it is conditioned by 
firm, industry and environmental factors 
- 
particularly those found in the 
nonmarket environment that includes government. " 
(Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, p. 121) 
In recent years, there has also been an increased interest in broader models of 
corporate social performance, social control of business and stakeholders (Freeman 
1984) within domestic settings, due to the growth in appreciation of more than one 
successful business system model. Such models have tried to go beyond the 
traditional narrow, efficient capital markets and shareholder driven approach to 
business and economics success. As quoted in Donaldson and Preston (1995), the 
diversity of global business systems was highlighted in the Economist (1993: 52): 
In America, for instance, shareholders have a comparatively big say 
in the running of the enterprise they own; workers... have much less 
influence. In many European countries, shareholders have less say and 
workers more... in Japan managers have been let alone to run their 
companies as they see fit 
- 
namely for the benefit of employees and of 
allied companies, as much as for shareholders. 
Roe (1994,1997) and Easterbrook (1997) make the point that corporate governance 
needs to be seen in a broader context than that normally used, taking into account the 
political processes. For example, Roe (1994,1997) in his in depth study has shown 
that the relative weaknesses of banks in the United States was due to political 
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considerations and regulations which prohibited the formation of bank concentration. 
This thesis has been further substantiated by Buckley (1997), who has shown that in 
Canada, a country with very similar background and culture as the United States, a 
much more important role is played by the banking sector, in a way similar to 
Germany and Japan; Buckley (1997), in a similar way to Roe's (1994,1997) works 
show that the highly successful U. S. business system may not be simply due to 
evolutionary processes and superiority over other systems, but due to historical and 
political events. In this sense, we agree with Roe (1994,1997) who sees corporate 
governance and ownership as part of a broader set of corporate relationships 
fundamental to industrial organisation within societies and the national business 
systems, what we believe are the political embeddedness aspects of national business 
systems. Zubkin and DiMaggio (1990) define "political embeddedness" as the 
following: 
"By political embeddedness, we refer to the manner in which economic 
institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves 
economic actors and nonmarket institutions... " 
(Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990, p. 20) 
Global competition can also be seen from the viewpoint of the domestic 
organizations and institutions (North 1990,1994) that motivate and constrain firm 
strategy and behavior. Such factors include national culture, legal and regulatory 
environment, business-government relationship, the role of financial institutions, and 
corporate governance system in the home market as well as host countries of 
multinational firms. The importance of the national business environment in 
influencing the organizing principles and competitive strategies of firms has been 
analyzed in Kogut (1991); Gomes-Cassseres (1990); Uzzi (1997); Fruin (1992); 
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Albert (1991). According to their analysis, domestic institutions play as important a 
role in determining corporate behavior as the pressures of globalization. For example, 
in many parts of Asia, it is not financial markets but various government ministries 
that monitor corporate performance and control financial allocation. In many 
continental European countries such as Germany and Switzerland, the banking sector 
as institutional shareholders monitors corporate performance and investment 
decisions. Firm behavior and strategy, especially investment decisions such as new 
market entry, diversification, and innovation and new product development can be 
significantly constrained by the differences of home market institutions while at the 
same time providing sources of competitive advantages that may or may not be 
transferred across national boundaries. Thus, the following is proposed: 
Proposition 1: In spite of the global nature of today's competition, the 
political, economic, and socio-cultural effects of home market institutions 
can have both positive and negative influence on firm capabilities and 
competitive advantages. 
Institutions versus Organisations: 
Following the distinction made by North (1990,1994), we believe there is a 
need to distinguish between institutions and organisations when analysing national 
business systems. Institutions are the rules of a business system. North (1990) 
distinguishes between two types of institutions. The formal institutions such as 
common law, and market regulations are very important in Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada (Roe 1994,1997; 
Ellickson 1991; Albert 1991). Informal institutions include codes of conduct; social 
norms; conventions, and other rules that society has developed over time. Such 
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informal institutions which are closely linked to aspects of collectivism and personal 
exchange, are crucial for communitarian countries such as Germany and Japan (Fruin 
1992; Choi 1994; Choi, et al. 1996; Orru, Biggart and Hamilton 1997). As North 
(1990,1994) points out, the existence of either or both formal and informal 
institutions is no guarantee of economic efficiency. 
Organisations are the players within a business system that take advantage of 
the formal and informal institutions (North 1990,1994). There are four major types 
of organisations. Economic organisations, such as firms, co-operatives, stockmarkets, 
banks, trade unions; political organisations such as political parties, city councils; 
social organisations such as clubs, churches, sporting groups; educational 
organisations such as universities, vocational training. Members of organisations, the 
players in a business system, have common objectives. In turn, these are driven by 
beliefs and ideologies, within the national business systems, which can change the 
formal and informal institutions, or the rules in a business system. 
The importance of national business systems has been raised recently in 
various works such as Hill, 1995; Choi 1994; Choi et al. 1996; Albert, 1991; Kogut, 
1993. These researchers, however do not make a clear distinction between institutions 
and organisations. We believe that this distinction is crucial for understanding why 
the mere adaptation of certain formal institutions such as common or statute law, or 
regulation that help business systems to be successful in Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the United States and United Kingdom is not necessarily sufficient for helping 
other countries to emerge and succeed in global competition. This is because they 
need to take into account the governance of the whole business system and the 
dynamic interaction between formal and informal institutions. Figure 2.1 is a 
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conceptualisation of North's (1990,1994) ideas which make a clear distinction 
between institutions or rules versus organisations or players in a business system. 
FIGURE 2.1 
Business Systems: Organisations and Institutions 
(Adapted from North, 1990) 
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As analysed by Boddewyn (1988), firms compete in the environment, which 
includes various nonmarket, noneconomic values such as the polity, community, 
public opinion makers such as media. North's (1990,1994) structure of institutions 
and organisations helps to show the richness and realities of national business 
systems, much beyond the traditional, narrow neo-classical economic market 
paradigm. As discussed by Kogut (1991), countries' competitiveness can be 
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attributed to the interaction of their particular organisational and institutional 
capabilities. 
We believe this interaction between formal and informal institutions, and in 
turn their interactions with the four types of organisations fundamentally determine 
the success of business systems. In individualist business systems, such as in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries of the United States and the United Kingdom, there is a 
relatively weaker connection across the four types of organisations. There is also a 
relatively larger proportion and importance placed on formal relative to informal 
institutions. Thus the economic organisations such as firms, stockmarkets, and in the 
U. S. the Federal Reserve, are quite separate from the political organisations of 
political parties and city councils (Hillman and Keim 1995; Boddewyn 1988; Roe 
1994,1997; Kogut 1993). In turn, working for an economic organisation, such as a 
fine, is seen as the public aspect of life, and separated from the private activities such 
as the social organisations of clubs, church. 
In collectivist business societies, such as Germany or Japan, there are strong 
linkages across the four organisations: economic, political, social and educational. 
The linkage across these organisations is very strong, "communitarian" (Choi, et al 
1996; Albert 1991; Sorge 1991; Lenway and Murtha 1991), as in most continental 
European countries and Japan. In such countries, there is also a larger proportion of 
informal institutions relative to formal institutions. As discussed in the in depth 
review of governance systems, Roe (1994,1997) hints that the emerging economies in 
Eastern Europe are also adapting the communitarian system more characteristic of 
Germany and many continental European countries. 
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Figure 2.2 shows the relatively strong linkages among organisations and 
institutions in collective business systems, and the relatively weak linkages within 
individualist business systems. 
FIGURE 2.2 
Comparing Business Systems 
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Source: Adapted from Choi. et al, MIR forthcoming 
Anglo-Saxon versus Communitarian Business Systems: 
Since the late 1980's, Anglo-Saxon societies, such as the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia have had their economies driven by the short termism 
of the stock market (Choi 1994; Bowman and Useem 1995; Lenway and Murtha 
1991; Choi et al. 1996). Although the stock market undergoes a certain amount of 
government regulation and supervision, in general, the stock market is seen as an 
example of an efficient institution driven by market forces; as analysed by 
Easterbrook (1997), efficient capital markets require much less regulation and 
supervision. This stock market driven short-termism limits U. S. and U. K. companies' 
capacity to make highly profitable long term investments with long pay-back period; 
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no such restrictions seem to apply to their Japanese or German rivals (Fruin 1992). 
Decision makers in these countries have in consequence been rethinking the values of 
their business system and its appropriateness for the global competition of the 1990's. 
A key benefit of such a style could be obtained by sharing information 
between corporations and their investors. The takeovers of the 1980's which were a 
sign of the market determining relationships, are now being displaced by co-operative 
agreements and strategic alliances, leading to an alliance based capitalism (Dunning 
1996; Gerlach 1992). These bypass the traditional competitive model of markets and 
lay open the possibility of further sources of added value. As quoted in Watanabe and 
Yamamoto (1993), a German company manager once said that companies in the 
United States work for their shareholders, those in Germany for customers, and those 
in Japan for employees. The Anglo-Saxon governance system has been criticised in 
recent years as disenfranchising individual shareholder, distorting stock prices due to 
the thinness of the market and limiting the control that can be exercised over the 
activities of executive management (Roe 1994,1997). 
The literature has compared as extremes the communitarian German and the 
apparently networked Japanese systems of governance, with the impersonal stock 
market driven systems of the United States and the United Kingdom (Franks and 
Mayer 1997; Roe 1994,1997; Fruin 1992). In general, the Japanese and German 
approach is to build trust between all the parties involved in a particular value chain 
and use group loyalty and understanding to build an informal system of network 
control rather that one that could be described to achieve governance of a particular 
legal corporate entity within the network. As noted in works such as Fruin (1992); 
Albert (1991); Choi et al. (1996); Whitley (1990), they rely upon several non- 
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contractual mechanisms to reduce the possibilities of opportunism. This contrasts 
with the Anglo-Saxon, approach based on the rule of law and contracts. The 
differences in approaches of Japan and Germany, versus the Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the United States or the United Kingdom have led to researchers contrasting 
the difference as one of personal trust versus legal contracts systems. This leads to the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 2: The relative superiority of either the Anglo-Saxon or the 
Communitarian business systems can depend on the nature of political 
embeddedness and the interactions within the systems between market and 
nonmarket forces. 
Markets and Governance: 
Markets are the systems prevalent in Anglo-Saxon societies which first seek to 
de-personalise social interactions by mediating them through arms length competitive 
trading and abhor the hegemony of any ideology as anathema to free-thinking, liberty 
and creativity. It hardly needs to be said that loyalty is not necessarily absent in the 
operations of Anglo-Saxon systems but in many ways the supreme loyalty is to a 
system which collectively transcends individuals, groups and ideas allowing the 
individuals right to pursue his own interests within a framework or law and contract. 
These systems have access to what we believe Williamson (1985) has called the high 
powered incentives of the market. In fact elsewhere, following, through on 
Williamson (1985) idea of a hybrid system between markets and hierarchies we have 
suggested that what is perhaps emerging are more complex hybrids based on a more 
complex vision of the world than that available. Earlier work by Etzioni (1988) has 
suggested a compromise way forward that permitted both perspectives to have their 
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place however we feel for corporations the requirement is for a synthesis of these 
perspectives to emerge not for their simultaneous mutually antagonistic sustenance. 
What is available both in terms of insights and responses seems to be a 
function of the situation and is something organisations must consciously act to 
design for if they wish to have some control over their survival prospects in the global 
market place. For example will it be possible for German and Japanese corporations 
faced with a significant downturn in the world economy or increasingly effective 
competition from both new and old players to manage downsizing successfully (Fruin 
1992). The downsizing of organisations based on strong group or ideological loyalty 
suggests significant difficulties. The commodities traded in return for loyalty, such as 
long term stability of employment with gradual progression through a hierarchy, will 
increasingly not be open for an internationally competitive company to offer. On the 
other hand, flatter organisations with shorter chains of command may allow less scope 
for noisy or biased loyalties to develop. Rather than disappear, company loyalty may 
just be replaced by loyalty to individuals, at least those well placed to monitor disloyal 
acts. While person mediated bonding in groups is strong its flexibility is suspect over 
the full range of imaginable trading conditions. Its weakness is its instability when 
people are forced out and the deep internal antagonism that can develop within an 
organisation when group loyalties are betrayed. Structuring the environment for senior 
managers in changing time may thus involve finding new ways to incorporate 
elements of the market, loyalty hierarchies and perhaps even familial loyalty. The 
longer time scales on which the later are based may provide stability in the face of 
otherwise impossible to manage adjustment tensions. 
56 
Type of governance system Key characteristics 
Strong legal system, reliance on 
contracts; importance of the individual; 
ANGLO-SAXON GOVERNANCE belief in free market exchange and trade; 
support of major innovations and 
entrepreneurship; separation of financial 
markets from banking and industries 
Importance of social groups and laws for 
communities; concern with redistribution 
COMMUNITARIAN GOVERNANCE of wealth; importance of banking 
relative to financial markets; government 
intervention in industry; managed trade 
rather than free trade; overlap among 
banking, industry, financial markets 
High levels of uncertainty in business 
environment; volatility and rapid 
EMERGING MARKET GOVERNANCE developments in consumer demand, not 
always stable political systems; legal 
systems relatively weak; important role of 
trust and reciprocity based types of 
exchange. 
Source: Adapted from Choi & Kaman (1997) 
Table 2.1: Three major governance, business systems 
The emerging market business system refers to certain regions of the world 
that seem to be rapidly entering the world business system and includes most of the 
Asian countries, some of the Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Czech 
Republic, and some of the Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, Brazil. 
Due to their phenomenal economic growth, large populations, and increasing 
corporate success in the global environment, the emerging markets have become a key 
focus for personal and institutional investors as well as for international corporations. 
At the same time, the nature of society, business exchange, legal systems, consumer 
demand, public policy in these emerging markets which are often very different from 
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the more mature economies have provided difficult dilemmas for North American and 
Western European government and corporations (Olson 1991,1992; Choi et al. 1996). 
But there is also a need to appreciate the differences even among the mature 
economies of the world, especially between the Anglo-Saxon business system versus 
the Communitarian business system of the world. Table 2.1 summarises some of the 
key distinctions among the three major types of governance systems, the "new triad". 
Emerging Business Systems: 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conclude whether the whole of the 
Anglo-Saxon, individualist system is superior or inferior to the Communitarian, 
collectivist system; both mature business systems have been successful for at least the 
latter half of the 20th century. The relative success of these two systems in terms of 
the overall global political economy, could be determined by various factors such as 
the types of industries, the level of the business cycle, the importance of the political 
system (Choi 1994; Choi et al. 1996; Whitley 1990; Orru, et al. 1997). Nevertheless, 
there may be lessons and guidelines from these two systems for the emerging 
economies that are establishing appropriate governance in their national business 
system. In order to understand which aspects of the systems are of relevance, it is 
importance to understand the major characteristics of emerging economies. They can 
be characterized as the following: 
" 
High economic growth rates; 
" 
High overlap within and between institutions and organizations; 
" 
Relatively weak legal system for the enforcement of contracts; 
" 
High uncertainty and turbulence, due to rapid change; 
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9 Lack of development of financial services industries, such as stock markets and 
investment banking. 
Some of these characteristics have similarities to new, emerging industries, especially 
in high technology industries. 
The "emerging" regions of the world, especially Asia and Eastern Europe 
provide a potentially important area of research in terms of the rapid development of 
institutions and organisations and the difficulties of combining them, as shown by the 
economic crisis in various Asian countries in 1997. As these emerging societies which 
operate under greater uncertainty and fewer institutional and legal structures become 
more mature, and developed, it is important to see the differences between these 
emerging regions and other regions of the world. Other recent works that have 
addressed related issues of enforcement, co-operation, in different business systems 
include Noorderhaven (1992); Choi (1994); Olson (1991,1992); Choi, et al. (1996); 
Besley (1995). In general, in emerging economies, the enforcement of agreements or 
co-operation in general, becomes problematic, because of the lack of laws, high 
uncertainties in the legal system, difficulties in communication and infrastructure. 
Including the emerging business systems to the better established Anglo-Saxon and 
Communitarian systems leads to a, "new triad" of global competition that 
complements the traditional economic triad of United States, Europe and Japan. 
Under this new triad, some of the developing countries will advance and enter the 
emerging market business systems. This is shown in the figure below. 
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Fig. 2.3: The "New Triad": business systems 
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In many parts of Asia and in Eastern Europe it has traditionally been the state 
and other types of "nonmarket" institutions (Besley 1995; Arnott and Stiglitz 1990) 
which has taken responsibility for individual welfare. In the current economic crisis 
climate in Asia, this clearly buttresses the desire of entrepreneurs to move in a legal 
and contracting rather than trusting direction. For example, in many emerging Asian 
countries, informal credit and insurance arrangements are often used instead banking 
and insurance services linked to formal legal contracts; such nonmarket institutions 
require non-anonymous peer reviews and monitoring based on trust. This has many 
similarities with the overlapping and intertwined organisations and institutions we see 
in the communitarian business systems of Germany and Japan. 
The implication of this analysis can be explored a little in the context of the 
developing market economies in Eastern Europe which has a history saturated with 
collectivist, or absolutists, who controlled affairs of states with very dynamic 
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boundaries. We might be led to assert, then, that the absence of individualism would 
promote a high trust form of society. In the familial sense that is probably true. 
However, the experience of enforced collectivisation has now led to a pervasive, if 
not universal, reaction against it, such that individualism and individual rights against 
the state, are now firmly on several national agendas. This suggests a desire for a 
transition direct from one form of society, collectivist to another, individualist. 
However this is unlikely to be possible as the "rule of law" is a pre-requisite for this 
and this requires a great deal of certainty in the conduct and regulation of commercial 
affairs (Olson 1991,1992). Hence, just as the lawlessness of the American Wild West 
may be helpful in explaining the popularity of legally enforced contacts in 
contemporary America, so the newly forming "Emerging East" may end up similarly 
replete with legal support for contract enforcement. 
Proposition 3: Emerging economies that are in the process of forming 
business systems need to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
both Anglo-Saxon and Communitarian business systems. 
The increasing prevalence of emerging markets, countries and regions have led 
to increased social science and management research on the different institutions, 
corporate strategies, organisational structures that exist in these areas relative to the 
more mature and developed parts of the world such as North America and Western 
Europe. The importance of understanding some of the fundamental differences in 
these emerging societies has led to research on various types of "nonmarket" or what 
could be called, non-standard customs and practices of transactions, business, 
exchange in these emerging societies. Recent works highlighting such differences 
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include Choi et al (1996); Choi (1994); Arnott and Stiglitz (1990); Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough (1992). 
Combining Business Systems: 
As analysed in depth by North (1990,1994), there is no guarantee that a 
success national business system, whether Anglo-Saxon or Communitarian can be 
successfully transferred to other parts of the world, such as emerging economies 
(Olson 1991,1992). The economic crisis of 1997 in various Asian countries such as 
Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia has shown the difficulties these various 
countries have experienced in combining these aspects of Anglo-Saxon (individualist) 
and Communitarian (collectivist) business systems into a mature business system such 
as in the United States, United Kingdom, and Continental Europe. For example, as 
shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2, what should be the relative ratio of formal, legal 
mechanisms to informal, societal norms in a national business system. Was the Asian 
economic crisis that began in 1997, due to an insufficient level of formal, legal 
exchange mechanisms, or were they due to the fundamental difficulties of adjusting to 
globalization, emergence, and the combining of individualist and collectivist business 
system characteristics. 
In countries such as South Korea, the economic crisis that began in 1997 were 
fundamentally due to the difficulties in an insufficient banking sector, that has 
misallocated funds to certain inefficient, government supported corporations. In other 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, the economic difficulties were due to the greater 
exposure of a recently developed stock market that was over-capitalised by foreign 
investment relative to the size of the domestic economy. The complexities of national 
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business systems as shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2, would imply that the realities of the 
Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 were due to the difficulties of the 
relationship not only between the "institutions" or formal and informal ratio within the 
national business system, but also the relationship among the "organisations", the 
economic, political, social and educational. Both institutions and organisations need 
to reach a mature and appropriate balance for a national business system; 
globalisation, and other dramatic changes in the global political economy have made 
such balances more difficult to achieve as shown by the Asian business system crisis 
that began in 1997. 
As analysed by North (1990,1994), the relationship between institutions and 
organisations need to be analysed as a whole in order to fully appreciate the 
complexities of successful economic performance. Traditional research has tended to 
generalise the success of mature economies in Western Europe and North America 
and what hints they can provide to new emerging and still developing economies. 
The purpose of this paper was to develop the general frameworks of North (1990, 
1994) further, to show the difference between the Anglo-Saxon (individualist) and 
Communitarian (collectivist) business systems, within the successful mature 
economies of Western Europe and North America. We also took into account in our 
analysis, the role of "political embeddedness" or the interaction between economic 
and non-economic or nonmarket actors (Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990; Boddewyn and 
Brewer 1994; Choi 1994; Olson 1991,1992), in determining the success of national 
business systems. The Anglo-Saxon and Communitarian business systems have a 
different emphasis on the relationship between organisations, the relative importance 
of formal versus informal institutions, and the overall interconnections between 
63 
organisations and institutions within a national business system. In this sense, this has 
provided an even more complex national objective for emerging business systems 
such as in Asia, that have tried to combine elements of both business systems: 
"... it is the mixture of formal rules, informal norms and enforcement 
characteristics that shapes economic performance. While the rules may 
be changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only 
gradually... The implication is that transferring the formal political and 
economic rules of successful Western market economies to third-world 
and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good 
performance. " (North 1994, p. 366) 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the role of political embeddedness in 
comparative business systems research and its potential implications for the 
governance systems of emerging economies. We believe our preliminary research and 
framework takes into account the reality of the local, non-economic (Whitley 1990; 
Olson 1991,1992; Choi 1994; Boddewyn 1988; Toyne 1988; Zubkin and DiMaggio 
1990) forces that influence firm capabilities and behaviors. It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to conclude whether the Anglo-Saxon individualist system is always 
superior or inferior to the Communitarian collectivist system. Our purpose was to 
analyze their relative strengths and weaknesses, especially the relationship between 
institutions and organizations (North, 1990) so that they can serve as potential 
guidelines for emerging economies that are in the process of establishing a 
governance system; emerging economies have a choice either between the two 
systems, or a combination of both systems. But such analysis also shows the crucial 
importance of analysis that goes beyond, pure market and economic factors, that takes 
into account the nonmarket actors and factors that influence the success of national 
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business systems. Emerging market business systems add an additional generic 
complexity due to rapid growth, lack of various institutions, and the general level of 
uncertainty in their business environment. 
In this chapter we have highlighted a number of significant issues which in our 
opinion will help us analyse, in the next chapter, the success and failure of the 
emerging market economies, especially in Asia, in the recent past. These include the 
fact that in spite of the global nature of competition, the home market constraints 
imposed by domestic institutions and organizations (North, 1990) can have both 
positive and negative influence on firm capabilities and competitive advantages. Also, 
the relative superiority of either the Anglo-Saxon or Communitarian business system 
depends on the nature of political embeddedness and the interaction between market 
and non-market forces in each country. Finally, we highlighted the development of the 
"emerging" market business system (Choi, 1994), and suggested that the emerging 
market countries should assess the relative strengths of both the mature business 
systems in the context of their own political economy. 
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FINANCIAL CAPITAL ALLOCATION & DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, we highlighted the role of political embeddedness in 
comparative business systems research and its potential implications for governance 
systems in emerging economies, taking into account the non-economic forces that 
influence firm capabilities and behaviour. We suggested that analysis of issues such as 
governance, and capital allocation should grounded within the "new" triad framework 
of competing business systems (Choi et al, 1996). This is necessary because existing 
research in markets and capital allocation, especially from an international business 
perspective, does not take into account fully the different nature of costs in emerging 
economy business environments. However, most of developing countries, including 
Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, China and India are 
all emerging, rather than mature business environments; globalization has further 
complicated the nature of such emergence (Rodrik 1997; Hirschman 1994; Putnam 
1996). The importance of such different costs, whether they be monitoring or 
enforcement costs in exchange or general costs about product quality, and obtaining 
information and knowledge can be seen in the ongoing research and debate on 
transaction costs (Hirsch & Lounsbury 1996; Choi, 1994), although the majority of 
the past research has been in mature, developed, single country contexts. For 
example, the academic debate on the relevance of transaction costs for market and 
nonmarket based exchange has continued in various works as Williamson (1996); Hill 
(1995); Nooteboom (1996); Ghoshal and Moran (1996); Granovetter (1985); Parkhe 
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(1991); Simon (1991), with the conclusion that both market and nonmarket based 
exchange within organizations are crucial for the success of any business 
environment. As discussed by North (1990,1991) and Olson (1992), institutions have 
been developed by societies to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange and 
cooperation; in Asia's emerging economies, such institutions have not been fully 
developed, magnifying the level of uncertainty; the globalization of capital 
movements combined with the "level" of the still developing financial institutions in 
Asia were key factors in the Asian economic crisis. 
In the first section of this chapter, we analyze the Asian economic crisis 
through the role played by two major factors: "knowledge" and "financial capital" 
allocation. We believe that an interdisciplinary framework incorporating international 
business, international economics and economic development can help to provide a 
more systematic understanding of not only past Asian economic success, but the 
present Asian economic crisis. The fundamental issue is that the national business 
systems (North 1990; Olson 1992) in Asia were phenomenally successful for decades 
and then dramatically problematic in 1997. There is a need to understand the factors 
for past success, and which of these factors, if any were responsible for the crisis 
which began in 1997. In analyzing the economic crisis in Asia, we include the 
economic as well as the various non-market forces, such as institutional settings that 
influence the nature of exchange and co-operation in emerging economy 
environments (Whitley 1992; Boddewyn 1988; Brewer 1992). Thus, although global 
capital movements have been given as a primary economic reason for the Asian 
economic crisis (Krugman 1998), there is a need to analyze how capital was actually 
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created, allocated and "governed" in Asia, through the institutional arrangements and 
why these past arrangements became inappropriate in the late 1990's crisis. 
In our opinion the crisis in Asia is an opportunity for international investors to 
try and establish themselves in the region; but, repeatedly their efforts are frustrated 
due to the inherent psychic distance towards Asia. In the next section of this chapter 
we attempt to further develop a framework for overcoming such, psychic distance 
towards Asia, in order to create the "pre-negotiation" fundamentals in terms of beliefs, 
perceptions, images, values. Such pre-negotiation psychic distance needs to be 
overcome in order to proceed to successful international negotiations (O'Grady & 
Lane 1997; Kogut & Singh 1988; Gatignon & Anderson 1988). Rather than focusing 
on the well researched area of national, culture (Hofstede 1980), our purpose is to 
focus on the more general national business systems (Kogut 1991; Whitley 1992; 
North 1990; Olson 1992) with a focus on the implications for pre-negotiations. Our 
analysis takes into account the various political, sociological, legal, anthropological, 
organisational and economic aspects that help to comprise a business system (Kogut 
1991; Etzioni 1988; Brouthers & Bamossy 1997; Thurow 1992; Boddewyn 1988; 
Lenway & Murtha 1994; Murtha & Lenway 1994; Choi, et, al. 1996; Geringer & 
Hebert 1989; Choi & Lee 1997). Most of the research on international bargaining and 
negotiations has shown that over time, co-operative relationships are terminated for 
the inverse reasons for which they were formed; thus when the possession or control 
of certain resources is reduced, the nature of the co-operative relationship is also 
weakened (Beamish & Inkpen 1997; Young & 01k 1994; Sohn 1994; Parkhe 1991). 
We believe that differences in national business systems, are a permanent underlying 
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and fundamental factor in the nature of international negotiations and thus play a 
much more important role in the long term success of such international relationships. 
We analyse the question of whether the transactional aspects of negotiations 
could be the same in mature versus emerging market environments. In emerging 
business environments, the realities of uncertainty and high measurement and 
enforcement costs may require a mutual commitment (Schelling 1960,1966) type 
approach to international negotiations. This fundamentally differentiates the Asian 
environment from more mature business environments, where there are much lower 
uncertainty, measurement and enforcement costs (North 1990,1991). 
SECTION 3.1: ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Although some international economists such as Krugman (1998) believe that 
the Asian economic miracle was exaggerated, it is difficult to deny the phenomenal 
economic growth throughout the Asian region over the last thirty years, which saw the 
increase in per capita incomes in countries such as South Korea increase over a 
hundred fold from U. S. $100 dollars to U. S. $11,000 dollars. Although many purely 
economic and market based explanations and theories have been formulated about the 
Asian crisis (Krugman 1998), the noneconomic, organisational and institutional 
factors in the crisis seem as important as the purely macroeconomic and market driven 
fundamentals. The research of Simon (1991), North (1990) and Olson (1992) on how 
organisations influence and change institutions is especially relevant for such analysis 
that takes into account economic as well as noneconomic factors in business and 
economic performance. North's research showed how the combination of formal and 
informal constraints determine the rules of exchange and change in national 
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economies (Hirsch & Lounsbury 1996), combining the political, sociological, 
historical and ideological aspects of behavioural based theories along with the rational 
theories of organisational economics. 
The approach in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we analyse the two systems of 
capital allocation and ownership that have been proven widely successful in the 
mature economies of the world. These two major business systems can also be 
fundamentally divided into shareholder and stakeholder systems of capital allocation 
and ownership structures (Roe 1994; Hirschman 1994; Putnam 1996; Freeman 1984; 
Albert 1991). Shareholder capital allocation systems, which characterise the business 
system in countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, are dominated by 
financial equity markets, strong legal systems and externally driven measurement of 
business and economic performance. In contrast, stakeholder capital allocation 
systems in countries such as Germany and Japan are more internally organised around 
collaboration among banking, financial markets, government and employees (Gerlach 
& Lincoln 1992; Fruin 1992; Roe 1994); banks and other non-institutional 
organizations play the crucial role in capital allocation. The Asian economic crisis 
was greatly due to the fact that in many of the more emerging countries of Asia 
including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, neither systems of external nor internal 
financial capital allocation had been fully developed. Thus, the "level" development 
of financial institutions in the national business system (Levine 1997; Demirguc-Kunt 
& Maksimovic 1996; Boyd & Smith 1996) is crucial to understanding the Asian 
crisis. 
Secondly, we focus on the importance of taking into account the nature of 
"knowledge" acquisition, diffusion and delivery in emerging economies. Despite the 
70 
past economic success of emerging economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, international business research has not sufficiently analysed how such 
emergence environments differ from the mature business environment of North 
America and European Union; exceptions include Beamish (1988); Choi (1994); 
Inkpen & Beamish (1997); Landa (1994); Olson (1992). Emerging economies face a 
much higher level of uncertainty, change, requiring additional factors in analysis, 
relative to mature economies. Under uncertainty, the traditional advantage of pure 
markets, the power to co-ordinate exchange partners becomes considerably weakened 
(Simon 1991). 
The balance between the three major parts of knowledge, acquisition, diffusion 
and delivery have changed. The strength of the collective, relationship and trust based 
national business systems in Asia were based on the "diffusion" and dissemination of 
externally created knowledge, usually from foreign countries such in North America 
and Western Europe. However, as the global business environment becomes 
increasingly dependent on creativity, R&D, technology, the so called, high-tech 
industrial milieu (Castells and Hall 1994), global competitiveness in knowledge 
resources has become more dependent on acquisition and delivery, rather than 
diffusion. In this sense, the knowledge allocation mechanism in Asia, based primarily 
on past diffusion has become no longer appropriate in today's global business 
environment. 
Double Triad Framework & Asian Emerging Markets: 
According to the definition of North (1990), national institutions are formal 
and informal institutions, which mix with national organizations in determining the 
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economic performance of a country. In terms of international business research, 
related research has focused on the role of the state in affecting the success of national 
firms and has been analyzed in various works such as Rugman et al. (1995), Lenway 
and Murtha (1994), Murtha (1993), Murtha and Lenway (1994), on the role of the 
state; Kogut (1993) on country capabilities and technological innovations; Boddewyn 
(1988), Brewer (1992) on political risk and embeddedness. In reality, of course firms 
take into account not only international market competition, but also the home market 
constraints, or the role of national institutions; this is similar to the concept of two 
level games, which has been widely researched in international relations and 
international political economy, which analyse simultaneously national institutions 
and international diplomacy (Putnam 1988). As analysed by Boddewyn (1988) firms 
compete in the environment, which includes various nonmarket, noneconomic values 
such as the polity, community, public opinion makers such as media. North's (1990) 
structure of institutions and organizations helps to show the richness and realities of 
national business systems, much beyond the traditional, narrow neo-classical 
economic market paradigm. As discussed by Kogut (1993), countries' 
competitiveness can be attributed to the interaction of their particular organizational 
and institutional capabilities. 
National Institutions versus International Markets: 
Recent research on multinational corporations from the United States, 
Germany and Japan show the continuing importance and influence of their national 
institutions on their strategies such as R&D, capital financing, direct investment 
(Pauly & Reich 1997). This study based on three parts of the traditional economic 
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triad, the United States, Western Europe and Japan has shown that in terms of national 
institutions, and their influence on multinational corporations, globalization of 
international markets has had a smaller effect than expected. This adds further 
impetus to our framework which creates a, double triad grouping of countries, one 
triad of international markets (Vernon 1966), the other triad of national institutions. 
Firms face the constraints and advantages of national institutions. Dunning 
(1996) in a recent, comprehensive study of factors that help firms to be globally 
competitive has discovered that firms from certain countries such as the United States 
find national institutions such as government regulation, subsidies, social practices, 
relatively less helpful for global competitiveness. However, for European and 
Japanese companies, national institutions were seen to be an advantage and in support 
of global competition (Pauly & Reich 1997); this was also the case for emerging 
market economies. 
Rugman (1993,1997) helped to create the double diamond framework, taking 
into account international factors, and thus broadened the single diamond analysis by 
Porter (1990) of purely national competitiveness factors. Our double triad framework, 
in a similar vein combines the existing, well known, "external" global economic triad, 
which is based on international markets, income levels, geography (Dunning 1996; 
Vernon 1966; Ohmae 1985) with the realities of an "internal" global triad taking into 
account, national institutions (North 1990). 
In terms of the second component of the double triad, this would be the 
domestic institutional factors such as the role of equity markets versus banks in 
financing, the strength of legal systems, the collectivism or individualism of the 
societies. Under this type of groupings, we have the Anglo-Saxon business system 
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(U. S., Canada, United Kingdom, Australia); a Communitarian business system 
(continental Europe); an emerging business system grouping (parts of Asia, Eastern 
Europe, Latin America). This type of double triad framework is shown in the figure 
below: 
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Figure 3.1: Double Triad 
- 
external and internal 
Financial Capital Allocation 
In terms of understanding emerging Asia from this new "double triad" 
framework combining international markets and domestic institutional constraints, 
our analysis is based on the "business system", or the various economic, political, 
social, and business issues that constrain and influence the behaviour of corporations 
from these systems (Olson 1992; Kogut 1991; Whitley 1992). The first major factor 
which can help to frame the past economic success and present economic crisis in 
Asia is that of "capital allocation". The issue of capital allocation and economic 
success has been one that has been argued for at least most of the 20`h century. 
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Prominent economists such as John Hicks argued that the financial markets of the 
United Kingdom allowed rapid industrialization in England, through the mobilization 
of capital and overcoming of risk for the development of immense, major industrial 
projects (Hicks 1969). In contrast, Joseph Schumpeter argued that banks rather than 
financial markets were fundamental to economic success, because banks would 
identify and fund the key entrepreneurs to develop technological innovations (1934). 
The academic debate on the relationship between financial factors and economic 
growth has been discussed in detail recently by Levine (1997); King and Levine 
(1993); Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Empirical research has shown that although 
countries with larger banks and more active financial markets tend to also have higher 
economic growth rates, it is not certain which particular financial allocation 
mechanism, or which mix of banks and financial markets helps to create the greater 
economic success (Levine 1997; Albert 1991; Stem 1989). 
The allocation of financial capital, within the financial systems literature is an 
immense area covering international economics, economic development and corporate 
finance (Giovannini and Melo 1993; Caprio, et al. 1994; Greenwood and Jovanovic 
1990; Fry 1995). Fundamentally, financial systems serve major functions including: 
allocating resources; monitoring management performance; mobilizing savings; 
providing information about prices; facilitating exchange in the economy (Merton and 
Bodie 1995; Levine 1997). The effectiveness of financial systems in leading to 
economic success has been analyzed in two major types of models. In the first type of 
economics and finance model, the financial system affects the rate of capital 
formation through savings rates changes and reallocations (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; 
Rebelo 1991). In the second type of economics and finance model, the financial 
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system helps to encourage new technology and production processes (Romer 1990; 
Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992). 
The economics and financial literature behind these two major models of 
economic success have not provided conclusive theoretical or empirical conclusions 
in three major areas. First, there is very little research on the role played by 
institutional factors such as legal traditions or political systems in influencing 
effective financial capital allocation; recent exceptions include LaPorta (1996); Choi, 
et. al. (1996); Engerman and Sokoloff (1996). Second, although both effective 
banking and financial markets are seen to be crucial to economic success (Levine 
1997), there are few conclusions on which mix of these financial instruments such as 
banking, insurance, equity markets, bond markets are optimal for a particular 
economy or region. Third, there is very little evidence on the linkage between 
financial capital allocation systems, and the level of economic maturity (Demirguc- 
Kunt and Maksimovic 1996). For example, it is not certain whether particular capital 
allocation mechanisms such as banking, equity or bond markets, derivatives which 
may enhance economic success in mature economies such as the United States or 
United Kingdom, are appropriate for more emerging economies such as in regions of 
Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe (Choi, et, al. 1996). 
Shareholder & Stakeholder Systems: 
For the majority of the economies in Asia, capital allocation since the 1960's 
has tended to be closer to the model envisioned by Schumpeter (1934), where banks 
rather than financial markets play a major role in capital allocation decisions. The 
only exception to this system in Asia probably is Hong Kong, with its relatively 
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service and equity market driven systems (Choi, et. al. 1996; Amsden 1989; Wade 
1990), which was modelled very much after the United States and United Kingdom. 
The unexpected Asian economic crisis of 1997 has created research needs to 
more fully understand the role of domestic and international institutions in the 
effectiveness of private sector organizations such as banking, equity and bond 
markets. But even before the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and more general 
emerging markets crisis in Latin America and Russia in 1998, there had been a 
growing academic and policy debate on systems of capital allocation and effects on 
national and regional economic success within the mature economies of North 
America and Western Europe. The majority of the past research before the 1990's in 
economics, finance and international business has tended to study the financial capital 
allocation system common in the United States and United Kingdom. This system is 
based on a strong legal structure, along with external monitoring of economics, 
business and management performance through financial markets, especially equity 
markets (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen & Murphy 1990). But the economic 
success of countries such as Japan, Germany, France throughout the 1980's, where 
financial capital is fundamentally allocated through banking and insurance 
organizations raised fundamental questions of two systems (Albert 1991). As 
mentioned earlier, this academic debate goes back at least as far back to Schumpeter's 
(1934) belief in bank driven capital allocation, versus Hick's (1969) belief in 
financial, equity markets driven capital allocation. 
The more recent research in economics and finance has begun to empirically 
test the differences between the financial markets driven capital allocation system of 
United States and United Kingdom, relative to the banking driven capital allocation 
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system of Japan and most of continental European countries, in works such as Gerlach 
and Lincoln (1992); Franks and Mayer (1997); Roe (1994). In countries such as 
Japan and Germany, and most of continental Europe, major banks and insurance 
companies, act as external stakeholders by holding major shares in firms, exercising 
governance and control over internal management, through a more informal, 
relationship based exchange. Countries using this type of capital allocation 
mechanism have been broadly called "stakeholder" economies, or social market 
economies (Albert 1991; Choi, et. al 1996). Many Asian national business systems 
are still, emerging, and can often be a mix of both shareholder and stakeholder 
systems (Fruin 1992; Gerlach & Lincoln 1992). 
Asia's Mixed Systems: 
As discussed by Simon (1991), the shareholder based system of free market 
exchange assumes that exchange occurs with very little knowledge and identification 
of the other exchange partner; whereas in reality, exchange needs to take into account 
such identification, and shared values. We believe that in understanding Asia, there is 
a need to appreciate that the difference between shareholder and stakeholders types of 
exchange can exist in "mature" economies, and is not an issue of mature versus 
emerging economies. Thus, the relatively less researched (Brouthers & Bamossy 
1997; Choi, et al. 1996; Freeman 1984) stakeholder systems which represent most 
continental European countries (Albert 1991) have a far greater overlap in 
organisations and institutions, and where exchange across organisations such as 
banking, government and financial markets, resembles more the close exchange found 
within departments of an organisation in the more widely researched, shareholder and 
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financial markets driven system of capital allocation (North 1990; Simon 1991; Olson 
1992; Hirschman 1994). The differences between shareholder and stakeholder 
systems of capital allocation is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 3.2: Financial Capital creation and allocation 
The acceptance of this diversity in relations among organisations and 
institutions (North 1990; Simon 1991) and between shareholder and stakeholder 
systems in mature economies, helps to overcome the, psychic distance, psychological 
uneasiness (Kogut & Singh 1988; O'Grady & Lane 1996; Johanson & Vahlne 1977) 
towards emerging business systems, such as Asia. Our focus on comparative national 
systems, from the viewpoint of financial capital allocation systems has similarities to 
past research on institutional aspects of organisational analysis such as Hirschman 
(1994); Putnam (1996); Whitley (1994). 
The bank driven financial capital allocation system envisioned by Schumpeter 
(1934) as the ideal system for economic success is a collective, relationship based, 
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stable national business system. It's fundamental strengths are long run performance 
measures, relatively equal distribution of wealth and a broader inclusion of social 
issues such as the environment; its fundamental weaknesses are an inability to change 
quickly, and a system relatively closed to external, including foreign participation 
(Gerlach and Lincoln 1992; Choi, et. al. 1996; Albert 1991). As discussed earlier, 
most Asian countries adopted this system of financial capital allocation throughout the 
1960's until the crisis of 1997. There were two major changes internal and external to 
Asian national systems during this period. The first was the general external change 
of globalization, or the integration of goods, services and capital. As discussed in 
depth by Rodrik (1997), although there is a general consensus that globalization of 
goods and services is economically positive, it is not certain that such benefits exist 
for globalization of capital. Asian business systems, which experienced the volatility 
of global financial capital movements in 1997, did so from a stakeholder base or a 
system, where financial capital was traditionally allocated through organizations such 
as banking, rather than financial equity and bond markets. 
As discussed earlier, the stakeholder system of Schumpeter (1934) is 
fundamentally a closed system, of internal participants such as banking, industry, 
government. This system is fundamentally ill-equipped towards major external 
forces, such as deregulation in global financial capital movements. The high growth 
rates, uncertainty of emerging business environments in much of Asia, further 
increased the unstable impact of such global capital movements. The reason why 
Asian business systems had originally adopted the more closed, stakeholder and 
system of financial capital allocated through banking also has to do with the nature of 
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uncertainty and change in the business environment of emerging economies such as in 
Asia. 
Knowledge Allocation: 
Knowledge has become an important topic of research in international 
business in the context of multinational enterprise and the transfer of knowledge 
across borders (Kogut and Zander 1993,1995; Love 1995; McFetridge 1995). This 
past research has tended to define knowledge generically and to focus on the issue of 
how markets and organizations differ in their capabilities of transferring knowledge. 
Thus, the comparisons of markets versus organizations has been in a "developed" 
country context, such as the situation that would face a North American multinational 
enterprise transferring knowledge across borders through its subsidiaries. Thus, the 
major questions of knowledge, multinational enterprise, efficient markets may change 
substantially in an emerging market context, such as in Eastern Europe or in parts of 
Asia (Choi 1994). For example, the definition of knowledge in North American 
multinational enterprises may be defined as closer to research and development and 
original innovation; however, in an emerging economy context, knowledge's value 
may be in the context of technology licensing, or in the context of establishing 
institutions to protect intellectual property rights to knowledge. 
There are two major issues concerning knowledge in the context of this 
chapter on Asian economic success and crisis. First, although there is a general 
interest in knowledge as a resource, there is a substantial gap in definitions between 
international business research and related areas of economics research. However, 
there is clear overlap in disciplines over some of the major issues including 
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multinational enterprise, global markets, knowledge transfer, public goods just as a 
substantial part of international business research has relied on an international 
economics methodology (Buckley and Casson 1998; Dunning 1996). We believe this 
gap has existed because although international business research has followed a 
relatively broad and interdisciplinary agenda within business and management 
research, international economics research has followed a more narrow agenda of 
trade theory and exchange rates. In order to analyse knowledge as resources, there is 
thus a need to address the areas of diversion and overlap, but to consider whether 
other areas of economics research also have value in international business research. 
One area that especially warrants attention is the more recent research in economic 
development, which differentiates between knowledge about technology versus 
knowledge about quality and attributes of goods and services, which face more 
general problems of imperfect information (Dasgupta 1994; Bowles and Gintis 1996; 
Knack and Keefer 1997; Levine 1997; Choi 1994; Stiglitz 1996). 
Second, international business research on knowledge has tended to analyse 
the specific situation of developed countries. For example, a typical starting point of 
analysis would be a North American multinational enterprise facing the issue of 
knowledge transfer through markets versus through its own subsidiaries (Kogut and 
Zander 1993,1995; Love 1995; McFetridge 1995) in a developed country business 
environment with relatively perfect information, effective institutions and intellectual 
property rights. The majority of business environments however are in a developing 
or emerging economy context, with imperfect information, institutions in transition 
and lack of intellectual property rights. The value of knowledge in such an emerging 
economy context may be very different for multinational enterprises as well as for the 
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overall economy and society. For example, the value of knowledge may be contained 
in the context of technology licensing, or in the development of certification agencies 
standardising quality and attributes of goods and services (Lall 1992,1995; Mody and 
Yilmaz 1997; Wade 1990; Amsden 1989; Westphal 1997). 
Knowledge and the Asian Crisis: 
There are three aspects of knowledge which are relevant in terms of the Asian 
economic success and crisis: acquisition, dissemination and delivery (Stiglitz 1994). 
Acquisition includes domestic creation as well as acquisition from foreign sources. 
Dissemination includes rapid diffusion within the domestic national business systems. 
Delivery is linked to the technological systems that allow effective delivery such as 
the internet, telecommunications systems. These distinctions are shown in the figure 
below. 
Knowledge acquisition Knowledge dissemination Knowledge delivery 
Acquisition primarily is Effective dissemination or The effectiveness of 
from foreign sources or diffusion of knowledge is knowledge delivery to 
created domestically. dependent on absorptive organizations, institutions 
Asian business systems capacities (Cohen & in the national business 
primarily acquired their Levinthal 1990). The system is dependent 
knowledge from the speed of such knowledge primarily on infrastructure 
United States and Western exchange and diffusion such as 
Europe through technology (Choi & Lee 1997) is telecommunications and IT 
licensing, with inadequate dependent on tacit, trust systems. Asian economies 
efforts towards domestic based exchange, which is adopted successfully such 
creativity (Amsden 1989) more common in delivery systems primarily 
and knowledge creation. collective societies such as from the United States. 
in Asia. 
Table 3.1: National knowledge 
- 
acquisition, dissemination, delivery 
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Traditionally, the relative strengths of the Asian national business systems 
(Choi et al. 1996; Whitley 1994) has been in the areas of dissemination and delivery; 
acquisition has been fundamentally borrowing from foreign sources through 
technology licensing (Amsden 1989). The collective nature of Asian culture has 
allowed the rapid dissemination of knowledge acquired from the United States and 
Western Europe through trust based networks and exchange (Choi et al. 1996). The 
fundamental problem that had been arising even before the start of the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis was the problem of "creativity" or the need for domestic creation of 
knowledge, rather than dependence on foreign sources (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). 
This increasingly became a problem when the United States and Western Europe 
increasingly became knowledge based in their economies, developing industries from 
computer software, to biotechnology, to media and entertainment. 
The key difference of these knowledge based industries is their, "intangibility" 
in terms of quality attributes and success factors. The importance of intangibility of 
knowledge goes back at least as far as Polyani (1944), who differentiated between the 
informal, tacit aspects of knowledge versus the formal, explicit, codifiable aspects of 
information (Nelson and Winter 1982). When economies become relatively more 
dependent on knowledge based industries, their is a shift in importance in the three 
aspects of knowledge: acquisition, dissemination, delivery. Acquisition, especially 
domestic creation becomes crucial to success. The Asian economic systems had 
learned only about the dissemination and delivery of tangible, manufacturing 
industries and product attributes. The greater importance of intangibles and invisible 
assets (Itami & Roehl 1987), including the value of financial assets and capital 
movements were fundamentally new to the Asian business systems. 
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SECTION 3.2: ASIA: OVERCOMING PSYCHIC DISTANCE 
While the Asian economic crisis beginning in 1997 has raised fundamental 
questions and debates about the fundamentals of the Asian business system, for a lot 
of international investors this crisis is an opportunity to make investments in the 
region. But the negotiations needed to exploit these opportunities in Asia require a 
fundamental understanding of the national business system (North 1990; Simon 1991; 
Kogut 1991). In this section we analyze the "pre-negotiations" factors necessary to 
overcome psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne 1977; O'Grady & Lane 1996) 
towards Asia. The fundamentals of rational, negotiation analysis, especially in an 
international setting with multiple actors, were formulated by the works of Schelling 
(1960), Luce & Raiffa (1957) and Raiffa (1982). Since this pioneering research, the 
more general nature of co-operation, collaboration and conflict in the international 
business environment has begun to develop as an important area of research 
throughout the 1990's. Recent works such as Parkhe (1991), Inkpen & Beamish 
(1997) have begun to address the importance of negotiation and bargaining in the 
success of international joint ventures. A substantial amount of social science 
research that has been carried out in the last few decades, and the frameworks that 
have been developed have been unprepared for the major turbulence, change in 
today's international business environment; for example, one of the most dramatic 
recent issues has been the economic and business crisis in Asia since 1997. In this 
sense, it is an opportune time for further research on negotiations, especially the 
governmental and institutional factors for success in today's international business 
environment. Such research must also address the issue of "psychic distance" 
towards the Asian business environment (O'Grady & Lane 1997; Andersen 1992; 
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Benito & Gripsrud 1992; Peng & Heath 1996; Kogut & Singh 1988), or the socio- 
cultural distance that companies and countries feel towards countries they consider to 
be dissimilar from their own business systems. 
Existing research in negotiations, especially from an international business 
perspective, does not take into account fully the different nature of costs in emerging 
economy business environments; recent exceptions include Inkpen and Beamish 
(1997). However, most of Asia, including countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, China are all emerging, rather than mature business 
environments; globalization has further complicated the nature of such emergence 
(Rodrik 1997; Hirschman 1994; Putnam 1996). The importance of such different 
costs, whether they be monitoring or enforcement costs in negotiations and exchange 
can be seen in the ongoing research and debate on transaction costs (Hirsch & 
Lounsbury 1996; Choi, 1994), although the majority of the past research has been in 
mature, single country contexts. For example, the academic debate on the relevance 
of transaction costs for market and nonmarket based exchange has continued in 
various works as Williamson (1996); Hill (1995); Nooteboom (1996); Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996); Granovetter (1985); Parkhe (1991); Simon (1991), with the conclusion 
that both market and nonmarket based exchange within organizations are crucial for 
the success of any business environment. 
As discussed by North (1990,1991) and Olson (1992), institutions have been 
developed by societies to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange and 
cooperation; in Asia's emerging economies, such institutions have not been fully 
developed, magnifying the level of uncertainty. In game theoretic terms, negotiations, 
which requires co-operation can be difficult when the game is not repeated, when 
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information about the other actors is limited, and when there are large number of 
actors involved in the potential exchange (North, 1991). Such factors characterize 
negotiations and co-operation in emerging market business environments. Research in 
international business has also shown that companies tend to begin their 
internationalisation process, and even their continuing business exchange in countries 
that are, psychically close (Andersen 1992; Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Benito & 
Gripsrud 1992; Kogut & Singh 1988; O'Grady & Lane 1997). Such research on 
psychic distance showed that psychic distance comprised of cultural (Hofstede 1980) 
as well as structural differences, such as legal and administrative systems (Johanson & 
Vahlne 1977). We believe that such structural, legal, administrative systems 
differences have not been sufficiently researched in international business as key 
factors in negotiation and exchange, and especially in the context of the Asian 
business environment. 
The purpose of this section is to further develop a framework for overcoming 
such, psychic distance towards Asia, in order to create the "pre-negotiation" 
fundamentals in terms of beliefs, perceptions, images, values. Such pre-negotiation 
psychic distance needs to be overcome in order to proceed to successful international 
negotiations (O'Grady & Lane 1997; Kogut & Singh 1988; Gatignon & Anderson 
1988). Rather than focusing on the well researched area of national, culture (Hofstede 
1980), our purpose is to focus on the more general national business systems (Kogut 
1991; Whitley 1992; North 1990; Olson 1992) with a focus on the implications for 
pre-negotiations. Our analysis takes into account the various political, sociological, 
legal, anthropological, organisational and economic aspects that help to comprise a 
business system (Kogut 1991; Etzioni 1988; Brouthers & Bamossy 1997; Thurow 
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1992; Boddewyn 1988; Lenway & Murtha 1994; Murtha & Lenway 1994; Choi, et, 
at. 1996; Geringer & Hebert 1989; Choi & Lee 1997). Most of the research on 
international bargaining and negotiations has shown that over time, co-operative 
relationships are terminated for the inverse reasons for which they were formed; thus 
when the possession or control of certain resources is reduced, the nature of the co- 
operative relationship is also weakened (Beamish & Inkpen 1997; Young & Olk 
1994; Sohn 1994; Parkhe 1991). We believe that differences in national business 
systems, are a permanent underlying and fundamental factor in the nature of 
international negotiations and thus play a much more important role in the long term 
success of such international relationships. 
We focus on the importance of taking into account the nature of emergence in 
Asian economies, and how this differs from the mature economy situation, which 
dominates the studies in international business; exceptions include Beamish (1988); 
Inkpen & Beamish (1997); Landa (1994); Olson (1992). Emerging economies face a 
much higher level of uncertainty, change, requiring additional factors in analysis, 
relative to mature economies. Under uncertainty, the traditional advantage of pure 
markets, the power to co-ordinate exchange partners becomes considerably weakened 
(Simon 1991). The emergence factor is thus a major driver of psychic distance 
towards Asia. 
Asian Negotiations : Emergence 
To overcome the psychic distance, it is imperative that all parties take into 
account the dynamic nature of emergence and its influence on pre-negotiation psychic 
distance (O'Grady & Lane, 1996; Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Kogut & Singh 1988) in 
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the context of the Asian business environment. The concept of trust is often used to 
describe Asia, especially in terms of the difference to more market based exchange 
and co-operation (Fruin 1992; Gerlach & Lincoln 1992; Hill 1995). Past work in this 
area has contrasted Japan and the United States. In Japan, the organisation-oriented 
system is seen as owned by the entire community and therefore trustworthy while the 
market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system countries such as the United States, has the self- 
interests of individuals, rather than groups as its principle focus of interest. This 
distinction has been made in works international business and other social science 
works such as Fruin (1992); Choi & Lee (1997); Parkhe (1991); Granovetter (1985); 
Hirschman (1994); Putnam (1996). 
In terms of international negotiations in Asia, we believe that one aspect that 
both types of definitions and reasoning of trust versus market based exchanged share 
is insufficient emphasis on the importance of measurement (North 1990; Simon, 
1991). This becomes especially important in an international business setting, where 
there are various different standards and definitions of value in exchange. In general, 
the emerging market situation of Asia also makes uncertainty and measurement and 
enforcement problems (Choi & Lee 1997) crucial for any type of negotiations. 
Although the role of measurement costs distinguishes the approaches of Williamson 
(1985) versus North (1990), there is a scarcity of research on the importance of 
measurement costs (Hirsch & Lounsbury 1996); exceptions include Barzel (1982); 
Choi, et al. (1996); Bernstein (1992). In any type of exchange, the attributes of the 
product or service being exchanged needs to be measured. Brand names, warranties, 
objective third party experts all play a role in reducing the costs and temptations to 
incur measurement costs in exchange. Barzel (1982) has shown that if such 
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guarantees exist, then exchange partners in choosing products or services over time, 
may be satisfied with the, average level. This in turn, saves the partners the 
transaction costs, in this case the measurement costs of measuring the value of the 
product or service every time they make a co-operative exchange. 
It is in the interests of both exchange partners, even with different national or 
other types of cultural backgrounds, not to measure the exact value of what is being 
exchanged at every transaction, since this would unnecessarily raise the transaction 
costs of negotiation and exchange in the relationship. In terms of negotiation analysis 
(Schelling 1960; Raiffa 1982), this is related to the concept of, focal points, in that the 
negotiating parties may be able to implicitly, or informally agree on key criteria 
without necessarily analysing in depth the value to both negotiating parties. In turn, 
as Barzel (1982) has discussed, each party may still have the temptation to try and 
incur the unnecessary measurement procedures, which in turn leads to higher costs for 
both parties. This temptation can be reduced by actually maintaining or increasing the 
measurement costs of the exchange, and thus increasing the asymmetry between the 
transacting parties. 
The two extremes of achieving exchange and co-operation through either trust 
or contracts does not address the situation of emerging market business environments 
whether neither enforcement mechanism for exchange are possible; this is further 
magnified by the difficulties of measurement costs for many of the complex products 
and services being exchange in today's business environment (Barzel 1982; Choi & 
Lee 1997). Regions of the world such as Eastern Europe, certain parts of Asia, Latin 
America, Africa all provide environments where neither contracts nor trust type 
enforcement mechanisms may be effective. An alternative to either may be similar to 
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what Schelling, as early as 1960, described as the tendency for parties to mutually 
exchange a hostage in order to ensure co-operation and enforcement of agreements in 
environments with highly problematic outcomes: 
"... the ancients exchanged hostages, drank wine from the same glass to 
demonstrate the absence of poison, met in public places to inhibit the 
massacre of one by the other, and even deliberately exchanged spies to 
facilitate transmittal of authentic information..., in a lawless world that 
provides no recourse to damage suits for breach of unwritten contracts, 
hostages may be the only device for partners to strike a bargain. " 
(Schelling 1960) 
Schelling's (1960) classic frameworks of negotiations under uncertainty, are highly 
applicable to the emerging business system situation of Asia today. This mutual 
commitment style approach to negotiations and exchange, overcomes the weaknesses 
of implicit trust, reputation or ethics as guarantors in exchange in very uncertain and 
unpredictable environments. It does this by creating a situation where both parties 
must lose if they do not co-operate. 
Negotiations and uncertainty 
The research on international negotiations, bargaining and co-operative 
relationships such as Parkhe (1993); Madhok (1995); Inkpen & Beamish (1997); 
Beamish (1988) have shown that the uncertainty of whether the other party will fulfil 
obligations, commitments and expectations is a major issue in international business 
environments. In the international business setting, especially under the high 
uncertainty of emerging markets, the difficulty is in identifying the other party, in 
addition to measuring the content or value of the product or service being exchanged. 
Even under the situation where the value has been ascertained by both parties to the 
negotiation, the problem is one of mutual interpretations, informational constraints, 
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communication distortion or similar to the communication and co-ordination costs 
analysed by Schelling (1960); Raiffa (1982). Pre-negotiation psychic distance 
(O'Grady & Lane 1996) can further complicate such potential negotiations and 
agreements. 
In the case of emerging markets business environments, the issue combines 
both the problems of identification and of assessing the value and tangibility of the 
product or service being exchanged. Once the identity of the two parties has been 
made, this will help to determine the way value is ascertained, and how over time, the 
gains will be distributed to both parties, or bargained as analysed by Schelling (1960, 
1966), Raiffa (1982), Inkpen and Beamish (1997). Under such circumstances, the 
identity helps determine the boundaries of the firm or organisation's behaviours, 
attitudes to opportunism and lowers communication and co-ordination costs. Such 
identification requires various types of shared non market transactions, such as social 
relationships, trust (Simon 1991; Granovetter 1985; Choi & Lee 1997) and other co- 
operative mechanisms. Identity itself may also be determined by external, third party 
intermediaries, or by other parties in one's social network or community (Kogut & 
Zander 1996). 
But this identity is not always easily known; and the measurement and 
enforcement costs of exchange also can be prohibitively high in emerging market 
business environments. 
Proposition 1: Identification in the market can be especially important in 
emerging markets because of uncertainty, and the difficulties of 
measuring the value and content of the product or service being provided 
in the market. 
The issue of, "identity" in turn needs to be analysed together with measurement and 
enforcement costs in order to better understand the nature of exchange in the emerging 
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Asian business environment. In our analysis, our key distinction is on whether the 
partners to a transaction can be identified as having shared or unshared values or 
identities. Thus, in an extreme case of a closely knit clan (Boisot & Child 1988) type 
transaction, it is expected that the identities will be closely shared. Another way to 
categorise this would be in terms of homogeneous versus heterogeneous beliefs or 
ideologies, again leading to shared or not shared identities. This may require a 
"mutual commitment" (Schelling 1960) from both parties or actors in the exchange in 
order to overcome such overall uncertainty in the business environment. This is 
shown in the figure below: 
Negotiations 
r"-"-----"-"---"---"---"-"-"- 
" Enforcement costs uncertain 
------------- 
Measurement costs 
uncertain 
Identity uncertain 
Source: Adapted from Choi, Lee & Kim, JIBS forthcoming 
Figure 3.3: Negotiations under uncertainty in emerging markets 
The uncertainty of whether measurement and enforcement costs are high or 
low, and the uncertainty of the identity of the transacting partner all add to the 
difficulties of co-operating in such situations. However, they help to illustrate the 
realities of exchange in many emerging business systems of the world such as Eastern 
Europe, parts of Asia, Latin America where there is high information uncertainty and 
in the business environment. 
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Proposition 2: The strength of a mutual commitment framework is that it 
allows negotiation and exchange in an emerging market situation, 
whether there otherwise would be no co-operation. 
Paradoxically, in terms of long term, trust based exchange, the measurement 
costs need to be high. In this sense, if the exchange actually occurs when there are 
high measurement and enforcement costs, then it could actually be advantageous in 
developing long term trust. The contract exchange which depends on low 
measurement and enforcement costs, does not help to establish long term trust. 
Proposition 3: The development of long term trust may require a 
negotiation and exchange situation where measurement and enforcement 
costs are potentially high. If co-operation can occur under such 
circumstances, this can in turn help to develop long term trust. 
In more general terms, what reduces the incentives for an exchange partner to try and 
measure the value of the product, service that is being exchanged or transferred? The 
asymmetry is that the party A, providing the product or service has more information, 
knowledge than the party B, receiving it, an asymmetry of information. One way is to 
"increase" rather than decrease the asymmetry of information between party A and 
party B. This reduces the temptation for party B to identify and attempt to measure 
the value, which in turn is a cost to party B, and also a cost to the co-operative 
relationship between party A and party B. 
Research in international business has shown that companies tend to begin 
their internationalisation process, and even their continuing business exchange in 
countries that are "psychically" close (Andersen 1992; Johanson & Vahlne 1977; 
Benito & Gripsrud 1992; Kogut & Singh 1988; O'Grady & Lane, 1997). Such 
research on psychic distance showed that psychic distance comprised of cultural 
(Hofstede 1980), as well as "structural differences", such as legal and administrative 
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systems (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Working in countries that are psychically close 
helps to reduce uncertainty, and it may be easier for companies to operate under 
similar conditions as in their home markets. As this past research has shown, the 
paradox is that psychically close countries are not necessarily the easiest to manage 
and succeed in, since the assumption of similarity can prevent companies from 
learning about crucial diversity in the international business environment (O'Grady & 
Lane 1997; Gatignon & Anderson 1988). 
According to such psychic distance paradox in past research, most Asian 
countries are relatively distant for Western European and North American 
corporations. Japan, which has been the subject of most research on Asia, was one of 
the most psychically distant countries from the United States perspective (O'Grady & 
Lane 1997; Kogut & Singh 1988). Other Asian countries, such as Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia have been relatively less researched, but show an even greater psychic 
distance than Japan. Although research in international business on psychic distance 
has focused on market entry strategies of multinational corporations, the psychic 
distance towards Asia also applies in terms of international negotiations. 
This section of the chapter has addressed the issue of overcoming psychic 
distance in order to create the most effective, "pre-negotiation" foundations towards 
Asia from two frameworks. Firstly, in analysing Asia, international business research 
needs to distinguish between shareholder and stakeholder value systems (Freeman 
1984; Albert 1991; Hirschman 1994; Olson 1992), which have important implications 
for business and economic behaviour and performance measures. Secondly, we 
showed that "emergence", and stages of emergence needs to be analysed in more 
depth in order to understand the implications for negotiations, exchange and co- 
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operation in Asia. Past research has not distinguished between the influence of 
emergence factors, relative to the more widely researched business environment in, 
mature business systems and implications for a broad definition of negotiations. Asian 
countries such as Japan and Korea are stakeholder business systems. However, other 
Asian countries such as Hong Kong are very much shareholder business systems, with 
others such as Singapore being mixed between the two systems (Albert 1991; Whitley 
1992,1994; Choi, et. al, 1996; Fruin 1992; Gerlach & Lincoln 1992; Roe 1997). This 
fundamental difference needs to be taken into account in analysing negotiations, 
exchange and co-operation in the Asian business environment. 
Conclusions: 
In the first section of this chapter, we analyzed the Asian economic crisis 
through the role played by two major factors: "knowledge" and "financial capital" 
allocation. We believe that an interdisciplinary framework incorporating international 
business, international economics and economic development can help to provide a 
more systematic understanding of not only past Asian economic success, but the 
present Asian economic crisis. The fundamental issue is that the national business 
systems (North 1990; Olson 1992) in Asia were phenomenally success for decades 
and then dramatically problematic in 1997. There is a need to understand the factors 
for past success, and which of these factors, if any were responsible for the crisis 
which began in 1997. We developed a "double triad" framework, including 
international markets and domestic institutions to better incorporate Asia's emerging 
economies into the global competition frameworks. 
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Within this framework we then analysed the two systems of capital allocation 
and ownership that have been proven widely successful in the mature economies of 
the world. These two major business systems can also be fundamentally divided into 
shareholder and stakeholder systems of capital allocation and ownership structures 
(Roe 1994; Hirschman 1994; Putnam 1996; Freeman 1984; Albert 1991). The Asian 
economic crisis was greatly due to the fact that in many of the more emerging 
countries of Asia including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, neither systems of external 
nor internal financial capital allocation had been fully developed. Thus, the "level" of 
financial institutions in the national business system (Levine 1997; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic 1996; Boyd & Smith 1996) is crucial to understanding the Asian crisis. 
We focused on the importance of taking into account the nature of 
"knowledge" acquisition, diffusion and delivery in emerging economies. Despite the 
past economic success of emerging economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, international business research has not sufficiently analysed how such 
emergence environments differ from the maturity business environment of North 
America and European Union; exceptions include Beamish (1988); Choi (1994); 
Inkpen & Beamish (1997); Landa (1994); Olson (1992). The balance among the 
three major parts of knowledge, acquisition, diffusion and delivery has changed. The 
strength of the collective, relationship and trust based national business systems in 
Asia were based on the "diffusion" and dissemination of externally created 
knowledge, usually from foreign countries such in North America and Western 
Europe. However, as the global business environment becomes increasingly 
dependent on creativity, R&D, technology, the so called, high-tech industrial milieu 
(Castells and Hall 1994), global competitiveness in knowledge resources has become 
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more dependent on acquisition and delivery, rather than diffusion. In this sense, the 
knowledge allocation mechanism in Asia, based primarily on past diffusion has 
become no longer appropriate in today's global business environment. 
Although the Asian economic crisis has been widely debated and researched, 
the analysis has tended to be dominated by purely neoclassical economics thought 
(Krugman 1998). This however does not take into account the undeniable 
phenomenal economic success from the 1960's until 1997. The approach in this paper 
was to follow a broader, interdisciplinary approach including economic as well as 
international business and management frameworks. The "level" of emergence, of the 
financial institutions in Asia, and the ability to allocate or misallocate capital was a 
crucial factor in the crisis. Along with a greater global dependence on knowledge 
creation and knowledge based industries further added to the lack of maturity in Asian 
institutions. At least two issues warrant further research. First, there is a need to 
compare the Asian business systems that are presently in crisis, with those in less 
affected emerging business systems, such as in Eastern Europe, in order to compare 
and contrast the success and failure factors. Second, further empirical work and case 
studies on the nature of financial capital and knowledge creation and allocation in 
Asian business system is needed. 
The purpose of section 3.2 was to analyse fundamental issues that influence 
pre-negotiation beliefs, values, assumptions held by international business negotiators 
in Asian context from two broader analytical frameworks: institutional (North 1990, 
1991) and organizational (Schelling 1960,1966). We feel that these two 
interconnected levels of analyses help to overcome the psychic distance (O'Grady & 
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Lane 1996; Sohn 1994; Johanson & Vahlne 1977) towards Asia in setting the 
foundations of successful international negotiations. 
We analysed the question of whether the transactional aspects of negotiations 
could be the same in mature versus emerging market environments. In emerging 
business environments, the realities of uncertainty and high measurement and 
enforcement costs may require a mutual commitment (Schelling 1960,1966) type 
approach to international negotiations. The strength of a mutual commitment 
framework is that it allows negotiation and exchange in an emerging market situation, 
whether there otherwise would be no co-operation. This fundamentally differentiates 
the Asian environment from more mature business environments, where there are 
much lower uncertainty, measurement and enforcement costs (North 1990,1991). 
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INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY & FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
ALLOCATION 
Introduction: 
Over the past fifty years, India has been a puzzle for students of comparative 
democratic politics. Its success in maintaining democratic rule since independence in 
1947, given the religious, cultural and linguistic differences of the large population, 
has confounded most political scientists. There seemed to be two puzzles posed by the 
Indian democracy; the first was its survival despite widespread poverty and illiteracy 
(Dahl, 1989), and the second was the puzzling contradiction between high level of 
political violence and the success in sustaining a democratic political system (Weiner, 
1989). The democratic system seems to have survived the doomsday predictions of 
the leading statesmen like Churchill and Western social scientists (Mill 1958; 
Harrison, 1960). Nowadays, there has emerged of a third Indian puzzle; this time it is 
in the economic sphere and is increasingly attracting the attention of international 
business. After having moved at a snail's pace, referred to as the Hindu growth rate of 
3-5%, India started emerging from the economic wilderness since the early nineties. 
Also, unlike the other countries in the region, India has emerged from the recent 
economic crisis largely unscathed. More importantly, it started making a significant 
impact on the world software industry 
- 
from 1990 to 1997, there has been no other 
country expect India wherein the software exports have consistently grown at 50% 
annual growth rate. The significance of this is primarily in the context of the fact that 
India has consistently been at the bottom of league when most social indicators like 
education, health, poverty are measured. How did a impoverished country like India 
emerge as a an important player in an industry that is the beacon of the knowledge 
revolution in international business? Will the Indian economy, in line with the 
political system, astound the sceptics, or will it be a victim of its own contradictions? 
The very size of the Indian economy, along with these puzzles and 
contradictions that makes India the focus of our analysis in this chapter. In it, using 
framework of the political embeddedness of the organisations and institutions which 
shape the business system (as explained in chapter 2) and the nature of allocation of 
financial capital in particular (as discussed in chapter 3), we analyse the domestic 
constraints that shape the Indian political economy. We then analyse the Indian 
financial capital allocation system and explore whether its' distinctive features were 
responsible for the country not being caught up in the recent regional economic crisis. 
Indian Political Economy 
Broadly speaking, the India's economic policies can be divided into four phases, with 
a shift in emphasis in each of those phases. In the first phase, which can called the 
Nehru era, the emphasis was on state monopoly capitalism (Bose 1990). The 
objectives were clear enough: to catch up with the industrialised world and to improve 
the living conditions of the people. But scarcity of capital was seen as the fundamental 
constraint on growth, low capacity to save limited the rate of capital accumulation, 
and even if savings could be raised there were structural constraints on transforming 
the savings into investment (Chakravarty 1987, Bettelheim 1968). It was believed that 
primacy of the market mechanism would lead to excess consumption by the rich and 
under-investment in sectors critical for development. At the same time it was 
assumed that unlike agriculture, industrialisation promised increasing returns and 
productive employment for surplus labour from the rural sector. The economic model 
with its emphasis on Soviet style industrialisation, dominated by the heavy industries 
in the public sector, import substitution, emphasis on the capital goods sector was 
influenced by a number of factors: the colonial legacy and the distrust of foreigners 
caused by it, the dominance of Fabian socialists in the bureaucracy and polity, and the 
inability of the private sector to invest in capital intensive projects. Thus the public 
sector was to dominate the commanding heights of the economy, thereby becoming 
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the mechanism to bring socialism, industrialisation, and modernisation to India's 
impoverished millions. Since the state was to play a major role in deciding economic 
policy and sectoral resource allocation, a plethora of controlling agencies were set up 
(Gough and Sharma 1973, Nayyar 1978). Arguably the bureaucratisation and 
politicisation of economic and industrial activities in this phase distorted the 
developmental model to such an extent that it became counterproductive and stifled 
growth. The compulsions of the electoral process meant that the state was effectively 
an alliance between the industrialist capitalist class, the land-owning class and the 
educated elite (Kothari 1970, Bardhan 1984, Rudolph 1987). This phase embedded a 
political economy in which the discourse would be influenced by the virus of 
socialism without the substance across the ideological spectrum of the polity. 
The second phase (1966-1984) of India's economic development was 
dominated mainly by the realisation that economic reality did not conform to the 
expectations and promises. In addition, the process of development, especially the 
land reform legislation, had led to the emergence of a rich peasantry which began 
placing demands on the ruling political elite (Mitra 1977, Brass 1980, Vanaik 1990). 
The initial years of this period witnessed a shift in focus towards agriculture (which 
had been virtually ignored in the earlier phase) and some liberalisation measures 
which provided market incentives (Government of India, 1969: 239). Fertiliser 
production was opened to private sector and foreign investors. These measures 
provided the incentives and environment for the Green Revolution to set in. Following 
this, when Mrs. Gandhi, who dominated the politics in this period, found her power 
base being challenged, she nationalised all major banks, coal mining industry, and 
copper industry to assert the government's socialist credentials (Vanaik 1990, Nayyar 
1991, Brass 1992). 
The decade, from 1973-1984, was a period of mixed economic policies. On 
the one hand there were attempts at gradual liberalisation, with the role of the public 
sector being redefined as having to facilitate the growth of the private sector. 
Competition was seen as the means of forcing the nationalised industries to become 
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more competitive. To do this the government removed some of the price preferences 
that the public sector enjoyed. Also, the private sector was given easier access to 
credit. Despite these trends on the economic front, overall the political and 
bureaucratic control of industry become total, mainly in the form of permits, licenses, 
inspectors, and lobbies. In 1977, in the clearest sign of the hold of "economic 
nationalists" over the polity, multinationals IBM and Coca Cola withdrew from the 
Indian market. 
It was in the 1980s, especially during the years of Rajiv Gandhi as Prime 
Minister, that the government began acknowledging that the public sector was 
unprofitable and that the economy was being stifled by controls. In an effort to ease 
government control over the economy, the process of liberalisation was formally 
institutionalised. The salient features of this were the gradual de-licensing of 
industries, easing imports and encouraging consumption of consumer goods, which, 
incidentally, had significant import content. On the one hand, this led to a surge in 
industrial activity and large-scale capacity creation commenced. However, its side 
effect was burgeoning imports without any corresponding increase in exports. The 
trade deficit was met predominantly by short-term sources of funds. The stagnation or 
decline in these sources precipitated a balance of payments (BOP) crisis in 1990-9 1. 
India's BOP crisis, the main reason for the implementation of the radical 
reforms by the present government, had been building up slowly over the previous 
decade. The foreign trade deficit, which was of the order of Rs60bn per annum from 
1980-81 to 1984-85, jumped to over Rs90bn per annum from 1985-86 to 1987-88 
(i. e., the advent of the Rajiv Gandhi era of liberalisation) and peaked at over Rsl25bn 
per annum during 1988-90. The BOP crisis arose mainly due to a crisis in confidence 
among short term lenders on whom India had come to rely heavily from 1987-88 
onwards, and a currency squeeze preventing the repayment of liabilities that arise 
from one month to the next. Thus, form hindsight one can argue that the robust 
growth rate of 5.6% during the seventh Five Year Plan was achieved by mortgaging 
the country's future. 
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To tide over the crisis the Indian government approached the IMF in 1991. 
The IMF agreed to a rescue package on the condition that India carried out `structural 
adjustments' to its economy. The Indian government formally adopted the New 
Economic Policy in July 1991, which incorporates three basic steps: 
" 
`stabilisation' of the economy; 
" 
`restructuring' of the economy; 
" 
`globalisation' of the Indian economy, focused mainly on export-led growth. 
Economic Reforms: 
The crisis that plagued the Indian economy reached its peak in the summer of 
1991, when foreign currency reserves had plummeted to almost US$ 1 billion, 
inflation soared to an annual rate of 17%, industrial production was falling and overall 
growth had declined to 1.1% in 1991-92. To overcome this crisis, the stabilisation, 
restructuring and globalisation of the economy began in July 1991. 
Stabilisation of the economy: 
To stabilise the economy, it was imperative that the deficit in the external BOP 
and the budgetary deficit be brought under control. As a first step, India devalued the 
rupee by 40% in 1991 as per the recommendations of the World Bank. Also sweeping 
reforms were made to the trade regime, and by 1993 the rupee was made convertible 
on the trade account. In addition, the lowering of the ceiling on the fiscal deficit in the 
annual budget was agreed to. 
Restructuring of the economy: 
In an effort to restructure the economy, sweeping reforms of India's industrial, 
fiscal, monetary and tariff policies were instituted. The reforms of the industrial policy 
included: 
" gradual abolition of industrial licensing; 
" reducing areas reserved exclusively for the public sector; 
" relaxing the conditions of entry for large-scale export oriented units in sectors 
reserved for small-scale industries; 
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" amending restrictive policies in the area of trade practices and foreign exchange 
controls; 
" capital market reforms, which amongst other things, facilitates the free flow of 
foreign capital to raise equity stakes to 51 %. 
Globalisation of the economy: 
The structural inefficiencies inherited over the last four decades meant that its' 
competitive edge in the world markets was insignificant. Therefore, the globalisation 
of the Indian economy, which would pave the way for growth, will be a lengthy 
process and the intervening period will essentially be a fight for survival. 
Analysis of the post-1991 reforms: 
The reforms that began in 1991 clearly marks a watershed in the Indian 
economy, for since then there has been a fair degree of political consensus to move 
away from the state monopoly capitalist system. There was consensus on the key 
elements of the reform process on the following issues 
" the Indian economy should not revert to the closed trade and foreign investment 
regime of the pre-reform period 
" the bureaucratic policy framework had become dysfunctional and reforms were 
needed 
" market forces should be encouraged provided the negative impact on income 
distribution is kept within politically manageable limits 
" external and internal borrowings by the government should be moderated to avoid 
getting caught in the debt trap 
Although there was a consensus about moving away from the past economic 
paradigm, there is an intense debate internally about the future direction of the reform 
process. The alternatives on offer are the pluralist neo-liberal economic framework 
rooted in the Washington consensus and advocated by the international financial 
institutions like the IMF and World Bank and the corporatist Asian model whose 
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success has been grudgingly approved by the World Bank (World Bank 1993). At the 
start of the reform process in 1991, the liberalisation process drew inspiration from the 
neo-liberal philosophy with its key propensities of anti-bureaucracy, anti-planning and 
macro-economic discipline. The implied message was that the government should 
concentrate on setting the rules of the game and generally distance itself from market 
processes. In the context of economic policy, this translated into the government 
abolishing industrial licensing in July 1991 in the Industrial Policy Statement so that 
"entrepreneurs make investment decisions on the basis of their own commercial 
judgement". The government also decided to reduce the selective approach to foreign 
direct investment of the earlier policy, and permit a much wider domain of operation 
for foreign direct investment (Ahluwalia 1994). On the external front, the rupee was 
gradually made convertible on the capital account and there was a drastic reduction in 
quantitative controls, tariffs and subsidies. 
But in 1998, when the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government set forth 
its' economic policies, it essentially challenged the "minimalist state" ideology and 
advocated a more active role for the government. The government, in line with those 
in East Asia, was not to be a passive observer, but would consciously distort market 
incentives in pursuit of economic objectives. The reason the government chose to put 
forth a competing economic paradigm of policy making was the fact that there was an 
emerging consensus that the neo-liberal framework was not delivering on its 
promises. This was not surprising, as most astute observers had, early on in the 
process, rightly observed that the reform agenda focused almost exclusively on the 
economic aspects, and remained ambivalent on the institutional aspects of change that 
were needed. Most of the discussions of reforms, emanating from official sources, 
rarely went beyond scolding and cajoling state functionaries to implement the reforms 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993). One of the key participants in the process stated 
that the government was besieged by pressure groups seeking to influence policy - 
there was a seething mass of communication aimed at the government from the press, 
parties, lobbies, industrial organisations, trade unions, public interest groups and other 
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busy bodies (Desai, 1993). Thus the lack of even a modicum of insulation needed to 
project an image of unbiased rule making was never present in the implementation of 
the neo-liberal reform process. Thus the political embeddedness of the various Indian 
institutions meant that there was bound to be an inherent inconsistency between the 
ideological appeal of a rule base rational neo-liberal economy and the ground realties 
of relational coalitions. This made the process vulnerable to lobbying pressures to 
change the rules of the game. This was especially true when the stakes were high 
when institutional loopholes would justify undermining the rule based ideology of 
reforms (Chandramohan et al, 1993). 
The present Indian government presented its vision of the future direction of 
the reform process when it unveiled its annual budget in 1998 (Government of India 
1998). The thrust of the budget was significantly different in two main areas 
- 
the 
advocation of a internal looking nationalist economic framework and looser 
commitment to fiscal discipline and macro-fundamentals. The budget clearly sought 
to provide higher protection from external competition through its indirect tax 
proposals which would clearly dampen international capital flows by projecting a 
nationalist-autarkic image abroad. In addition it would introduce differential 
protection to different sub-sectors and economic groups. The significance of these 
changes lay in the heightened degree of politicisation of the budget process. The 
budget also sought to make a sharp distinction among external investors, with special 
treatment offered to non-resident Indian investors, together with a lukewarm approach 
to the international investor community. The attempt in the budget, in line with the 
East Asian corporatist model, was for the government to forge links between certain 
segments of the domestic industry and external non-resident Indian interest groups so 
as to insulate it, to a very large extent, from the pressures of free flowing international 
capital. There is an element of irony in this, as it is precisely these two groups that are 
to a very large extent responsible for the economic crisis; the domestic industry which 
was heavily protected helped ensure that most industries would remain 
technologically backward; the non-resident Indians precipitated the economic crisis 
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on the external front in 1991 by withdrawing the funds that they had invested in short 
term deposits in India. 
Overview of the Indian Economy: 
From a predominantly agrarian economy, with about 55% of GDP in 1950-51 
coming from agriculture, India has done fairly well, achieving a compound annual 
growth (CAGR) in GDP of 4% in the past 40 years. This was largely due to sustained 
industrial and service sector growth, and in the process reduced dependence on 
agriculture. Therefore, in 1991-92, only 31% of GDP originated from the agriculture 
sector, with industry contributing 29% (against 16.1% in 1950-51) and services 40% 
(against 28.4% in 1950-51). During this period, agriculture grew at a CAGR of only 
2.5%, while in contrast, industry grew by 5.5% and services by 4.8%. Some of this 
growth has been achieved because of the robust growth in the domestic savings rate, 
which is currently over 24% of the GDP 
- 
one of the highest in the world. 
But the main pillars of on which the revival of Indian economic growth was 
founded since the budget of 1991, i. e., industrial production and exports have revealed 
their vulnerability. In addition, as indicated by the table below, both industrial and 
agricultural growth have slowed down considerably, and the fiscal deficit has risen. 
Year Index of 
Industrial 
Production 
Index of 
Agricultural 
Production 
Exports 
(US Dollar 
Revenues) 
Gross Fiscal 
Deficit 
(% of GDP) 
1990-91 8.2 3.8 9.2 8.3 
1991-92 0.6 
-2.0 -1.5 5.9 
1992-93 2.3 4.1 3.8 5.7 
1993-94 6.0 3.8 20.0 7.4 
1994-95 9.3 5.0 18.4 6.0 
1995-96 12.1 
-2.7 20.7 5.4 
1996-97 7.1 9.3 5.3 5.2 
1997-98 4.2 
-3.7 1.5 6.1 
Source: Lompueu from uovemment of India, Economic Survey 1997-98; Ministry of h manse, montniy 
Economic Report May 1998; Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 1997-98. 
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Table 4.1: Selected Indicators of India's Economic Performance 
Further, as indicated by the table below, the foreign direct investment flows 
are down sharply. 
Year Foreign Direct Investment 
(Million $) 
Portfolio Investment 
(Million $) 
1990-91 93.4 7.1 
1991-92 132.2 3.8 
1992-93 237.8 182.0 
1993-94 581.7 3645.3 
1994-95 1266.9 3580.0 
1995-96 1960.0 2736.6 
1996-97 2528.3 3307.1 
1997-98 3119.5 1790.4 
Dourer.: vnmpuruJrurn [reserve aanK of [naia, Annua[ Keport /YY/-YZf 
Table 4.2 : Foreign Capital Flows into India 
External Sector: 
India's inward looking policies since independence have led to a dismal 
performance on the export front given its focus on self sufficiency and import 
substitution. The trade model was defined by "export pessimism" (Bhagwati, 1993: 
57) where it failed to use the exchange rate policy to encourage exports and 
introduced inflexible and pervasive controls which were an handicap to penetrate 
competitive foreign markets. So it is not surprising that India currently ranks 33rd in 
world exports and has a lowly 0.5% share of global exports. However, post- 
liberalisation, India's exports grew impressively at 19.5% in 1993-94 and the trend is 
expected to continue. The composition of India's exports has also undergone 
considerable changes over the decades Agro-commodities, such as tea and cotton, and 
textiles constituted over 75% of exports until the early 1960s, and now account for 
35% of exports. Impressive progress has been made in exports of engineering goods, 
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garments, gems, and jewellery, leather goods, and marine products. The main 
destinations for these exports are the European Community (34.4%), U. S. (18.8%), 
Japan (7.7%). 
India currently ranks 29th in imports world-wide, with an insignificant 0.6% 
share of total world imports. Some imports are unavoidable, largely due to crude oil 
and petroleum products deficiency within the country. In 1993-94, India's imports 
grew by 6% but imports are expected to go up as the economy opens up. 
Barring two years of negligible surpluses, India's trade balance has 
consistently been negative and the position was aggravated in the 1980s by a growth 
policy which allowed liberal imports without really promoting exports. In 1998 the 
estimated trade deficit was U. S. $ 9 bn. 
External Debt: 
The perennial trade deficit and the need to import capital goods and raw 
materials necessary for development has forced India to increase its borrowing. The 
foreign debt has burgeoned since the 1980s, and has reached a staggering level of US$ 
73 billion at the end of 1993. The fact that most of this debt is in the form of medium 
to short term, high interest bearing, commercial loans is disturbing and attempts are 
being made to retire these, using the forex reserves that the country has managed to 
attract in the recent past. 
Forex Reserves: 
India's forex reserves which were never healthy due to negative balance of 
payments position, dipped to precarious levels during the crisis of 1991, when it fell 
to about US$ lbn. Thereafter, the situation improved because of borrowing from the 
IMF, devaluation of the rupee, and foreign investment in India. The reserves had risen 
up to US$ 25 bn in 1998. 
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Currency: 
Although the Indian rupee was pegged to a basket of currencies and was 
supposed to move in tandem with these currencies and the countries purchasing 
power, the rupee was consistently maintained at a higher level than the BOP situation 
warranted. This led to a proliferation of illegal forex deals and the flight of capital 
form India. To counter this, the rupee was periodically devalued. Since the 
devaluation of 1991, the rupee has been relatively stable, and the removal of most of 
the controls on the forex transactions has meant that the market is the key factor in 
determining the rupee's value. 
Fiscal Operations: 
The government is the largest spender (about 20% of GDP) in the Indian 
economy. The central government consumes two-thirds of the budgetary expenditure 
and transfers one-third to the state governments and union territories. On the receipts 
side, the revenue only accounts for 56% whereas the government's revenue 
expenditure is over 71 % implying a deficit by both the central and state governments, 
which averages about 2% of the GDP. The gross fiscal deficit accounted for an 
average 7% of GDP in the last 15 years, but lately there has been an effort to limit it to 
about 6%. The three major components of the governments revenue expenditure are 
interest payments on government borrowings, subsidies, and defence expenditure. 
Indian Industrial Sector: 
Other than a liberalising economy, India has some unique features which are 
attractive to international investors. A pluralistic democracy for most of its post- 
independence era, India is governed by an English speaking elite, based on an Anglo- 
Saxon legal system. In addition, since it has always had a vibrant, albeit small, private 
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sector run by veteran entrepreneurs, and a well established capital market with 23 
stock markets which have about 7000 companies listed. In addition, there is an 
adequate financial and banking system, and adequate protection of industrial property 
rights. Thus India has most of the structures and systems needed to transform itself in 
place, and has to focus on boosting the efficiency in its current economic structures. In 
terms of business practices, probably the single greatest weakness plaguing the 
country is the degree of corruption. The problem is grave simply because of the fact 
that it affects all layers of society and seems to be the one of the defining 
characteristic of the political economy. 
After independence in 1947, India embraced a mixed economy, with the 
public sector dominating what were perceived as being the sectors that were important 
in the national interests, and the private sector operating in a small cocoon behind 
walls of protection and captive markets. As Bhagwati (1993: 50) has so eloquently 
stated: 
"The Indian planners and regulators sought to regulate both domestic entry 
and import competition, to eliminate product diversification beyond what was 
licensed, to penalize unauthorized expansion of capacity, to allocate and 
prevent the reallocation of imported inputs, and prevent the reallocation of 
imported inputs, and indeed to define and delineate virtually all aspect of 
investment and production through a maze of Kafkaesque controls. This all- 
encompassing bureaucratic intrusiveness and omnipotence has no rationale 
in economic or social logic, it is therefore hard for any one who is not a 
victim of it even to begin to understand what it means. " 
The Public Sector: 
The Indian public sector, which is truly substantial, has always been 
considered to be an important sector to cultivate and enlarge. The public sector was 
not confined to utilities or infrastructure; the idea was to have a gradual take over by 
the public sector of the manufacturing sector as well. In turn, the two Industrial Policy 
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Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 shifted an number of industries to the exclusive domain 
of the public sector. Included in this were not merely defence related industries, but 
also atomic energy, iron and steel, heavy machinery, coal, railways and airlines, 
telecommunications, and the generation and distribution of electricity. 
Instead of providing revenue and efficiency to the economy, the public sector 
soaked up subsidies. With three-quarters of the country's industrial assets, the public 
sector contributes only to one-third of the industrial output (Thakur 1993). By 1991- 
92, there were 237 public sector enterprises with total investment of Rs 1470 bn. In 
theory, these enterprises makes a 2% return on capital, but in practice, according to Y. 
Venugopal Reddy, economic adviser to the commerce ministry, this is an 
overstatement (Economist 1995: 20). This is primarily because the returns are heavily 
weighted by the profits of the petroleum enterprises, and even this meagre profit was 
ephemeral, based on historical-cost depreciation: corrected for replacement cost, the 
profits in public-sector enterprises in coal, steel, fertiliser, power, and transport were 
even estimated to be negative. ' There were also other costs involved in sustaining an 
inefficient public sector. The public sector is monopolises the infrastructure sector, 
and as pointed out by Jagdish Bhagwati any "inefficiency there multiplies everywhere 
else and that has become a big albatross" (Tyagi, 1994: 16). 
As a part of the reforms that began in 1991, it was decided to offer up to 20% 
of government holdings in selected public enterprises to mutual funds, financial 
investment institutions, workers and the general public to raise funds , encourage 
wider public participation and provide greater accountability. As a part of this policy, 
'For an excellent account see B. R. Nayyar, "The Public Sector in India: The Dialectics of Legitimation 
and Rent Seeking, " in L. Gordon and P. Oldenberg (eds. ), India Briefing 1992, The Asia Society 
(Boulder, Col.: Westveiw Press, 1992). 
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the government selected 32 public enterprises with a good track record and offered a 
portion of their equity for sale.. For reasons that are partly ideological, and partly to 
do with the influence of the trade unions, the government has not yet bitten the bullet 
on disinvestment of 51 % in the public sector. The present policy of selling small 
tranches has come in for strong criticism even within the bureaucracy. As a 
government document, quoted in the Economist (1995: 20) states: 
Partial disinvestment of equity in the public sector enterprises fails to address 
the efficiency problem.... it has no impact on ownership, control and 
management.... it has been used more as a fiscal tool in order to raise cash to 
finance the government deficit, rather than to improve the efficiency of 
enterprise operations.... There is also the danger that such an approach can be 
a temptation to privatise badly and to postpone the more difficult but much- 
needed longer term fiscal reforms. 
So far only in one enterprise does the extent of divestiture exceed 40 per cent 
of the government's equity. At least in half the number of enterprises the divestiture 
works out to be less than 10 per cent. Most of the divested companies, with some 
minor exceptions, have been the most profitable companies that have contributed 
about 85 percent of the total dividend to the exchequer in last three years. The 
government has not, as seen in the table below, made much progress in actually 
closing down a single public sector enterprise. Other than the legal issues involved, 
one of the main reasons for the lack of progress has been the absence of a credible 
social safety net. 
Status Number of PSEs 
Recommended for winding up 5 
Winding up notices served on 5 
Revival package approved 8 
Stay of proceedings by the High court 2 
Cases under inquiry 23 
Total 53 
Source: Mohan (1996), p. 78 
Table 4.3: Current status of sick PSEs 
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The area where some progress has been achieved in terms of reform is the 
competition policies, where the number of industries that were exclusively reserved 
for the public sector has been progressively reduced to 5 from 18. As of now the only 
industries where the public sector has a monopoly are defence production, atomic 
energy, mineral oils, railway transport and radioactive materials. The government has 
also tried to introduce performance measures for the sector through Memorandum of 
Understandings which spells the respective roles of the government and the public 
sector to improve performance. Although the system has been in existence since 
1988-89 and has progressively covered nearly 40 per cent of the sector, there are no 
credible sanctions against the management if they fail to meet their commitments 
(Chopra, Atal et al 1995: 64). There is also a clear conflict of interest in an 
administrative machinery rating and supervising public enterprises that fall under their 
jurisdiction. For example, in 1993-94,75 per cent of the evaluated enterprises were 
rated as "excellent" or "very good" and only 10 per cent were rated "fair" although 
most of them were loss making enterprises. 
The Private Sector: 
In contrast to the "prescriptive" economic regimes of the East Asian countries 
where the government seeks to point the economy in a certain direction and then 
leaves the economic space open for the private sector to thrive in, India has a 
"proscriptive" economic regime (Bhagwati, 1988). In such a regime government 
officials were given the power to refuse permission for most private initiatives. This 
effectively created quasi-monopoly rents for those few who managed to get licences 
or import quotas, and a self-sustaining system of privileges and rents came into being. 
While oligopolies were flourishing in various sectors like automobiles (with 
about 80-100% market share), the government, rather ironically, was trying to prevent 
concentration of economic power, by licensing the creation and expansion of capacity. 
This is best exemplified by the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 
which in an effort to check the large-scale or organised sector, promoted the small- 
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scale sector. The other rationale for promoting small scale firms was to boost 
employment, since these industries employ more workers per unit of output and 
capital. The effect was to "proscribe the expansion of small firms, discourage 
economies of scale and encourage high-cost production; the result was that India 
ended up with inefficient small companies and monopolistic large ones 
.... 
The lack of 
a coherent bankruptcy policy (known as `exit' policy in India) completed the tale of 
woes. "(Thakur 1993). In an excellent analysis of India's textile sector, Dipak 
Mazumdar has shown how the industrial policy has handicapped India's textile 
industry, by preventing firms from diversifying into synthetic fibres adequately for the 
sake of protecting the small scale producers of cotton textiles (Mazumdar 1991). 
Having been nurtured in such a protected environment and captive home 
market, the Indian private businesses are "blinking in the sunlight"(Economist 1994) 
ushered in by the radical reforms. There are mood swings between extreme 
exuberance about the opening up, and a feeling of unease about facing up to foreign 
competition. The first is reflected in the business confidence index shooting up during 
1994 in the wake of the explosive rise in corporate profits of 102%. The output of the 
capital goods industry, which was the first to go into recession, was 18% up on the 
same period in 1993. These results were effectively a result of specific policy changes. 
Import duties which reached 300% in 1991, were down to 65% in 1994, and projected 
to go down to 25% in 1998. Capital gains tax has been cut from 40% to 30% and 
corporate taxes reduced from 50% to 40%. Additionally, there has been a huge flow 
of capital into the stockmarket 
- 
market capitalisation grew from 1,110 billion rupees 
in 1990-91 to 3,980 billion in 1993-94, which has given the companies a lot of 
investable cash. 
To counterbalance this euphoria, a number of the older oligopolies are feeling 
threatened disappearance of their captive markets. Arguing that the new environment 
is demanding a new range of skills, the management consultant Mrityunjay Athreya 
says that "in the past, when companies were making plans, the first thing they looked 
at was the statute book. Now they have to look at the market. "(Economist 1995). 
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These companies are having to restructure their organisations, typically cutting their 
hierarchies from nine levels to four of five, and try and increase efficiency. The latest 
management techniques, ranging from just-in-time, kaizen, business process 
reengineering, and total quality management are being adopted. In trying to 
concentrate on their core competence, the older firms are selling off some of their 
subsidiaries. For example, the old business house of Tatas, whose strength lies in the 
engineering sector, sold off its soaps and toiletries divisions to Hindustan Lever. 
In addition to such restructuring, some of the older firms are pressurising the 
government to help them protect their family empire. They are against the government 
opening up sectors to imports in which their firms will lose their captive markets, like 
the consumer goods sector. The "Bombay Club" as this group of industrialists are 
referred to, has been successful in persuading the government to give industry tax 
breaks, and stop foreign investors from taking over their family-controlled public 
companies, essentially with the help of the huge nationalised financial institutions 
which have controlling stake in most of these companies. At the same time, these 
firms have not shied away from teaming up with foreign firms, especially in 
competitive sectors like consumer electronics and huge infrastructure projects. 
A significant feature of the large private sector firms is the influence of the 
financial institutions that have investments in these firms. Most of these financial 
institutions are in the nationalised sector. Since they were the primary source of large 
funds till very recently, the firms were forced to turn to them for capital investments. 
In the context of the political economy, the nexus between the industrial lobby, the 
political elite and the bureaucracy became firmly entrenched. As a result of this, the 
large nationalised financial institutions have a controlling stake in most of the large 
private sector firms. To a very large extent these institutions have avoided the misuse 
of their power and remained "silent partners. " But as the recent case of the role of the 
financial institutions in the power struggle between BAT Inc., (U. K) and the Indian 
management highlighted, these institutions are not averse to playing a critical role, 
especially when they believe it is in the interest of the firm and/or the nation. 
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Figure 4.1: Indian Financial System 
The Indian financial sector is characterised by the predominance of public 
sector institutions, which, till the early nineties, were motivated by socio-economic 
considerations. The banking sector is a prime example in which the so-called social 
banking, coupled with political interference, has vitiated the profitability of the 
banking sector. Over the years, the government increasingly relied on the RBI to 
finance its borrowing. The RBI in turn asked the commercial banks to maintain a 
large proportion of their Demand and Time liabilities as reserves which reduced 
banks' yield on capital employed. Another reason for the poor performance of banks 
is the priority sector lending scheme wherein almost 40% of the total credit has been 
advanced to sectors like agriculture and small-scale industry from where recoveries 
are very poor. 
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Financial institutions also suffer from poor asset quality. Under the License 
Raj, once a license was granted by the government, institutional finance had to be 
provided regardless of project viability. Moreover, the government's concern for 
employee protection forced financial institutions to continue to lend to ailing 
companies. In addition, the insurance industry is completely government-controlled. 
With a view to deregulating the financial sector, the government instituted the 
Narasimhan Committee to recommend changes in the existing structure. On the basis 
of the recommendations, the government has over a period of time reduced the 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) from 38% to 25%, allowed the nationalised banks to 
tap the capital market and directed banks and other financial institutions to achieve 
capital adequacy ratio of 8% of risk weighted assets by March 1996. 
The Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) have played an important role 
in the progress made by Indian industry. The integrated structure of these institutions 
comprises 9 institutions, of which 5 are All India Development Banks and four are 
specialised finance institutions. The bulk of term lending for project finance is 
undertaken by the Development Banks. Two of the specialised institutions, are 
involved in risk capital and technology development financing, the third provides 
shipping credit, and the fourth provides finance for hotels and tourism related projects. 
The DFIs have been instrumental in the development of Indian industry by providing 
term finance by underwriting and direct subscription to equity and debentures. In the 
past, the Development Banks have had access to cheap funds by issuing Government 
guaranteed SLR bonds which carry low coupons compared to market rates. The 
downside, however, was that they were forced to lend irrespective of project viability. 
The minimum lending rate for the DFIs is fixed by the RBI. The DFIs also provide 
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assistance through leasing asset credit. By 1992, all subsidised funding to the 
Development Banks had stopped, forcing them to become more market oriented in 
sourcing funds and lending them out. Most of the DFIs have diversified into non-fund 
financial services such as merchant banking and capital market operations. 
Even though the autonomy of these financial institutions has increased in the 
last few years, they still have the government as their majority equity holder and thus 
have to abide by the government's policy directives. Ironically, as the access of the 
Indian corporate sector to foreign funds has increased, coupled with a comparatively 
buoyant capital market and high domestic interest rates, companies have increasingly 
shifted to using equity, instead of debt, to finance projects. This has saddled the DFIs 
with financing second and third tier companies, thus increasing their asset risk profile. 
Movements in interest rates, financial and currency risk management and successful 
diversification into other financial services are influencing the stability in income of 
the DFIs. 
Broadly speaking, economies can be characterised as being either stock- 
market oriented or bank oriented (Allen 1993, Porter 1992). Traditionally, the US and 
UK have been regarded as being stock-market oriented while Japanese and German 
economies are regarded as being bank oriented. A priori, one could expect agency 
costs and information problems to be lower in a bank oriented system than a stock- 
market oriented system. Therefore, internal finance should be less important in a bank 
oriented system than a stock market oriented system. 
In this framework, India can be considered to be a bank oriented system. As 
noted by Bhatt (1994), the lead bank system in India is similar to the universal banks 
in Germany and the main bank system in Japan. In the late 1960s, India devised three 
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main types of lead banks with a view to raising the rate of financial savings, allocation 
of financial resources to the most productive uses, and improving the investment and 
productive efficiency of assisted enterprises. In practice, the lead development bank 
system in India has not fully accomplished its goals of promoting efficient import 
substitution and export promotion because of deficiencies in: 
" project appraisal and evaluation 
" monitoring and supervision of projects 
" mechanisms to anticipate problems and take a proactive role in tackling them 
through managerial, technical, and/or financial assistance in time 
The primary reason for the lack of adequate monitoring has been their failure 
to evolve mechanisms of co-ordination with the commercial banks, who typically 
provide working capital finance in the Indian context. In addition, there has been the 
classic free rider problem with regard to monitoring of borrower activities due to the 
absence of an institutional framework for co-ordination of decision making among 
banks. In addition, although the lead bank system in India shares several 
characteristics of the Japanese system, the differences in overall institutional and 
policy framework has made the Indian system very different compared to the 
Japanese. Also, unlike Japan and Germany, commercial banks in India do not own 
equity in corporation; only the development banks hold significant equity stakes in 
firms. In addition, term finance provided by the development banks can, in certain 
circumstances be converted into equity. This has proved controversial in context of 
the market for corporate control in certain instances. 
As highlighted by the table below, in case of Indian firms, external finance has 
become more important in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. This is due to debt as 
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well as equity; in particular, equity has become more important after 1987, consistent 
with the overall boom in the stock market during this time. Overall, on an average, 
internal finance contributed about 42 per cent of total funds and external finance the 
remaining 58 per cent. While external equity made up about 4 per cent of all funds, 
long term borrowing contributed 29 per cent. 
Particulars 1995 1996 1997 1998 
No. of listed companies 4702 5603 5832 5853 
Market capitalisation ($ Billion) 138 153 129 142 
Annual turnover ($ Billion) 22 15 35 53 
Average daily turnover ($ Billion) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Average number of daily deals 85,010 73,855 64,503 80,192 
BSE Sensitive Index (Year end) 3261 3367 3361 3893 
No. of Registered FlIs 308 366 439 496 
FII Net investment ($ billion) 0.67 0.92 0.85 0.63 
source: isomoay MOCK txcnange 
Table 4.4: An overview of the Bombay stock market 
The Indian capital market has come a long way since its inception over a 
century ago. The first stock exchange was established in Bombay in 1875 as `The 
Native Share and Stockbrokers' Association'. It has evolved over the years into its 
present status as the premier stock exchange in the country. The Bombay Stock 
Exchange is the oldest in Asia, even older than the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which was 
founded in 1878. At present there are 21 stock exchanges in India recognised under 
the Securities Contract Regulation Act (1956). India has far more listed companies 
than any other emerging market; in fact only the US matches India on this count. 
Although India has had a stock exchange for very long, its development until 
1980 was erratic, but in general very slow. The total market capitalisation on the 
Indian stock markets as a proportion of GDP in 1980 was only 5 per cent. Following 
the limited liberalisation measures initiated in the eighties, the ratio had risen to 13 per 
cent by 1990. It was in the wake of the liberalisation measures initiated in the early 
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90's that the stock market growth has been explosive. By 1993, total market 
capitalisation had reached 60 per cent of GDP. The rapidity of the growth can best be 
appreciated from an historical perspective 
- 
it probably took the US stock market 85 
years to achieve a broadly similar increase in capitalisation ratio, from 7 to 71 per cent 
(Mullins 1993). There has been an almost thirty fold increase in daily turnover of 
shares on the Bombay stock exchange, with the daily trading volume on the Bombay 
market in the early 1990s similar to that in London 
- 
about 45,000 trades a day. 
The growth in the stock market is also reflected in the large amounts of capital 
that Indian corporations raised on a very active primary market to finance their growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s. As shown in the figure below, there was a 250 fold increase 
in the amount raised through corporate securities since 1980. Another indicator of an 
extremely active private market was the fact that in 1994-95 nearly 1700 companies 
raised equity capital, either through direct offerings or through rights issues; of these 
369 were new companies. 
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Source: Bombay Stock Exchange 
Figure 4.2: Amount raised through primary' market ( Billion Rupees) 
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There is general consensus that the stock market boom, reflected in the 
Bombay Sensitive Index (see figure) was largely policy induced (Balasubramanian 
(1993), Nagaraj (1996), Singh (1998)). Several studies, for example, Sahni (1985), 
Kothari (1986), Lal (1990), Ramesh Gupta (1991,1992), Raghunathan (1991), Varma 
(1992), and L. C. Gupta (1992) comment on the Indian capital market in general and 
trading systems in the stock exchanges in particular and suggest that the systems 
therein are rather antiquated and inefficient, and suffer from major weaknesses and 
malpractices. According to most of these studies, significant reforms are required if 
the stock exchanges are to be geared up to the envisaged growth in the Indian capital 
market. Stock market reforms, liberalisation, and fresh regulation happened 
simultaneously in an economy that was facing acute macroeconomic problems (Joshi 
and Little, 1996). The most crucial piece of legislation that was enacted was the 
Securities and Exchange Board Act of 1992, which attempts to ensure transparency in 
the stock market. Under this act, the authorities have attempted to regulate the 
activities of stockbrokers, merchant bankers, and other intermediaries in the primary 
market. Liberalisation measures have included the repeal of the Capital Issues Act of 
1947 by which the government controlled new share issues and determined the issue 
price. The government also permitted foreign institutional investors to directly 
purchase Indian corporate shares; at the same time it allowed Indian companies, 
subject to some restrictions, to raise funds abroad. According to Pandya (1992) the 
measures brought in by SEBI broadly cover measures for allocative efficiency in the 
primary market with fair degree of transparency, reforms in the secondary market for 
visible and mutual funds, regulation of various market intermediaries and above all 
for the protection of the investing public. On whether SEBI has been successful in 
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improving the functioning of the stock markets, the conclusions are mixed (Francis, 
1991; Barua, 1993; Dhillon, 1993). These studies reveal that the regulation of the 
markets through various instruments have had only a marginal impact on the dual 
objectives of controlling market activity and insolvency risk. 
By the early 1980s, in the context of a worsening economic situation, neither 
the development finance institutions nor the commercial banks could meet their 
government imposed requirements to lend to the priority sectors of the economy at 
concessional rates and also meet the needs of the private corporate sector. The 
Reserve Bank of India advised the mobilization of household savings through capital 
market expansion to meet the corporate sector's requirements (Singh 1998). In 
practice, this translated into a rapid growth in the number of investors on the stock 
market, mainly through mutual funds. The entry of a large number of investors, 
especially of foreign investors, lowered the cost of capital for Indian corporations, 
which in turn encouraged them to raise large amounts of capital on the stock market. 
In developed countries, bond markets tend to be bigger in size that the equity 
market. In India however, corporate bond market is quite small compared to the size 
of the equity market. One of the main reasons for this is that a large part of corporate 
debt, being loan from financial intermediaries, is not securitised. But this picture is 
undergoing a sea change in the last few years, as increasingly larger number of 
companies are entering the capital market to raise funds directly from the market 
through issue of convertible and non-convertible debentures. The deregulation of 
interest rates is also resulting in innovative instruments being used by companies to 
raise resources from the capital market. 
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Conclusion: 
"Given the complexity of India's development experience, it would be idle to 
pretend that everything it did was right but it would be naive to suggest that 
everything it did was wrong" (Nayyar 1998). From a long term perspective, when 
compared to most developing countries, the most important success was in creating a 
thriving political democracy with a mixed economy which provides a viable model 
for the countries that are making the transition from communism. The Indian 
experience clearly illustrates the possibility of succeeding in such a arduous venture 
and at the same time highlights the limitations and pitfalls of development. This 
chapter has clearly highlighted the institutional constraints within which the Indian 
economy works. From 1947 to 1991, although there was consensus about following a 
state market capitalist path, the pressures from various groups forced the various 
governments to choose the path of least resistance. This effectively diluted the impact 
of most policy initiatives 
- 
on the plus side it meant that the country avoided the 
excesses of other developing countries; on the other hand, political compromises 
meant that even measures that would be beneficial were watered down. After the 
economic crisis of 1991, initially there was enthusiasm for following a pluralistic 
neo-liberal economic path to development. But the perceived failure of these policies 
and the conflicting interests of domestic interest groups has led to the proposed 
adoption of a corporatist model of development. This confusion is partly a function of 
the extant political economy where there is a problem in resolving the view points of 
various pressure groups. These conflicts are best reflected in the financial system 
where there is a bank oriented stake holder economy, which is trying to cohabit with a 
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thriving share-market driven domestic industry. These conflicts are best reflected in 
the financial system where there is a bank oriented stakeholder economy, which is 
trying to cohabit with a thriving share-market driven domestic industry. We have 
suggested that the mixed economy within a democratic framework has worked to the 
advantage of India during the recent crisis 
- 
the various institutions that have 
developed over the past have limited the excesses taking place, especially in the 
context of short term borrowing by the private sector (which has been one of the main 
factors leading to the crisis in the rest of Asia), free convertibility of the currency and 
excessive "crony" capitalism. Although it is the constraints imposed by the 
institutions and organisations within the political economy that has checked the pace 
of liberalisation, this ironically, has worked to India's advantage in the recent crisis, 
especially in relation to capital controls on foreign currency movements. 
Notwithstanding the fact that India was one of the "safe havens" during the crisis, 
there is a obviously a need to focus much more ön the building of institutions and 
greater transparency within the business system, at the same time quickening the pace 
of liberalisation. This is especially true if India has to keep up with the rapid changes 
that are taking place within the global economy with knowledge industries emerging 
as one of the primary locomotives of economic development. 
In the context of corporate governance and capital allocation, India today is 
caught between the two main systems, i. e. shareholder system dominated by the share 
markets or be guided by the government through the financial institutions and banks. 
At present given the government's fiscal problems, it looks like the India is drifting 
towards the establishment of the market for corporate control. But given the problems 
associated with the interlocking of intergroup interests of large family businesses, the 
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total exclusion of ordinary shareholders from decisions regarding corporate 
restructuring, mergers, divestments, etc. and the lack of institutional safeguards, this 
drift might not be in the best interests of the nation's financial health. 
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SECTION II: 
KNO WLED GE, DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS 
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KNOWLEDGE BASED EXCHANGE: 
INALIENABILITY AND RECIPROCITY 
Introduction: 
An organisation's ability to create and exchange knowledge within a network 
of social and technological relationships has become crucial to success in today's 
world of globalisation, uncertainty and turbulence. In chapters 5,6, and 7 we explore 
various aspects of knowledge which will have a profound impact on development and 
international business. In this chapter, the focus will be on the distinctive nature of 
exchange of knowledge given the fact that unlike most other goods that are exchanged 
it is intangible. Most of the vast past research on knowledge based competition has 
tended to rely primarily on transaction cost analysis, and to neglect the salient 
features of the nature of knowledge as an intangible resource and the difficulties of 
assessing its value. Recent exceptions include Grant (1996); Choi and Lee (1997); 
Spender (1996). We believe that the intangible nature of knowledge especially in 
today's constantly turbulent world, shifts the focus away from knowledge products or 
services being exchanged in the market, towards how the market identifies certain 
firms and certifies their knowledge resources and value in the market. The 
intangibility of knowledge also raises the fundamental question of the effectiveness of 
knowledge based market exchange, and what possible alternatives exist to such 
market based exchange. 
Research by behaviourally oriented scholars such as Polyani (1944,1957, 
1966,1971); White (1970); Burt (1992); Coleman (1990a, 1990b); Granovetter (1985) 
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have helped to show that once analysis moves away from the abstract economic 
models of perfect information and frictionless exchange, reality is based on the 
complexities of imperfect competition and exchange based on social structures, 
personal contacts and relationships. We believe that the realities of such social 
capital, structure and relational effects are especially true in knowledge based 
industries (Walker et al., 1987; Spender, 1996). The significance of this proposition 
rests on the fact that it is very difficult to ascertain the quality and value of 
knowledge, not only at the time of exchange, but potentially even after the exchange. 
The recent research on knowledge has focused on creation and benefits of knowledge, 
without providing frameworks for understanding the nature of exchange in intangible 
assets (Itami & Roehl, 1987) such as knowledge. 
If knowledge is relatively tacit and implicit (Polyani, 1957), the nature of 
exchange cannot be the same as for more explicit information exchange and for the 
exchange of tangible assets such as capital, plants, equipment. As noted by Lippman 
and Rumelt (1982); Spender (1996); Grant (1996), an organisation's competitive 
advantage may increasingly be based on variables that are least identifiable, and most 
difficult to measure. Thus, the ability to identify the other firm or, "actor" in 
exchange rather than the product or service, and assess the value of the firm becomes 
crucial. Such identification can be greatly influenced by external intermediaries in the 
market. 
Our theory in this chapter is rooted in the concept of "exchange" (Simmel, 
1978; Sahlins, 1972; Bourdieu, 1977; Levi-Strauss, 1966; Durkheim, 1951). The 
objective of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, the intangibility of knowledge in 
exchange raises North's (1990) important point on measurement and enforcement 
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costs, which Williamson (1985) has taken as exogenously given (Hirsch and 
Lounsbury, 1996). We analyse the importance of intangibility and "inalienability" in 
understanding the nature of knowledge as an asset. We believe that this characteristic 
of knowledge requires us to develop different conceptual frameworks by which 
knowledge assets are exchanged. Knowledge based assets tend to be inalienable, 
whereas commodity type assets, which can be freely exchanged in the market are 
alienable. 
Secondly, although existing research views the accumulation of knowledge as 
a positive attribute, the process of exchange whereby knowledge is acquired or lost is 
not sufficiently analysed; plus, if knowledge is tacit, informal, how can it have a 
transparent market valuation? The premise in this chapter is that because the 
intangibility and inalienability of knowledge requires a more informal system of 
exchange and co-ordination, we can learn from the social anthropological literature 
(Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978) which has studied the nature of exchange in, primitive, 
premodern, social systems. These systems developed effective exchange mechanisms 
without formal systems of law or contracts (Bourdieu, 1990; Sahlin, 1972; Casson, 
1996), however they also studied in depth the difference between exchange of 
commodities, versus exchange of inalienable assets (Gregory, 1982). We believe that 
the exchange of tacit, informal assets such as knowledge (Polyani, 1957,1966) 
requires analogous frameworks of analysis. 
Modern Capitalism and Alternatives: 
In analysing the concepts of organisations, markets and exchange in modem 
society, we implicitly assume the model of modem "capitalism". Modem capitalism 
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and its particular approach to organisation, production, distribution and market 
exchange is seen to be superior to and in direct contrast to, central planning, or the 
system of the former Soviet-type economies (Elster and Moene, 1989). Capitalism is 
then private ownership of most means of production and decentralised market 
exchange; in contrast, central planning or socialism is government ownership of most 
important means of production and centralised distribution (Weitzman, 1984,1985). 
In reality, capitalism and market exchange has elements of central planning and 
central planning has elements of market exchange; nevertheless the two can be seen as 
extreme contrasts. The question we raise in this chapter is if knowledge has become 
increasingly important as an asset and if knowledge is difficult to exchange through 
markets (Polyani, 1957,1966; Spender, 1996), do we automatically assume that 
between the two systems mentioned, the capitalism model will also be the ideal one 
for utilising and exchanging knowledge? 
There is a certain consensus that the system of central planning in the former 
Soviet union type systems could have been potentially a perfect system, if there were 
perfect information, and an abundance of "trust" (Elster and Moene, 1989). With full 
information and trust between principals and agents, the central planning system 
could avoid the potential pitfalls of opportunism (Williamson, 1975,1985) or self- 
interest. But recent research in management and social sciences has shown the 
increasing importance of trust in all systems, including the capitalism system which is 
seen as the system of modem society (Etzioni, 1996). Trust also becomes essential, 
when the nature of exchange and assets being exchanged has intangibility quality or, it 
is difficult to have a market valuation or price. 
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Polyani (1944,1957,1966,1971), who is universally quoted in terms of the 
distinctions of implicit knowledge versus explicit information actually discussed, an 
alternative model to either capitalism or socialism. Polyani (1957) and other social 
scientists such as Kolm (1984) have suggested the existence of a third system, that of, 
reciprocity, defined as, "the giving and receiving according to need" (Polyani, pg. 
210). This idea overlaps partly with the concept of worker-managed producer co- 
operatives which have been analysed in detail by Weitzman (1984,1985); this system 
has also been called, the profit sharing system. The distinctions among these three 
systems is shown in the figure below: 
SYSTEM Major characteristics 
Private ownership of most factors of 
Capitalism production, with decentralised decisions 
and exchange carried out by the market 
Government ownership of most factors of 
Central Planning (socialism) production, with centralised decisions, 
redistribution carried out by government 
Reciprocity, based on giving and 
Alternative Systems receiving according to need, profit 
sharing among all actors in the system 
Table 5.1: Capitalism, Central Planning versus Alternative Systems 
These earlier works by Polyani (1957), Kolm (1984), Weitzman (1984,1985) 
however do not provide a sketch of the institutions that could potentially work in such 
a reciprocity based system. The ideas and frameworks provided by this earlier 
research also do not distinguish between the nature of production, distribution and 
exchange in tangible assets such as manufactured products, and intangible assets, such 
as knowledge. The purpose of this chapter is to fill this void. We sketch out a 
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preliminary framework for understanding such reciprocity based systems, since they 
are traditionally seen as part of primate, or pre-modem societies (Bourdieu, 1977, 
1990; Gregory, 1982). However, one characteristic of pre-modem societies was that 
exchange was based on informal, social exchange, overlapping with concepts of 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992) of the social structure; 
these systems of exchange combined various elements of markets, reciprocity, 
redistribution in exchange; we believe this can provide a framework for understanding 
knowledge based exchange. 
In terms of trust based exchange, these pre-modem societies, based on 
informality, had created institutions for undertaking trust based exchange in, 
"inalienable" or intangible assets. The literature agrees that intangibility is a key 
component of knowledge as an asset (Spender, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Thus, 
the nature of exchange of knowledge assets can learn from the nature of exchange in 
these pre-modern societies on inalienable assets (Bourdieu, 1977,1990). 
Money and spheres of exchange: 
In order to develop our frameworks for analysing the exchange of knowledge 
as an asset, we need to broadly discuss the nature of markets, and market based 
exchange. Although the vastly expanding research on knowledge emphasises that 
knowledge is tacit, informal (Polyani, 1957) and thus, unlike physical assets such as 
equipment, capital, difficult to acquire through the market, there is insufficient 
analysis on the nature of, exchange for knowledge assets, and how it is different from 
exchange of non-knowledge assets. The key distinction is that tangible, physical 
assets such as equipment, capital have a "valuation" and price determined in the 
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market; this valuation serves as an universal, transparent mechanism to facilitate the 
exchange of such physical assets. Under market exchange of commodities, assets 
being exchanged are focalised, quantified, valued at a particular price (Gell, 1982). 
Tacit, informal assets such as knowledge, are difficult to determine a valuation for, 
and thus, the value can be context or situation specific, or specific to particular 
organisations or actors (Polyani, 1944,1971; Spender, 1996; Choi and Lee, 1997). 
What facilitates the co-ordination of market based exchange? Money and the price or 
valuation by the market seem crucial; money itself has different functions in market 
based capitalism versus centrally planned socialism. Under capitalism, most income is 
spent on housing and transport with less on clothing and consumer necessities; in 
contrast under centrally planned socialsim, housing and transport are subsidised and 
most income is spent on clothing and consumer necessities (Neale, 1976; Gudeman, 
1986; Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992). Prices thus reflect very different values, 
even for tangible commodities such as transport, clothing, consumer necessities. 
Past research in sociology and anthropology have analysed the important role 
of money in helping to determine and create markets. The existence of multipurpose 
money in turn allows a valuation of assets, goods, services in the market place. But as 
mentioned earlier, intangible assets such as knowledge are difficult to place a market 
valuation, because their value may be specific to organisations, actors, or even 
situation or context specific. Such assets may have a symbolic economic value 
(Bourdieu, 1977,1990; Douglas and Isherwood, 1979). Research in social 
anthropology have shown that in various societies where money exists, there has been 
a tendency to category, different, "spheres" or exchange, certain tangible items such 
as foodstuffs and raw materials were exchanged for money, but more intangible items 
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such as cloth would only be given as gifts without the exchange of money (Appadurai, 
1986; Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978; Gregory, 1982; Neale, 1976). Although such 
spheres of exchange could be seen as the difference between market exchange and 
social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), we are referring to the fact that certain, 
intangible assets such as knowledge may be reliant on different spheres than the 
spheres of exchange for tangible assets such as plant, equipment, capital. Such 
different spheres of exchange also exist in exchanges within families or households 
(Douglas and Isherwood, 1979; Bourdieu, 1990). We believe this is crucial in 
understanding the exchange of knowledge: it is difficult for knowledge assets to have 
a market valuation, or price determined by multipurpose money. 
Invisible, Intangible & Inalienable Assets: 
The rapidly expanding literature on knowledge based assets has raised the 
importance of, invisible assets in the success of organisations. As analysed by 
Jacobson (1992), dynamic frameworks of competition, such as those advocated by the 
Austrian school of firm competition places a greater emphasis on intangible, invisible 
assets and the role of unobservable factors. Itami and Roehl (1987) have also noted that 
traditional research has tended to define assets too narrowly, focusing on the tangible 
assets, such as plant and equipment. They note that invisible assets such as accumulated 
consumer information, brand name reputation, management skill, corporate cultures are 
just as important to the success of the firm. These invisible assets are key to a firm's 
success because they are difficult to obtain, and in some sense, difficult for competitors 
to, imitate. The invisibility of such assets in turn raises the problem of exchange of such 
assets also with potential collaborators (Choi and Lee, 1997). This has similarities to the 
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idea of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) aspects of a firm's strategy, 
which are difficult for competitors to overcome or imitate because of the ambiguous 
nature of the competitive advantage. Such asymmetric information and the resulting 
competitive advantage may be greater for firms with invisible assets, because 
competitors find such assets ambiguous, and more difficult to imitate. Knowledge has 
many similar characteristics of such invisible assets; how in turn, is knowledge 
exchanged? 
In the abstract, system of anonymous exchange and competition used in many 
economics driven models, there is no need to identify the other actor or actors within 
market based exchange. The assumption is that the content or value of the product or 
service is tangible, thus there is no uncertainty or transaction costs and the value and 
tangible quality of the product or service being exchanged will determine the nature of 
the relationship. In this sense, there is no, social aspect of the relationship. However, 
the expanding research on networks, and other social capital driven organisations 
(Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990a, 1990b; Raub and Weesie, 1990; 
Schrum and Withrow, 1988; Walker et al, 1997) has tried to analyse broader aspects 
of exchange. What has been insufficiently analysed in these earlier works is that they 
have tended to just distinguish between market exchange and social exchange as two 
extremes (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990). A more formal typology 
of exchange mechanisms, and the overlap between market and social exchange which 
exists in most societies (Polyani 1944,1957,1966,1971) has not been sufficiently 
discussed. 
We try and provide such a typology of exchange, in order to better understand 
the nature of exchange in invisible assets such as knowledge based assets. To do so, 
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we need to make the distinction between commodities, or alienable assets, which are 
freely exchanged in markets, and inalienable assets, which tend to have more of a 
social exchange aspect. We use the term "alienable", a term more commonly used in 
social anthropology (Simmel, 1978; Bourdieu, 1990; Sahlins, 1972), to describe the 
exchange of such commodities under market exchange. We now define the difference 
between intangibility and inalienability: 
"..... the market value of intangible assets can only be known through 
high measurement costs..... inalienable assets may not have a market 
value, and may have value only in organisation specific and situation 
specific contexts. 
Thus, according to our definition, intangible assets can be measured and be accorded a 
valuation in the market, however the measurement costs may be high. Inalienable 
assets however may not have a market valuation; their value may be dependent on 
organisations, individuals, situations and context. Shown in figure 5.1 below, is a 
classical case of market exchange of alienable commodities. 
Alienable Exchange 
Actor A Pr öduct 
1,41411111* 
Actor B 
service 
Source: Adapted from Choi & Lee (1997) 
Figure 5.1: Exchange of "alienable" assets 
As analysed by North (1990), Hirsch and Lounsbury (1996), information 
costs, such as measurement costs are one of the fundamental problems of interactions 
139 
and exchange in the market. Such measurement costs are especially high for 
knowledge based industries, where there is high intangibility of value and content. 
Thus, the identity of the firms and consumers in exchange becomes relatively more 
important as the value of what is being exchanged becomes more uncertain. 
The limitations of the pioneering works by North (1990) and others is an 
insufficient analysis of the systems of "exchange". Market exchange, which leads to 
the exchange of alienable, commodities has been seen to characterise modern 
societies; in contrast to primitive societies, which rely more on social, inalienable 
exchange. The concept of gifts has been used by social anthropological researchers to 
show the difference with commodities; gifts are inalienable and thus exchanged 
socially, commodities are alienable and thus exchanged in the market (Bourdieu, 
1977,1990; Douglas and Isherwood, 1979; Gregory, 1992). However as far back as 
Polyani (1944), it has been known that most societies have elements of both 
alienability and inalienability. This is especially the case with asset such as, 
knowledge, which have a tacit, informal characteristic (Polyani, 1957,1966,1971) 
and are thus often organisation or individual specific (Choi and Lee, 1997). 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) discuss the three conditions which must be 
satisfied for exchange and combination of resources to take place. However, similar 
to other works on networks and social capital (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992) they do 
not analyse the different "structures" of exchange and focus instead on factors such as 
the opportunity, value expectancy and motivation; thus they do not distinguish 
between alienable assets such as commodities, versus inalienable assets such as 
knowledge. In exchanging inalienable assets, a consumer can in turn be driven by the 
identity of a firm, in addition to the quality and value of the product or service being 
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provided. Thus, the crucial aspect of a firm's competitive assets and advantage may 
shift away from the product or service to the importance of its overall firm identity or 
reputation in the market. In the extreme case, the product or service can actually 
become identified with the firm, and with the firm's quality, status leading to an 
increased role of trust and long term relationships within the market. In the case of 
inalienable assets such as, gifts, the identity of the actor giving the gift, can in turn 
determine its value (Bourdieu, 1977,1990; Gregory, 1982). This is shown in the 
figure below where firms and consumers are categorised as actors. 
Inalienable Exchange 
Source: Adapted from Choi & Lee (1997) 
Figure 5.2: Exchange of inalienable assets 
We argue that such identification in the market is "relative" and leads to status 
(Bourdieu, 1977,1990) within the industry. This is similar to the concept of, "gifts" 
in social anthropology. Exchanges based on gifts are seen to create status, and 
symbolic, relative rankings for the exchange partners (Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978). 
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Knowledge is "inalienable" 
part of firm, actor 
Exchange and Inalienability: 
Researchers in sociology and anthropology have indicated the important 
distinction between alienability and inalienability. Alienability refers to tangible 
assets, products and are fundamental to market based exchange, such commodities can 
be easily valued to have certain monetary prices, and their values can be quantified. 
In contrast, inalienability refers to intangible assets, such as gifts, which may be more 
difficult to measure in terms of market prices, and may be more dependent on quality 
rather than quantity measures (Polyani, 1944,1957; Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978; 
Douglas and Isherwood, 1979). 
In this sense, exchange of inalienable assets such as knowledge are similar to, 
"barter" based exchange, which are seen to always have a social or psychological 
component (Bourdieu, 1977; Gell, 1982; Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992; 
Appadurai, 1986). Barter exchange differs from commodity based exchange, which 
involves money and is done through the market. Traditionally, barter type exchange 
has been thought as only existing in primitive or pre-modem societies, however recent 
research on topics such as countertrade (Choi and Lee, 1997; Marin and Schnitzer, 
1995) and linked trade have shown that these various types of non-standard exchange 
can exist even in modern economies such as Western Europe or North America. This 
means that non-standard types of exchange, including barter have an additional value, 
that may not be measurable in terms of market valuation and market price, but 
nevertheless facilitate exchange of inalienable assets such as knowledge. 
The important point is that for inalienable assets, the identity of the exchange 
partner, or actor is important in determining the quality of the inalienable asset. 
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Knowledge is seen as intangible, and research in knowledge as an asset does discuss 
the fact that knowledge is often organisation or individual specific (Choi and Lee, 
1997; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996). An example is that of, gift exchange; it is 
however a more general issue of exchange that has been much more thoroughly 
analysed in the social anthropology literature such as Bourdieu (1977,1990); Simmel 
(1978). Gift type exchanges were traditionally seen as the extreme opposite of 
commodities in market exchange (Malinowski, 1961; Gregory, 1982; Bourdieu, 1977, 
1990). Including barter type transactions as a, "alternative" or third category, we have 
the three categories of exchange: reciprocity as in barter; redistribution as in gifts; 
market exchange as in commodities. In terms of our earlier classification among 
capitalism, central planning (socialism) and alternative systems: market exchange 
corresponds to capitalism; redistribution corresponds socialism, central planning; 
barter or "reciprocal" exchange corresponds to the third, alternative system. This is 
shown in the table below. 
Types of Exchange Major Characteristics 
Under barter type exchange, the identity 
Reciprocity of the exchange partners are known, with (Alternative system) the market valuation, price less important 
than the social, psychological aspects 
Under gib exchange, inalienable assets 
Redistribution are exchanged, often between actors of (Central planning, socialism) different status, leading to a certain 
redistribution of assets 
Under commodity exchange, exchange is 
Market Exchange through money of alienable objects, 
(Capitalism) products, services between free actors, 
agents, who may enact further exchange 
Table 5.2: Reciprocity. Redistribution, Market Exchange 
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Under alienable exchange, the identity of the actors in exchange is not 
important. This is because the asset being exchanged is highly alienable, tangible, and 
the quality and market value transparent. In addition, the rules and procedures of 
exchange, such as search costs, or time of exchange, frequency are already determined 
again, making the identity of the actors less important. In contrast, when the asset 
being exchange is, inalienable, then the asset does not have a clear, transparent, 
market value, because the quality is intangible. If an asset such as knowledge, is also 
linked to rapidly emerging new technologies, such as in multimedia industries, the 
rules, procedures of exchange may also be uncertain. For example, whereas 
commodities may be exchanged at a particular time, in the world of the internet, assets 
are constantly being exchanged at all times. The net result, is a high importance, on 
the identity of the actors. This distinction between alienable and inalienable or 
knowledge based exchange is shown in the figure below. 
Figure 5.3: Alienable versus inalienable exchange 
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Knowledge Based Exchange: 
In modern societies, exchange is seen to occur between players in the 
anonymous marketplace (Granovetter, 1985; White, 1970; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1990). But because of uncertainty, incomplete and asymmetric information issues, 
many types of exchange even in mature economies of Western Europe and North 
America have elements of, "reciprocal exchange. " Reciprocal exchange can be 
defined as types of exchange where there are informally enforced agreements between 
parties in exchanging goods, services (Choi, 1994; Kolm, 1984). Reciprocal exchange 
has elements of both these systems and has similarities to the "gift" exchange that 
anthropologists have analysed in primitive and premodern societies ( Levi-Strauss, 
1966; Gregory, 1992; Bourdieu, 1977,1990; Malinowski, 1961; Sahlins, 1972). 
However, gift exchange or reciprocal exchange has also been commonly seen in 
modem societies, and has been analysed in various recent works such as Choi (1994); 
Schlicht (1993); Kranton (1996); de Soto (1989). 
These recent works on gift or reciprocal exchange have shown that they can 
have various advantages over anonymous market exchange even in modem societies. 
Such exchange invariably has elements of, "trust" in the relationship. Trust is defined 
as having some fate in the workings of systems or processes of which one possesses 
only limited knowledge. Trust is vested not in individuals but in abstract capacities. 
Therefore, the operation of trust relationships depend on the consumers' knowledge 
and the process of information that directly constrains the consumers' decision 
making and behaviour. There is a vast literature on notions of trust throughout 
management and social sciences research. Some general works that analyse issues of 
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trust in markets and organisations include, Douglas and Isherwood (1979); Choi 
(1994); Elster and Moene (1989); Williamson (1985). 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the fundamental issue that 
knowledge and knowledge based assets cannot be readily exchanged in the market. 
The response in the literature (Spender, 1996; Williamson, 1985) is to consider 
alternatives such as knowledge transfer within organisations, across national 
boundaries, or in strategic alliances (Choi and Lee, 1997). However, we believe that 
when an asset cannot be readily exchanged in the market, we are in conflict with the 
foundations of what we call, "modem exchange". Thus, the nature of exchange itself 
has to be questioned in order to find the most effective ways of exchanging 
knowledge. In this paper, we analysed the alternatives to such market based 
exchange, and indirectly to capitalism. 
Conclusions: 
Most of the vast past research on knowledge based competition has tended to 
rely primarily on transaction cost analysis, and to neglect the salient features of the 
nature of knowledge as an intangible resource and the difficulties of assessing its 
value. Recent exceptions include Grant (1996); Choi and Lee (1997); Spender (1996). 
We believe that the intangible nature of knowledge especially in today's constantly 
turbulent world, shifts the focus away from products or services being exchanged in 
the market, towards how the market "identifies" through external cues, certain firms 
and certifies their resources and value in the market; the identity of the actor in 
exchange in turn requires a more social, reciprocal and trust based analysis. 
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In this chapter, we defined the distinction between intangible and inalienable. 
The market value of intangible assets can be known, through high measurement costs; 
inalienable assets, may not have a market value, and may have value only in 
organisation specific and situation specific contexts. Although existing research 
views the accumulation of knowledge as a positive attribute, the process of 
"exchange" whereby knowledge is acquired or lost is not sufficiently analysed. 
There is a need to create frameworks for understanding exchange mechanisms for 
intangible and inalienable assets such as knowledge. 
We provided alternative frameworks based on reciprocity and redistribution, 
exchange systems traditionally more commonly associated with pre-modern societies 
(Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978). However, these non-capitalist societies have 
traditionally developed exchange mechanisms for differentiating between 
commodities type assets, which are exchanged through the market, and inalienable 
assets such as knowledge, which are exchanged through reciprocal arrangements. 
These in turn may be the most effective exchange mechanism for intangible and 
inalienable assets such as, knowledge. 
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ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, we analysed market exchange and alternative S 
frameworks from modern and pre-modern societies, in order to understand the nature 
of exchange in intangible and inalienable assets such as knowledge. We believe that 
the intangible nature of knowledge especially in today's constantly turbulent world, 
shifts the focus away from products or services being exchanged in the market, 
towards how the market "identifies" through external cues, certain firms and certifies 
their resources and value in the market; the identity of the actor in exchange in turn 
requires a more social, reciprocal and trust based analysis. We defined the distinction 
between intangible and inalienable. The market value of intangible assets can be 
known, through high measurement costs; inalienable assets, may not have a market 
value, and may have value only in organisation specific and situation specific 
contexts. 
This very distinctive nature in the exchange of intangible and inalienable 
goods, leads to clustering of industries mainly due to the advantages in exchanging 
tacit information which is a essential for maintaining a continuous process of 
innovation. It is this that has led to the emergence of centres of excellence in form of 
cybercities like Bangalore and Silicon valley. This in turn has made the location of 
business and economic activity a fundamental topic of international business research 
- 
to analyse the potential increasing returns and agglomeration benefits of the 
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economic integration we need to take into account the realities of international 
business factors such as labour mobility, institutional myopia, political uncertainties. 
But the issue of location brings together various economics as well as non-economics 
literature including: geography, complexity theory, history and path dependence. 
The location of corporations has become a crucial factor in economics and 
business success for cities, countries and regions. Krugman (1991a, 1991b, 1998a, 
1998b) has been the researcher most responsible within international economics for 
advocating a branch of research known as the, "new economic geography". This 
relatively interdisciplinary area of research incorporating complexity theory, 
international economics and economic growth theories, and geography have begun to 
show how historical accidents and certain underlying factors can lead to dramatic 
creation or disintegration of economic activity. This research has not only relied on 
the latest developments in economic theory, but also the earlier European works in 
geography and regional science of Weber (1909); Christaller (1933); Losch (1940). 
Although there has been a certain interest within international business on the 
existence of clustering of industries (Porter 1990), the existence of such networks and 
clusters have not been fully integrated into the growing research in the new economic 
geography, which have begun to provide the underlying reasons for the process that 
such networks and clusters can help to create cities, countries and regions. 
As the pace of globalization increases and most activities become increasingly 
mobile, firms can split their production choices among locations, as well as being able 
to supply more distant markets and customers. Competition between the various 
states for attracting investments within India has further added to the urgency of 
further research on such issues of the new economic geography (Sapir 1996; Krugman 
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and Venables 1995; Krugman 1998). The fact that a particular firm's location 
decision may in turn be determined by the location decisions of other firms, and the 
aggregated benefits of the location make it potentially a crucial area of international 
business research. This is especially the case, because if indeed such geographical 
factors are driving foreign direct investment and firm decisions towards location and 
strategy, this has substantial implications for public policy and the role of the state 
towards such firm decisions (Lenway and Murtha 1991). 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we hope to integrate the 
rapidly expanding literature in the new economics geography, which includes 
developments in international trade (Krugman 1991a); growth theory (Romer 1986); 
economic development (Stiglitz 1994) with the research agenda of international 
business. These developments in several areas of economics have moved away from 
traditional neoclassical economics of perfect information and perfect market 
mechanisms, towards imperfect information, imperfect competition and complex 
interactions among the state, markets, and society. Thus, the substantial results of this 
economics research needs to be more closely intertwined with international business 
frameworks. 
Secondly, we focuses on how the results and frameworks of this new economic 
geography can be applied to the economic developments in India. We analyse how the 
results of economic geography need to take into account the issues of "labour 
mobility" in order to fully comprehend the relevance for international business 
research. The lack of labour mobility, which has political, social and psychological 
foundations could work in opposite directions as the economic effects of geography, 
agglomeration and increasing returns. 
150 
Location and Geographical Advantage: 
Research on geography, location and economic success have confirmed the 
expectation that market access and transport networks are crucial factors in economic 
success. More recent research has shown that economic growth rates and income 
levels are substantially higher for countries that have a high proportion of the 
population near the coast near one of the major economic regions of the United States, 
European Union and Japan (Gallup and Sachs 1998). The new economic geography 
shows that geographical advantage is greatest for an intermediate level of trade costs. 
For example, there will be an initial clustering in a center of firms to reduce trade and 
transportation costs, i. e. centripetal forces, but as these costs decrease, firms tend to 
reverse the flow and scatter towards periphery regions, i. e. centrifugal forces 
(Krugman 1991a, 1991b, 1998). 
Overall, the key determinant of geographical advantage is the ease of interaction 
and exchange with major other players, such as consumers, suppliers, information and 
technology. Such interactions are necessary for backward linkages such as the firm 
purchasing from others in the region, and forward linkages such as the firm supplying 
parts or training workers (Krugman and Venables 1995; Gallup and Sachs 1998). The 
tug of war between the twin forces of clustering and locating in one place versus 
separating out into several areas has been the crucial areas of research in the new 
economic geography. The clustering towards the center, or centripetal forces is given 
by factors such as market size effects, concentration of highly skilled labour; whereas 
the opposing centrifugal forces that lead to a scattering of firms are driven by the rents 
and costs of land and the immobility of labour (Krugman 1998; Krugman and 
Venables 1995). 
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Neoclassical economics generally assumes a rational maximizing behavior 
among various actors in the economy. Thus the path dependency, historical accident 
aspects of economic geography have more similarities to evolutionary biology 
(Krugman 1998). In evolutionary biology, players in the business environment can 
make myopic choices based on past behaviors, the behavior of others, or due to 
historical precedent. The well known article by Knickerbocker in international 
business of course discussed the tendency for multinational enterprises to follow into 
areas, countries, regions that other multinational enterprises have pursued in the past. 
But the new economic geography as well as the new economic growth theories show 
that this type of oligopoly effect can be further enhanced or magnified due to 
increasing returns effects (Arthur 1994; Krugman 1991; Romer 1986). Thus, the 
oligopoly effects of following rivals into the same new markets, countries, regions 
becomes much greater and can fundamentally change the development of areas 
through the interaction of related players. 
Economic geography's main focus has been the cumulation or agglomeration 
process of firms that decide to locate or conduct business in a particular location, 
country, region (Krugman and Venables 1995; Krugman 1991,1998a; Audretsch 
1998). This means that one region that has a slightly greater number of successful 
corporations can help to create a self-reinforcing (Schelling 1978; Arthur 1994) type 
of aggregate effect where larger markets are created, encouraging more suppliers to 
work in the region, and further reinforce the various positive effects (Audretsch & 
Feldman 1996; Audretsch & Stephan 1996). In the models of traditional neoclassical 
economics, firms having perfect information will rationally anticipate the future 
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location of various other firms, and thus make rational decisions that may or may not 
lead to such agglomerations. 
This is where traditional neoclassical economics and the new economic 
geography begin to diverge in their analysis and frameworks. The relevance of this 
new research on economic geography to international business is that like 
international business, the new economic geography takes into account the realities of 
firm decision making. Such realities of the international business environment 
include imperfect information, myopic decisions based on Knickerbocker type 
oligopoly effects, and lack of forward-looking decisions about future firm and 
industry concentrations. 
An Application to India: 
There is a need to analyse India through the conceptual frameworks of 
federalism. As analyzed by Weingast (1997), there are two generations of research on 
federalism. The first generation, similar to neoclassical economics has assumed that 
both firms and governments are black boxes, that will treat their shareholders and 
citizens benevolently. These earlier works showed that the decentralization from 
federalism would allow more informed decision making at the local government level, 
and that competition among various local and regional jurisdictions would allow 
citizens to choose according to their preferences (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). 
The more recent, second generation frameworks of federalism have taken into 
account the developments in social science research in the theory of the firm, and the 
various incentives problems that separate manager and shareholder interests. In an 
analogous fashion, these more recent works show that there is no natural reason for 
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political officials to necessarily further the preferences and interests of the citizens, 
although at the same time, there is no need to assume a necessarily malevolent 
government and political institutions (Olson 1965; North 1990; Weingast 1997; 
Kornai 1986; Inman & Rubinfeld 1997). This second generation of research thus 
takes into account the complexities of imperfect information, monitoring, and 
potential misalignment of interests between citizens, political officials and political 
institutions. The foundations of a successful federalism such as that of the United 
States is seen to be a state that rewards economic success, as well as punish economic 
failure; for example, Kornai's (1986), "soft budget constraint" showed how this 
provided incentives for the state to bail out inefficient firms or failed projects in 
Eastern European countries. The ability to reward and punish is dependent on the 
state making credible commitments to market; providing the central government with 
less information and power can increase the credibility of the federal government's 
commitment to economic rights and to the efficient functioning of markets forces 
(North 1990). 
Competition among local governments prevent a particular government from 
not acting in the interests of its citizens. Under federalism, a local government that 
bails out inefficient firms, will lead to mobile resources leaving for other local 
governments and regions and will also find it difficult to attract future resources. 
Buchannan (1995) has analysed in detail how the rent seeking by the New Jersey 
government of the corporations headquartered in the state, led to a shift of mobile 
resources, and to New Jersey being replaced by Delaware as center of major 
corporations. The major potential problem with federalism is that of redistribution of 
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wealth and resources; lack of a centralised determined redistribution policy can lead to 
increased inequality across regions, as in some of the American southern states. 
Thus relative to the United States, there is much less labour mobility in India. 
Second, is flexbility of wages and prices. In India, just as there has been relative 
immobility of labour, there is also rigidity in wages and prices. This inflexbility also 
has social and institutional causes, for example, that Indian industry is based on a mis 
of stakeholder values, or a tendency to measure economic and business performance 
through multiple criteria and shareholder values. Rather than using the prices of 
shares and the evaluation of the stockmarket for business and economic performance 
as in countries such as the United States, large segments of the Indian industry rely on 
banks, insurance companies, government, and employees to provide a multiple 
stakeholder evaluation of success, in a similar way to Japan, but leading to greater 
rigidity in wages and prices (Albert 1991; Choi 1994; Fruin 1992). Thirdly, is a need 
for a mechanism to transfer fiscal resources to the country or region experiencing the 
asymmetric shock. Such stabilising transfers may be a policy area where the India 
may be relatively effective, especially since the India has been undertaking such 
transfers to relatively lower income states to reduce horizontal fiscal imbalances 
which arise due to differing levels of development (Ahluwalia and Little, 1998). 
McKinnon (1995,1997) has pointed out that one crucial aspect of the system 
of federalism in the United States is that the local government are constrained in their 
borrowing, since their expenditures are not backed by the U. S. central bank. In 
contrast, in India, since each state has albeit limited tax raising powers, it creates the 
possibility that they will bail out loss making firms in the state (Ahluwalia and Little, 
1998). This is especially true of the large and inefficient public and private sector 
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enterprises which rely on huge loans from development banks rather than stock 
markets for their capital financing 
U 
. 
S., India and Economic Geography: 
In terms of the more economics driven aspects of the new economic 
geography and location theory research, the continuing integration within India 
provide an excellent sample to apply empirically these new theories (Amiti 1998). 
The new economic geography literature (Krugman and Venables 1995; Krugman 
1998a, 1998b; Venables 1996) extends the earlier new international trade literature 
(Krugman 1979; Ethier 1982) by showing that international or inter-regional demand 
differences can be caused by either the mobility of workers, labour or the mobility of 
firms. This leads to a combination of upstream and downstream agglomeration 
effects and clustering helping to create increased concentration of economic activity in 
a particular region. 
The existing empirical works predict that over time, there will be greater 
specialization and geographical concentration in countries or regions that have access 
to large markets and to export those goods and services that have a home market bias 
(Krugman 1979; Amiti 1998; Sapir 1996; Greenaway and Hine 1991). But a premise 
of this chapter is that in India, this will not occur on a similar scale to the 
regionalization and geographical concentration that occurred in manufacturing in the 
United States before the First World War (Kim 1995). In the works of Kim (1995) 
and Hanson (1996), empirical research has shown that the regional specialization in 
the United States that began to increase rapidly through transportation after the First 
World War, began to slow down in the inter-war years. 
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There is a fundamental difference that need to be addressed before the new 
economic geography effects become a reality in India. This is the social, political, 
and psychological aspects of "labour mobility". The concept of general labour 
mobility throughout the population, of changing the types of jobs but also the 
organization is fundamentally a pheneomenon most commonly seen in the Anglo- 
Saxon countries such as the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia 
(Albert 1991; Darity and Goldsmith 1996; Choi 1994). We analyse these social, 
psychological and institutional determinants of labour mobility and immobility in the 
following sections. 
Labour Mobility I: Behavioural Factors 
The potential barriers to labour mobility, which is the crucial factor in 
determining the success of the India economically, helps to illustrate the differences in 
thought from traditional neoclassical economics and the more, social psychology 
based approaches (Darity & Goldsmith 1996). This is the distinction between the 
neoclassical economics view of substantive human rationality, versus the procedural 
view, more common to other social sciences such as psychology (Darity & Goldsmith 
1992,1996). This procedural and behavioural view common to sociology and 
psychology believes that shock such as unemployment can influence the taste for 
working and searching for work, which in turn influences their ability to be re- 
employed and their productivity. These ideas were also discussed by earliest 
economic theorists such as Robinson (1933). India requires labour mobility across 
state and regional boundaries; moving employment across states is a shock to most 
Indians, who traditionally felt strongly about their regional identity, and a close 
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affinity to their regional culture, society, communities and institutions. Cyclical 
unemployment which will the necessitate moving to new states, are both shocks 
which we believe can have the behavioural, psychological problems on productivity 
and taste for work (Darity & Goldsmith 1996). 
Macroeconomics theories have also emphasised the importance of 
psychological factors influencing business investment, consumption, equity markets. 
However, such important factors are seen to be exogenous to the analysis; this also 
applies to models of productivity and the labour market. Traditional, neoclassical 
models of the labour market have tried to develop frameworks around factors such as 
demographic changes; structural changes that lead to mismatches between employers 
and employees (Blanchard & Summers 1988); insider versus outsider behavior 
(Lindbeck & Snower 1988); efficiency wages (Carmichael 1990). These frameworks 
accept the importance of psychological and social factors, but assume them to be 
exogenous to the analysis. 
In contrast, according to behavioural approaches to unemployment, and other 
aspects of changes in the labour market, such shocks, affect workers' productivity 
through lower self-esteem, losing control, and being left out of the worker 
environment (Darity & Goldsmith 1996). In India 
, 
most workers have been 
accustomed to long term employment, in turn building social and community 
networks of relationships around this assumption and help develop their, identity; the 
concept of mobile labour, and frequent employment changes more common in the 
United States is still relatively foreign to most Indian workers (Lambert 1963, 
Ramaswamy 1983). Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have shown how employment and 
unemployment are crucial experiences in a workers' life, leaving vivid and persistent 
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memories. Such psychological damage also affects former co-workers, who suffer 
from seeing their former colleagues leave their jobs. In India, the close knit social 
communities, especially magnifies this pressure, since the relations in communities 
tend to be both public and job linked, as well as private and family linked. Patel 
(1988) has investigated the consequences of closure of cotton mills in Ahmedabad, 
the town that was formerly known as the Manchester of India. Unemployed workers 
from these mills now depend on the informal sector for their livelihood; these workers 
have lost both the social provisions and the legal protection that lent respectability to 
their former lives. Employment related shocks, can thus lower the productivity and 
potential employability of not only the unemployed, but also the motivation and 
productivity of close knit friends and family members. 
As reviewed in depth by Darity and Goldsmith (1996), neoclassical economic 
models of the labour market and unemployment, such as efficiency wage models 
assume that the fear of being unemployed will motivate workers to raise their 
productivity, and the notions of human capital are based more on physical, rather than 
psychological health. In a similar way, we believe that rapid economic development 
will require workers in India to try and better understand the skills, capability and 
value of working across state boundaries. This creates a conflict with their traditional 
psychological well being which is based on close knit communities, and relatively 
little job mobility. If as advocated by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), firms tend to be 
risk averse, especially under conditions of information asymmetry or incomplete 
information, then firms will especially avoid not only unemployed workers, but also 
workers from different states. Different cultural and social backgrounds, experiences 
with institutions, can all become factors for firms to become risk averse towards 
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workers of other states or regions or castes (Greenwald & Stiglitz 1986), especially 
after high periods of uncertainty through the economic convergence. Such 
behavioural realities need to be taken into account in analysing the economic 
convergence. 
Labour Mobility II: Signalling and Sorting : 
The second major area of labour mobility that needs to be analyzed in terms of 
economic geography and international business research is the issues of imperfect 
information, and the results on market signals (Spence 1973) and various aspects of 
hiring and screening processes in the labour market. Weiss (1988,1995) in a series of 
papers, has analyzed the subtle importance of differences between market signals, and 
more unobserved abilities and qualities, an issue also analyzed much earlier by works 
such as Schelling (1969). Such signalling and screening models of labour and in 
generally overcoming imperfect information have been widely researched in 
economics in works such as Lazear (1981); Blanchard and Summers (1988). 
However, all these existing works assumed a mostly fixed, national, cultural, social, 
institutional background where such signalling and sorting were to occur. Weiss 
(1995) has discussed the differences between signalling and screening in the 
following way. In signalling, the informed party, such as a worker moves first; in 
screening, the uninformed party, such as the firm moves first. As analysed by 
Schelling (1960) in his classic work, the ability to coordinate and agree on points of 
salience, or focal points depends on such shared backgrounds and cultures. The rapid 
economic development in India raises the complex issues of labour that needs to move 
across different states, cultures, societies, institutions. Thus, we believe that the 
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potential economic benefits of rapid development needs to take into account the 
realities and complexities of such signalling and sorting criteria in analysing the issue 
of social mobility. 
Indian Education System: 
In such labour signalling and screening models, workers choose different 
levels of education, schooling; workers for whom education is a relatively lower cost, 
will tend to invest further in education, signalling to the market their quality and 
productivity (Spence 1973; Weiss 1995). The positive correlation between the ability 
and capability to learn, and in turn the length of investment in schooling or education 
is central to sorting results in the labour market (Weiss 1988,1995; Cho & Kreps 
1987). However, across different states of India, it is very difficult, if not impossible 
to compare the education system, and their relative merits and strengths, and what 
capabilities they provide within the labour market. This is mainly because of the fact 
that, other than a few centres of excellence that are run directly by the federal 
government, most educational institutions are under the control of the state 
government - the central government is only involved in dispersing some subsidies to 
the state governments and broadly overseeing the curriculum. In practice this has 
meant that there are vast differences in the standard maintained by the various 
educational institutions, with a very large correlation between the level of 
development of each state and the standard of the educational institutions within it. 
Altonji (1993) has shown that in the United States, the earnings are affected by 
a composite measure of secondary school scares, self-appraisals of ability, and scores 
on certain standardized tests. Thus, even if there are no structural differerences in the 
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education system in the various states in India, the differing quality of education 
makes it extremely difficult for screening, and signalling to occur in the labour 
market, as existing economics works such as Lazear (1981); Blanchard and Summers 
(1988) have analyzed in an American, single nation, culture, institution context. 
Human Capital and Unobserved Traits: 
Recent research in the American context such as Weiss (1988,1995); Card 
and Kreuger (1992) have shown that wage rates and labour mobility can be attributed 
to "unobserved" traits or capability of workers. For example, workers who had 
invested in longer periods of education, had greater perseverance towards their jobs, 
and thus tended to be more productive workers. Such perseverance is important 
because firms cannot always perfectly observe whether high performance is linked to 
ability, effort or luck (Akerlof & Yellen 1985). The willingness to work harder than 
others, can also be an observed characteristic that can be linked to rewards such as 
promotions, compensations later in their career (Milgrom & Roberts 1992). 
In terms of the importance of diversity of the environment, Card and Kreuger 
(1992) showed that within the United States, workers from states with more effective 
schools, such as smaller class sizes, had higher returns to education. The critics of 
such sorting models (Weiss 1988,1995) of labour markets predict that firms will find 
cheaper ways to find out about workers, or test for them directly. This has proven to 
be difficult even in the United States context (Card & Kreuger 1992), and will be 
substantially more difficult in the EU context. Problems of language, culture, testing 
systems, measurement of capabilities all raise substantial difficulties in such 
standardization of capability, signalling and screening in India; however, the pure 
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benefits of economic convergence, assume that such standardization exists, thus 
allowing the labour mobility requirement crucial for geographical economic 
integration within India. 
Human capital models divide human capital into general and firm specific and 
assume that the difference between a worker's productivity at a firm where the worker 
has acquired tenure, and that worker's potential productivity at another firm, is 
somehow shared between the worker and the firm. The complexities of employment, 
culture, society, institutions across India make it difficult for a worker and a firm to 
share such differences. Thus, even more than in a relatively standardized education 
system in the United States, companies in India need to assess the possibility of using 
sophisticated sorting models (Weiss 1988,1995) to discover the unobserved traits, 
and hidden capabilities of workers from different states, in order to create the social 
mobility that is fundamental to the success of the economic convergence. As Weiss 
(1988,1995) has discussed, such sorting models however have not been widely 
accepted even in the labour market research within the United States, because of 
assumption that the market would remove such inefficiencies, and also because such 
sorting is mistakenly grouped with credentialism. However, given the complexities of 
India, and the urgencies of economic convergence, Indian companies may need to 
accept certain aspects of credentialism, including the acceptance and standardization 
of certain education qualifications, for example, MBAs, master of business 
administration degrees. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Given the distinctive nature of the exchange of intangibles in knowledge based 
industries leads to clustering, location of business and economic activity has become a 
fundamental topic in international business research. Although there has been a 
certain interest within international business on the existence of clustering of 
industries [Porter 1990], the existence of such networks and clusters have not been 
fully integrated into the growing research in the new economic geography, which 
have begun to provide the underlying reasons for the process that such networks and 
clusters can help to create cities, countries and regions. The fact that a particular 
firm's location decision may in turn be determined by the location decisions of other 
firms, and the aggregated benefits of the location make it potentially a crucial area of 
international business research. This is especially the case, because if indeed such 
geographical factors are driving foreign direct investment and firm decisions towards 
location and strategy, this has substantial implications for public policy and the role of 
the state towards such firm decisions [Lenway and Murtha 1991]. This chapter 
advocates a greater mix of the research done in the new economic geography with 
international business research. 
We applied this to the India to show that the potential increasing returns and 
agglomeration benefits of the economic integration need to take into account the 
realities of international business factors such as labour mobility, institutional myopia, 
political uncertainties. International business research has much to contribute to our 
better understanding of a rapidly integrating states at different levels of development 
in India. However, international business will need to incorporate a broader range of 
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interdisciplinary frameworks from economics, psychology, sociology, law, in order to 
analyse all the complexities of integration. 
There are two areas of further research. Firstly, a further analysis of the 
different incentives offered various states, including competitive tax regimes, on the 
location of industries. Secondly, there is a need to address the public policy and 
governmental issues concerning the benefits of agglomeration effects as advocated in 
the new economic geography research, and how in order to achieve these benefits, 
there is a need to take into account the other non-economic factors such as 
institutional setting, social and psychological aspects of labour mobility; this paper 
began elements of this process by applying the frameworks of the new economic 
geography and international business to the continuing economic integration within 
India. 
We applied this to the India to show that the potential increasing returns and 
agglomeration benefits of the economic integration need to take into account the 
realities of international business factors such as labour mobility, institutional myopia, 
political uncertainties. International business research has much to contribute to our 
better understanding of a rapidly integrating states at different levels of development 
in India. However, international business will need to incorporate a broader range of 
interdisciplinary frameworks from economics, psychology, sociology, law, in order to 
analyse all the complexities of integration. 
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INDIAN SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Introduction: 
In chapters 5 and 6 we have analysed the nature of exchange in knowledge 
based industries and also some of the factors that leading to clustering in these 
industries. Knowledge can be broadly classified into technological and non- 
technological knowledge. The software industry exemplifies technological knowledge 
- 
in this chapter we analyse the Indian software industry in the context of the 
evolution of technological knowledge. We then analyse the growth of the city of 
Bangalore as an example of clustering of firms in a certain location. 
A number of studies in the recent past has identified information technology as 
one of the most crucial technologies affecting economic growth in the developing 
countries (Kaplinsky 1987, Bhatnagar 1992, World Bank 1992). In the information 
technology industry, the global software and software services is worth more than 
$900 billion in 1998, with new applications constantly being developed for a variety 
of sectors (Kular, 1999). For developing countries to enter into the information 
technology production complex, software production is the best entry point. This is 
mainly because there are much lower entry barriers in this sector, it is less capital 
intensive and more labour intensive, and it could lead to many positive externalities. 
Thus it is imperative that developing countries promote strong and indigenous 
software industries (Fialkowski 1990) which help adapt software technology to suit 
their particular local needs. 
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The global software industry has evolved three decades; this evolution can be 
divided into four eras, to help locate the different stages of development of the 
industry in the different parts of the world (Schware 1995, p. 419). According To 
Schware's typology, countries go through the various eras in the evolution of software 
development activities at different times, depending on factors such as their level of 
development, and the technological advancement of countries indicated by the 
presence of high technology industries. In era 1, the early seventies, there as a shift 
from software being an integral part of hardware to the unbundling of software. In the 
late seventies, era 2 in Schware's typology, customised software was becoming the 
norm, as companies needed software to address specific functions. In era 3, there was 
the development of `shrink wrapped' software packages like the Windows operating 
system, which are primarily used on personal computers allowing the user to work 
independently. Marketing is an essential aspect of success in this era, and therefore, so 
is access to funds to be able to finance large scale marketing. In era 4, companies 
across the board recognise that software contributes the key element to a complex 
industrial product, and try to improve or enhance their existing products using 
embedded software development. In any country, at any given time, there are 
overlapping eras. The time sequence presented above reflects the experience of 
developed countries which are now in eras 3 and 4, but most developing countries, in 
Schware's view are between eras 1 and 2, and are about 5 years behind in technology 
and skills. In this chapter we analyse the evolution of the Indian software industry and 
the factors that led to the emergence of Bangalore as one of the leading technopolis in 
the world. 
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Indian Software Industry: 
India has been in the forefront of developing its own software industry since 
adopting a software policy in 1970; this policy has primarily focused on promoting 
exports. The success of this policy, exemplified by the phenomenal growth in exports, 
has challenged the argument that a strong domestic oriented software industry is 
required to build up software production skills and capabilities necessary for exports. 
The software policy in India, has broadly followed the trends in the overall 
industrial and technology policy in India. Since independence in 1947, the importance 
of technology for modernisation has been stressed, with the Scientific Policy 
resolution adopted in 1958 emphasising the need for self-reliance and building up of 
local technological capability (Ahmad 1985). This stress on self-reliance has meant 
that in the software sector, till the mid-90s, the government has been a reluctant and 
hesitant liberaliser and policies have been geared to ensure that goods are only 
imported if they were not being leased out for use in the domestic market. Thus in the 
software sector, after some initial liberalisation in the late 1970s, there was more 
substantial liberalisation in the mid- i 980s, a period of relative stability, then renewed 
liberalisation from 1991. After an exhaustive study of the Indian software industry, 
Heeks (1996) has summarised the situation in the mid-1990s in the context of various 
policy areas as follows: 
Liberal Industrial entry and production capacity 
Fairly liberal Software imports and export incentives 
Partly liberal, partly controlled Foreign collaboration, hardware imports 
Not very liberal Finance, training, infrastructure, legal regulation, 
marketing assistance, software procurement 
Source: tieexs (IY #O) 
Table 7.1: Policy regime in the Indian software sector 
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The main thrust of India's industrial policies has been to promote growth for 
the domestic market, and there is general agreement that they have held back the 
development of exports (Ahluwalia & Little, 1998). The main difference between the 
software sector and most other industries has been the focus on exports; it is the only 
Indian industry that has been export oriented in practice as well as in official policy 
(Sridharan 1989). In fact, the government has specifically targeted the sector as an 
`export thrust area' with the government setting a target of 60 per cent value addition, 
compared to most other exporting industries. The hope was that Indian software 
exports would overtake all other commodity exports in the service sector (Mukhi & 
Chellam 1988). This focus on exports has led to the neglect of the domestic market, 
and some have argued that this has been detrimental to the emergence of a viable 
domestic software industry (Kohli 1991). 
The policies of liberalisation adopted by the Indian government over the past 
decade and the ongoing globalization of the information technology industry are 
having a great impact on the business opportunities available in the IT sector in India. 
A enormous pool of skilled and relatively cheap software professionals located in a 
stable parliamentary democracy with an established legal system, vibrant capital 
market and mature financial system, increasingly, makes India the preferred location 
for software development. As indicated in Table 
, 
in a recent study of ten countries, 
India has the distinct advantage in terms of providing the enabling factors for the 
development of software industry. 
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India Russia Europe Malaysia Singapore China Japan Israel Ireland 
Good general 
engineering education + + + - + + 
system 
Specific software and 
systems training + - + + 
Large pool of capable 
programmers + + + - - + + 
Limited (non-IT) 
opportunities for + + - - - - - 
engineers 
English language 
competence + - - - - + + 
Government policies on 
investment + 
- 
+ + 
- 
+ + + 
Communication 
infrastructure + 
- 
+ + + + + 
Entrepreneurial know- 
how + 
_ 
+ + + + 
Foreign corporate 
investment + + + 
- - 
+ 
Notes: Strong positive: + 
Strong negative: 
- 
Source: Stanford Computer Industry project 
Table 7.2: Country comparison 
- 
India Advantage 
It was in the late 1980s that the developed countries began entering era 4 and 
the industry became more internationalised. Increasingly, companies began to focus 
on their core competence and intensified their efforts at outsourcing all or part of their 
software development. Many firms found outsourcing offshore software development 
a viable alternative to in-house development because of lower cost, inability to hire 
and retain qualified programmers at home, and growing need to move swiftly from 
project initiation to systems installation (Patane and Jurison, 1994). The manpower 
shortage is highlighted by estimates that the gap between the supply and demand for 
programmers in the United States had risen to about 190,000 and world-wide there 
were over 900,000 programming jobs waiting to be filled (Baker, 1997, p. 46). India 
and Ireland have been the main beneficiaries of increased outsourcing, with Israel and 
Hungary being other popular destinations. 
Reflecting these trends, between 1980 and 1996 exports expanded from $4 
million to over $1 billion, nearly 250 fold growth (NASSCOM 1998). The 
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compounded annual growth rate between 1992-93 and 1996-97 was over 48%. As 
nearly 60% of the exports were directed to the US market, the devaluation of the 
Indian rupee vis-a-vis the dollar meant that the growth in real terms was a lot less. 
Between 1987-93, nominal growth was 46.4% while real growth was 28% per annum 
(Sen 1994). 
Year Policy Action Details 
1972 Software Export Hardware imports were permitted for the purposes of software 
Scheme development on the condition that the price of the hardware was 
recouped through foreign exchange earnings within five years 
1976 Further Hardware import duties reduced from over 100 percent to 40 percent; 
liberalisation in the faster clearance of software export applications; software exporters 
software indusrty could take advantage of export incentives including locating of EPZs; 
non-resident Indians allowed to import hardware for the purpose of 
software export with a 100 percent export obligation 
1981 Stricter controls on Import duties on hardware were raised but firms were allowed to use 
imports the hardware for the development of domestic software as well as for 
exports; software exporters could also import "loaned" computers 
1984 New computer Import procedures for hardware and software simplified; import 
policy duties for hardware and software reduced from 135 percent to 60 
percent for software; software was recognised as an industry and 
licensing procedures were simplified; improved access to foreign 
exchange for software firms; income tax exemption on net export 
earnings was reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent. 
1986 Computer software Imports of hardware and software further deregulated, anyone could 
export, software import software at 60 percent duty. 100 percent export oriented 
development and software production units permitted to import hardware duty free; 
training policy Indian firms allowed to sell foreign software as distributors 
-19-8-8 Software Creation of software technology parks for the production of software 
Technology Parks for export 
of India scheme 
1991 Liberalisation of the Devaluation and partial convertibility of the Indian rupee, abolition of 
Indian economy foreign exchange for travel tax; reduction in telecommunications 
charges for satellite links; duty free and obligation free imports of 
telecommunications equipment in the STPs; export obligations could 
be met from earnings from on-site services 
1992- Recent tax policies Software exports brought under the Income Tax Act exempting 
exporters from income tax; confirmation of this status occurred on an 
annual basis until 1995 when it became open ended; income tax 
exemption offered to EPZs and 100 per cent export oriented units was 
extended to software exports from companies taking part in these 
schemes which were established in or after 1993; import duties on 
software reduced in 1994 to 20 per cent for applications software and 
65 per cent for systems software and in 1995 to 10 per cent for both 
Source: Asma Lateel (1 y9 /) 
Table 7.3: Policies that affected the Indian software industry 
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Indian software industry's export profile: 
The Indian software industry is estimated to be worth US$ I billion with the 
potential to become the largest in the world. The industry, with the help of foreign and 
domestic investors, has been growing at a phenomenal rate, with a massive growth of 
140% registered in 1997-98; in the same period the exports from this sector has risen 
46%. In the past seven years exports have spiralled from $ 100 million to $ 1.8 billion 
in 1997. 
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Figure 7.1 : Growth in Indian software exhorts 
As American information technology firms and financial services companies 
have moved much more quickly than their European counterparts to take advantage of 
offshore programming (Tilley 1990), and it is by far the world's largest market, it is 
not surprising that the US market has dominated Indian software export market for 
more than a decade. 
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South-East Asia 
8% 
Rest of the work 
9% 
Source: NASSCOM (1998) 
USA 
58% 
Figure 7.2: Breakdown of Indian software exports by destination (1997-98) 
In addition there are there are other factors that have played a role in 
promoting exports to US including 
" extensive familial and business links between Indian residents in the US and the 
software industry in India 
" comparatively liberal immigration rules for work and residence than most 
developed countries 
In line with Schware's analysis of most developing countries being in era I 
and 2, the bulk of Indian software exports has been in the form of professional 
services, much of which is actually carried out at the client's site overseas, rather than 
offshore in India: onsite services generally comprises low value work, typically 
coding and testing. In 1997-98,58.7 % of the export contracts were carried out at the 
client site. while less than a third of the export contracts was offshore services 
(NASSCOM 1998). As the number of multinationals investing in this sector in India 
increases, the economy is further liberalised, infrastructure is improved, the off-shore 
component of the exports is expected to increase further. But the nature of work, in 
case of offshore contracts, has not necessarily undergone fundamental transformation; 
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Japan 
Europe 4% 
! -- ýý 21% 
the work remains similar to on-site services as a large chunk of the off-shore work 
includes data entry, the lowest in the skill category. However, a certain amount of 
managerial capability is transferred as local managers oversee several projects. 
Additional skill are generated through systems integration, managing facilities, and 
working on software conversions for multiple hardware platforms. 
Analysis of Indian software industry: 
The Indian software export industry is dominated by a few large companies. 
Of the 430 companies that currently export software from India, about 52 of them 
exported software valued at more than 100 million, as against 5 companies in 1991- 
92. The top 20 software exporters accounted for almost 60 % of the total revenues of 
the industry, with the top 10 firms listed below accounting for about 40% of the total 
revenues. 
Rank Company Exports 1996-97 
Rs. Million 
1 Tata Consultancy Services 6068.80 
2 Wipro Ltd. 2588.40 
3 NIIT Limited 1612.50 
4 Pentafour Software & Exports Ltd. 1594.26 
5 Infosys Technologies Ltd. 1267.10 
6 Tata Infotech Limited 1060.00 
7 Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 891.80 
8 International Computers India Ltd. 850.20 
9 Patni Computer Systems Ltd. 848.80 
10 DSQ Software Limited 803.99 
. ource: NA , SLUM (1998) 
Table 7.4 : Top 10 Indian software export firms 
The large Indian software firms do higher end customisation and reengineering 
using the most current technology while the smaller companies tend to do lower end 
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customisation and basic programming. Companies generally gain market share by 
effectively signalling their abilities to the overseas customer and convincing the 
potential clients of their abilities (interviews). The largest companies were often the 
first to start international work. They were "pioneering brands" (Schmalensee 1982) 
which established a reputation as quality companies that were capable of doing good 
work for their clients. This gives later entrants a disadvantage because the overseas 
customer must invest search effort in learning about the new company's quality nad 
abilities while they already know about the established incumbent in the industry. 
Thus most new entrants try to differentiate themselves form the current leaders so that 
a sizable number of foreign customers find them pioneering and not following 
(interviews). In order to penetrate the market, the new entrant either provides a higher 
quality product or lowers the resources that the foreign companies spend on learning 
about quality through signalling. Increasingly, the large companies have made large 
investments to disseminate information about themselves and to signal to new clients. 
This includes the formation of branches and numerous joint ventures, and constant 
upgrading of the knowledge base to keep up with the latest technology. The table 
below reflects the efforts of the largest and oldest Indian software companies to make 
clients abroad aware of the quality of their work in India. 
Company No. of Years No. of No. of No. of 
employees open collaborations agency branches 
operating 
Tata Consultancy 4400 27 0 6 43 
Services 
Unisys Ltd. 1598 17 3 6 30 ýipro 
Infotech 
P 
1789 14 2 0 28 
Source: Malhotra (199. )) 
Table 7.5: Signalling by "pioneering" firms 
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As highlighted in table 7.3, other than the overall stability in the economy, a 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, the tightening of the intellectual property regime, and the 
fast growing domestic market with the potential for accelerated growth, there are 
specific business advantages in developing software in India. These include: 
Low cost of operation: Whilst many countries offer low cost talent and 
infrastructure, none is as compelling as India when cost/benefit is considered. The 
total cost of operations in India is about one-fifth or one-sixth the cost incurred in 
USA; even after overcoming various bottlenecks such as inadequate infrastructure, the 
expense of operations is 30-40 percent cheaper than in other South East Asian 
countries (interviews). 
Leveraging off the skills of Indian programmers and infrastructure has yielded a 
number of multinationals savings in the range of 50-60%. Studies suggest that in the 
mid-1990s, salaries for programmers and systems analysts were 4-5 times lower in 
India than in the UK and 6-8 times lower than in the United States (Heeks, 1996, pp. 
115-16). However, the wages have been steadily increasing at over 20 per cent since 
1990 and it rose by about 21% in 1996. Much of this increase can be explained by the 
tight labour market and the high turnover rate which in 1996 came down to 17.2% 
from the earlier high of 25% in 1992 (Heeks 1996, NASSCOM 1998). This difference 
in wages has prompted a number of companies to develop their software in India 
through collaboration, setting up a subsidiary or an offshore development centre. 
While the smaller companies have usually outsourced or collaborated with Indian 
companies, the bigger companies like Microsoft, Philips, Oracle have their own 
development centres in India. Typically, these companies design their products in the 
home country, and have the development done in India according to their 
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specifications. But, in the recent past, a number of companies have acknowledged the 
design skills of some of the Indian engineers and made huge investments in R&D 
facilities in India. 
Enormous talent pool: India has the second largest English speaking scientific 
manpower pool in the world. There are over 1,600 engineering colleges, technical 
institutes and polytechnics which ensure a steady supply of well educated technical 
personnel. According to one estimate over 65,505 IT professionals with varying skills 
enter the workforce every year (NASSCOM 1998). The five Indian Institutes of 
Technology (IIT), along with a few other institutes have standards that are on par with 
the rest of the world. 
No. of Institutes 
National Institutes (IITs & IISc) 6 
Engineering colleges 32 
Degree Colleges at Universities 320 
Diploma Colleges 788 
ITIs (Computers) 596 
Total 1742 
Source: NASSUUM (1998) 
Table7.6: Educational institutes teaching courses related to computers in 1996 
High quality: Intense competition has fostered a keen awareness among Indian 
software companies of the importance of delivering world class quality in the 
international market. Of the top 200 Indian software companies, 127 companies have 
already acquired ISO 9000 or equivalent certification, which is the maximum number 
of ISO certification in the world. Motorola's Indian subsidiary is one of the few in the 
world that is an SE! development company. Increasingly, companies are outsourcing 
projects to India mainly out of quality consideration, and not just due to cost 
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consideration. The ability of the English speaking software engineers to work on a 
wide range of platforms and languages has been very helpful in ensuring that the work 
carried out in India meets world standards. The high quality of the infrastructure in the 
various technology parks that the government has also helped in the improving 
quality. 
Government incentives: The Indian government has adopted a very liberal foreign 
investment policy in the software sector, with repatriation of investment and profits 
freely allowed. There are no restrictions on foreign collaboration or foreign 
technicians working in India. Special incentives are given to investors setting up units 
in the various technology parks, export zones that have been set up in different parts 
of the country. Some of the incentives are: 
" 
Foreign equity up to 100% permissible 
" 
Duty free imports of most imports (with a few exceptions), including capital 
goods is permitted 
" 
Exemption from payment of corporate income tax for a block of five years in 
the first eight years of operation 
" 
After the five year period, profits on exports will continue to be exempt 
Various routes to developing software: 
Depending on their strategic goals, multinationals have chosen differing routes 
to develop software in India. Most of the big multinationals have set up their own 
R&D facilities; for example recently Microsoft set up a facility in India, its third after 
the U. S and Israel. Smaller firms have gone into collaboration with Indian software 
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firms. At the same time a number of firms have entered into strategic alliances with 
various universities, especially the various Indian Institutes of Technologies and the 
Institute of Science in Bangalore, to undertake research and development in the 
software sector. Amongst those firms which have done this are IBM, Oracle, Unisys. 
The six OECD countries account for about 81% of software exports from 
India. Of this Europe accounts for about 20% of the Indian software exports. 
European companies have established operations in India, either with Indian partners, 
or on their own. These include Alcatel, British Aerospace, Daimler Benz, Bosch, 
Deutsche Bank, Siemens. The most recent software development centre was set up by 
Astra of Sweden which tied up with a Indian software firm, in a deal worth $50 
million on an annual basis, to develop a software package that will support the quality 
system for Astra's Medical operating systems. 
Benefits o developing software in India: 
" 
Cost containment: Profit from internationally competitive pricing 
" 
High quality: Take advantage of a quality culture that is reflected in the large 
number of companies that are ISO 9000 certified 
" 
Timely delivery: Utilise large project teams in India to meet tight schedules. 
. 
Trained manpower and quality educational institutions: Have access to an 
enormous pool of trained manpower who have been executing software projects for 
international clients and develop ties with some of the leading technology institutes 
in the country. 
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Challenges facing the Indian software industry: 
Indian software developers have been very successful in outsourcing software 
development projects from foreign firms, especially those based in the US. However 
much of this has been done through a model of "body shopping" or in other cases 
providing back-end development services to established international firms. In the 
latter model the Indian firm is a sub-contractor to a larger international firm. 
However, margins in this business continue to recede. International firms are also 
building their own software development shops in India, Israel further eroding profit 
opportunities. This requires Indian software firms to rethink the suite of services and 
products offered to generate higher value for customers. 
Most industry observers feel that there are number of different alternatives for 
expanding value added or shoring up margins. These include: 
Shift to Products: 
Instead of just providing a software development service, it is important to 
shift to resellable products. Service based revenues are limited by the number of hours 
in a day. In contrast software products are replicable at low costs and resellable. These 
products may include specific systems such as those for reservations, hotel 
management etc. Increasingly firms are acquiring software templates which are then 
customised to the meet the needs of a specific company. A shift to products requires 
better knowledge of the customer's needs and industry context for successful 
development (interviews). One mode of acquisition of knowledge is the partnering of 
consultant firms to a specific industry, or a joint venture for development of a product. 
The strategy should be to proactively seek a joint venture partner rather than become a 
subcontractor. 
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Shift to Higher Value Added Services: 
Developing higher value added services include the sale of methodologies, 
business process modelling, workflow design services and systems consulting 
services. It is only recently that Indian firms have begun to acquire firms abroad to 
expand out into greater systems design and consulting services. Acquisition or 
partnering with select international firms can help to expand these higher value added 
services of business process redesign, work flow modelling and systems design to 
support these higher value activities. More importantly acquiring or partnering with 
existing firms in the market allows new entrants to leverage of existing brands. 
Both the alternatives above suggest the need for developing more specialised 
knowledge of vertical industry segments as well as better marketing and promotions 
to develop "brand equity" that would goad the customers to pay a premium price for 
the product. To date few Indian firms have invested in building a brand identity in 
foreign markets, especially the United State or for that matter established expertise in 
specific vertical markets. To do so will require a change in the way Indian firms think 
of the global software market. They will have to change their investment in product 
research and development, marketing and public relations efforts, as well as hiring 
and compensation policies to acquire industry specific expertise or relations with 
customers. 
Competing locations for software development centres: 
Bangalore is the software capital of India 
- 
it alone accounts for over 57% of 
the total software revenue earned by the whole country. India has a total of 700 plus 
IT companies in the various software parks; of these 207 are in Bangalore of which 
many are involved in developing software. Arguably, there is a critical mass of 
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software companies, including 66 leading multinationals, in Bangalore for the growth 
to be sustained for the near future. In the 1997-98 alone, Bangalore attracted MNCs 
like Lucent Technologies, Sony India, Siemens Semiconductors, Ericsson 
Communication, and Samsung Electronics. But in the recent past, host of 
multinationals have decided to locate their investments in the city of Hyderabad. 
Amongst the reasons cited for ignoring Bangalore are infrastructure snags, 
overcrowding and government inertia. 
Hyderabad is the city that is poised to give Bangalore a run for its cyberstatus. 
It is governed by an enlightened political leadership which has taken the initiative to 
bolster IT awareness, IT education, and IT usage in the state across all segments. 
Although there are problems with the infrastructure and power shortages, the pro- 
reform regulatory and political climate along with widespread plans to improve 
infrastructure and upgrade technical education, along with the pace and extent of 
reforms in terms of a responsive bureaucracy have attracted multinationals to the city. 
Hyderabad has other factors in its favour 
- 
its strategic location, relatively low real 
estate prices and an abundance of skilled labour. Amongst the companies that have 
homed in on Hyderabad in recent months are Microsoft, Oracle, and Citicorp. 
There are other cities that are trying to attract investments in the software 
sector. Amongst those are Calcutta in the north-east and Madras in south India. 
Cv_ b ercity Bangalore : 
Bangalore has been identified as one of the ten top technopolis in the world; it 
has been described as "a gateway to new global frontiers" and "a harbinger of a new 
global labour force that works in cyberspace and that, like much of the world's 
financial markets, operates beyond the reach of governments" (Stremlau, 1996, p. 158 
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and 154). Increasingly, the emergence of Bangalore has been recognised and has been 
the source of anxiety in the US concerning the long-term impact of competition from 
Bangalore and India as a whole (Madon 1997, Yourdon 1992, Wolman & Colamosca 
1997, Wessel 1998). Bangalore has a host of factors that have played a critical role in 
its emergence as the software capital of India. The city has, historically, been regarded 
as a high tech city, located in the state of Karnataka which has had a long history of 
support for science and technology. After independence, India's first Prime Minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, sought to turn it into India's intellectual capital (Stremalau, 1996, 
p. 157). 
Haug (1991) has identified five factors that play a pare in the locational 
decisions of new software companies. These include labour availability, quality of 
life, infrastructure, proximity to previous employer and residence, and proximity to 
customers. Of these factors, given the changing nature of the industry and export 
profile of the Indian industry as it has evolved, the last factor is not of much 
relevance. Bangalore has emerged as the software capital of India primarily because 
of the prevalence of the other factors; the problems in Bangalore is caused due to the 
erosion of some of these factors. 
The city has a highly talented pool of manpower, thanks to the Indian Institute 
of Technology, the Indian Institute of Science, Indian Institute of Management and the 
five regional engineering colleges that are located in South India. The state of 
Karnataka has 9 universities, 51 engineering colleges, 169 polytechnics and 35 
professional training institutes, which turn out 25,000 skilled professionals every 
year. In the context of the labour intensive nature of the industry, especially at the 
lower end of the value chain, the presence of such a large pool of manpower is a 
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major attraction. In addition, the city has pleasant weather throughout the year which 
has helped woo people from outside to come and settle down here. 
The dust-free environment and the intellectual pool of Bangalore led to the 
establishment, between 1956 and 1960, of large public sector undertakings like Bharat 
Electronics (BEL) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the city, along with 
national defence research laboratories. In addition, given the distance of Bangalore 
from India's borders, it was the ideal location for strategically sensitive industries like 
the Bharat Heavy Electronics Limited (BHEL) and the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (Sharma 1994, p. 85, and interviews). This concentration of electronics 
and aeronautics industries led to the creation of forward and backward linkages. To 
exploit these linkages, in the last two decades, a number of private sector electronics 
companies have sprung up; given the close links between the electronics and the 
computer industry, the software industry in Bangalore can thus be seen as a natural 
offshoot of the prevailing conditions in the city. 
It was this intellectual bank that helped Wipro Information Technology Ltd. in 
1981 (now a part of Wipro Infotech along with Wipro Systems) when it designed the 
first Wipro Computer along with the Indian Institute of Science, a premier 
engineering research institute in Bangalore. Two years later, home grown IT gaint 
Infosys Technologies made a very modest entry into Bangalore when it moved from 
Pune. But it was only in 1985, when the Rajiv Government announced the formation 
of Software Technology Parks, that the software industry in Bangalore gathered 
momentum. 
Probably the most important investment in 1985 was that of Texas Instruments 
- 
executives from Texas instruments did groundbreaking work when they introduced 
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the idea of having a 100 per cent export-oriented satellite-linked project to source its 
software requirements from India. This was in the pre-liberalisation era of the Indian 
economy, when Indian software companies hired Indian engineers and sent them to 
`body shop' in the US on Indian wages. To facilitate the venture, Texas Instruments 
not only brought its own earth station, set it up and even helped the government of 
India identify the right hardware needed for a direct satellite link meant for offshore 
projects. In setting up the project, the company had to go about getting as many as 20 
clearances from various local, state and central government departments. Initially 
Texas Instruments did lower end software projects for its own use, and as its 
confidence increased, mission critical applications began to be designed in its 
Bangalore office. Nowadays, all of the software, databases and designs produced by 
Texas Instruments in India are exported to the United States for distribution. 
According to the Managing Director of Texas Instruments India, the company "has 
developed world class competencies in the are of DSP, signal/analog interfaces and 
the ASIC methodology, creating products that are at the core of Texas Instruments' 
worldwide thrust. " 
Digital Equipment India Ltd. was the first multinational hardware company to 
enter Bangalore; it is the only multinational company in the field of IT which went 
public. It was the first subsidiary of Digital USA which was not 100 per cent owned 
by the parent company (it holds 51 per cent, with the rest owned by the public and 
financial institutions), and listed on the stock exchange. After the merger Digital and 
Compaq world wide, the Indian company will become the biggest IT company in 
India. 
185 
The qualitative leap in the nature of the software industry in Bangalore 
occurred in 1991 when Motorola set up its research base in the city. At present a lot of 
MNCs like Oracle, Novell, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Philips contribute work which is 
critical to the parent company's overall business. Companies like Novell decided from 
the very beginning to provide a facility and environment exactly similar to their 
engineering setup in the US in terms of testing facilities, technical managerial skills. 
"Since Novell India Development Centre has total product responsibility for key 
Novell products, it is a centrepiece of Novell's engineering strategy; the philosophy of 
identical environment and infrastructure helps Novell leverage the Indian software 
talent. " 
The real flood of companies into Bangalore occurred between 1991 and 1998. 
Most of the large multinationals in the IT sector have a presence in Bangalore. A 
handful of companies run by non-resident Indians, like Aspect Development, 
Information Management Resources, Complete Business Solutions have 
establishments in the city. In addition, large Indian software companies like Infosys, 
Wipro and BPL Software, based in the city, have gone on to become global players. 
Of the top 20 software exporters in India, 14 are in Bangalore; and of the top 20 
domestic software firms, eight are here. Total investments in terms of equity and loans 
are well in excess of Rs. 35 billion in this industry in Bangalore, where over 20,000 
software developers are employed. The turnover of the software industry in the state 
of Karnataka (Bangalore is the capital and most of the industry is concentrated here) 
was around Rs. 18 billion during 1996-97, and the expected turnover by the turn of 
the century of Rs. 50 billion. 
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Till recently, the attractive real estate prices were also a winner. When Infosys 
moved into Bangalore in 1986, it paid a paltry rent of Rs. 6 per square foot; today 
after skyrocketing to Rs. 70 in 1996, it has levelled off at Rs. 50-60. This is still way 
below the rates in major metropolitan areas of India like Delhi and Mumbai. 
City No. of 
companies 
Mumbai 115 
Bangalore 87 
Delhi, Gurgaon & Noida 70 
Hyderabad 37 
Chennai 51 
Calcutta 25 
Pune 23 
Others 22 
Source: NASSDOM (1998) 
Table 7.7: Location of Indian software company headquaters 
Although Mumbai has a greater number of software firms the exponential 
growth in Bangalore, especially involving major multinationals, has meant that today 
what happens in Bangalore dictates the trends in the rest of the industry in India. The 
city has two major technology parks - the Keonics Electronics city set up in the early 
`80s and the recent International Technology park, a joint venture between a 
consortium of Singapore based companies, the Tata Group, and the state government. 
These parks have their own infrastructure like power, water, telecom and satellite 
links. As the number of firms in Bangalore reached a critical mass, increasingly, 
employees have followed the path of those in the Silicon valley; they have left their 
previous employer and decided to set up their own firm. This along with the labour 
and infrastructural factors have been self-reinforcing and caused the clustering of 
software firms around Bangalore. 
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Strategic limitations to the growth of Bangalore: 
In the recent past Bangalore has received an adverse amount of bad publicity. 
The loss of the prestigious Indian Institute of Information Technology, to be set up by 
the Andhra Pradesh state government with funding from most of the leading software 
multinationals like Microrsoft, Oracle, IBM, etc., to the city of Hyderabad, along with 
the Microsoft software development centre has been embarrassing 
. 
As the loss of 
prestige started becoming obvious, increasingly, the total collapse of the infrastructure 
in and around Bangalore was cited as the main reason for investors seeking alternate 
locations (interviews). 
Although since 1991 the number of vehicles on the roads of Bangalore has 
increased by about 33 per cent, there has been no increase in the number or size of 
roads in the city (Stremlau 19960. This has caused traffic jams, delays in reaching the 
office and drop in productivity amongst employees (interviews). The situation 
worsened to such an extent that the hundreds of executives from various software 
firms blocked the major roads leading the software parks in protest against the state 
government's inaction. The increasing traffic has also led to a dramatic increase in 
pollution levels undermining one of the main attraction of Bangalore - its' weather. In 
addition the city still does not have an airport to cater to international flights - even 
now Bombay and Madras have to be used for international connections. The proposed 
airport which was to be built by a private sector consortium has become a victim of 
the vicissitudes of the Indian political system. To compound the problems faced by 
the industry, there are severe electricity and water shortages in the city. The situation 
has progressively deteriorated, with virtually no increase in the supply of either water 
or electricity in a city which has seen exponential growth in population over the past 
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decade (interviews, Nicholson 1998). One of the leading software entrepreneurs in 
India was of the opinion that "Given the malaise in bureaucracy and the acute 
infrastructural problems, the city has about five years to turn the situation around, 
before the investors start abandoning Bangalore. " (interviews) 
Thus the city has been plagued by the total lack of leadership at both the state 
and city level which has meant that there is very little vision or planning for its' 
overall management. The problem is that not only is it competing with other cities 
like Hyderabad and Pune in India, but also cities in other countries that are in a 
position to offer more investment options and enhanced infrastructure to lure 
multinational corporations. 
Conclusion: 
The software industry is one of the few Indian industries that can compete 
successfully in a global market. The industry which has leveraged its competitive 
strengths 
-a skilled, English speaking labour force with low wage costs, ties to 
industry professionals of Indian origin in many countries, and minimal government 
intervention 
- 
to attract international attention. Some firms in the industry have 
positioned themselves to be true multinationals by setting up operations in several 
countries, presenting their accounts according to international standards, and 
preparing to list on the major exchanges in the US and Europe. The industry has been 
opportunistic in taking advantage of fortuitous market developments such as the Year 
2000 problem and the introduction of the Euro. 
Although the Indian software industry started out low on the totem pole in 
terms of technological sophistication, it is steadily moving up. Several firms have 
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received ISO 9000 certification and a handful have received the highest awards for 
technical excellence. A recent example is the Software Engineering Institute's `level 
4' certification that Infosys Technologies Ltd. received, placing it in the top two 
dozen firms worldwide. 
The stock market is clearly factoring in a tremendous growth rate for the major 
software firms, with earning multiples reaching dizzying levels, even by Wall Street 
bull-market standards. This has resulted in at least a couple of companies with market 
capitalization approaching $1 billion, placing them at the very top of the Indian stock 
market. It is interesting to see that the market capitalization of the top Indian 
companies are not far behind those of their counterparts in the Unites States that were 
founded by people of Indian origin. In January 1999, the top 10 IT stocks account for 
nearly eight percent of the total market capitalisation of the listed companies on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange. At the same time last year they accounted for just 1.7 
percent of the market capitalisation (Economic Times, 1999). In sectoral terms, the 
software sector has catapulted itself into the top three industries in terms of market 
capitalisation behind the fast moving consumer goods and refinery sectors. In IT 
stocks like Wipro, Infosys, MIT, Tata Elxsi are for the first time, displaying price 
earnings ratios (P/Es) on par with the global technology majors in the US. P/Es of 
these companies range between a mind boggling 83-123. Analysts justify the 
attraction of such high P/E multiples to their earnings potential in the years to come. 
The IT sector is envisaged to grow a robust 50 to 70 per cent for atleast the next five 
years. 
Although the performance of the Indian software industry in the past five years 
has been impressive, it is still modest by world standards. Currently India's share of 
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the global IT industry is less than 2 per cent. The total Indian software exports for 
1997 were around $1 billion, a tiny fraction of the world market. Everyone recognises 
that the growth potential is vast in this industry, even without taking into account 
related opportunities in communication and computer services. The software industry 
association NASSCOM says that Indian IT industry is expected to grow to $85 billion 
from a mere 2.75 billion in 1998. Out of the projected figure, exports are expected to 
amount to $50 billion. Even at this level, India's share of the global market is unlikely 
to cross five percent of the then global IT industry size. 
Till very recently, the involvement of the Indian government in the software 
sector was restricted to occasionally provide incentives to promote exports. Although 
in the early eighties, the sector was identified as one of the strategic industries that 
should be promoted, given the overall autarchic nature of the political economy, 
nothing was done to actually promote transfer of technology or allow multinationals 
to invest in a big way. Thus the industry grew large on the back of private initiative. It 
is only in the last five years that the government has been making a conscious effort to 
try and meet the actual needs of industry, especially in terms of venture capital, 
infrastructure, tax concessions, etc. But given the overall nature of a underdeveloped 
federal political economy, government initiatives are constrained by lack of revenues, 
political compromises and lack of authority to actually see policy initiatives to 
fruition. This is especially true in the context of infrastructure development, which is 
proving to be a severe handicap for the Indian software industry vis-a-vis its 
competitors. The dramatic slowdown in the growth rate of the software industry in 
Bangalore is a clear reflection of this; ironically, this has led to a more balanced 
growth of the software industry in the country as a whole, with other cities like 
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Hyderabad, offering better facilities, emerging as the new poles of growth. Also, in 
equally ironic terms, the underdeveloped judicial system (which is prone to delays of 
about a decade in civil cases due to overburdening) has meant that employees in the 
software sector are extremely mobile and have no judicial constraints in changing 
jobs. This in turn has facilitated the exchange of tacit information and led to greater 
innovation in the sector. 
192 
SECTION III: 
STAKEHOLDER SYSTEMS & KNOWLEDGE INDUSTRIES 
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-8- 
Dynamic Identity: Stakeholders Systems & Knowledge Industries 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapters, we have developed two broad streams of research 
- 
first, on 
the nature of allocation of financial capital in different business systems (chapters 2,3,4), 
and second, on the problems associated with exchange in knowledge based industries 
(chapters 5,6,7). The issue that is common to both the streams of research revolves around 
problems associated with measuring performance in the stakeholder system of allocation of 
financial capital and in knowledge based industries (due to the intangible element in 
knowledge goods). This chapter attempts to develop a framework that will help us with 
performance measurement in both cases. 
The field of business and society has become a crucial area of social science and 
management research (Ullman, 1985; Marcus, 1993; Arlow & Gannon, 1982). As analyzed 
by Jones (1995) three major strands have dominated research in this field: models of 
corporate social performance (Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991a; 1991b) focusing on the internal 
aspects of the firm; models of social control of business (Jones, 1995) focusing on the 
external environment of the firm; and, stakeholder models (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Preston & Sapienza, 1990; Polonsky, 1995; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; 
Rowley, 1997; Hill & Jones, 1992) focusing on the various actors that constrain and influence 
a firm's behaviour and performance. These models endeavor to address the ongoing academic 
debate between the neoclassical assertion that any attention to social performance "is a breach 
of [investors'] trust that inevitably reduces the welfare of shareholders" (Preston, 1994: 2), 
194 
and the more behavioral based view of firm performance founded on notions like cooperation 
and trust between business and society, namely that business legitimacy is derived from 
favorable social performance, and that social and financial performances tend to be positively 
correlated in the long-term (Freeman, 1984). In general, it is increasingly conceded that 
within management research there is growing appreciation for the role of stakeholder 
relations (Rowley, 1997; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), but the diversity of stakeholder 
interests erects significant obstacles in terms of their capability to ascertain measurement and 
performance in the market place. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) have recently integrated the three major aspects of 
descriptive accuracy, instrumental power and normative validity of stakeholder theories. 
Their works and other earlier works such as Freeman (1984) have helped to raise fundamental 
issues which combine the purely economics and competition driven aspects of firms, along 
with the more social dimension of exchange based on cooperation. These works overlap with 
the research of Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1990), and Burt (1992) which demonstrated the 
importance of embeddedness in the social structure and the role of social capital. Both 
streams of research however assume that the value of the products and services provided by 
the firm in the market place is tangible and easily measurable. Thus, uncertainty for 
stakeholders has in past research to do more with agency and monitoring problems (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) than with the nature of intangibility of a firm's quality and 
its implications for competitive success. 
In this chapter, we try and integrate the problem of measurement costs in research on 
stakeholder systems; it seeks to link the fundamental issue of measurement and performance 
assessment difficulties with the role of multiple groups of stakeholders in management 
theory. This link is structured around a dynamic notion of, "identity". Existing literature that 
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overlaps with this framework includes Dutton and Jackson (1987) and Haunschild (1994). 
Our standpoint differs from these earlier works in the following two ways: first, we raise the 
issue of quality intangibility 
- 
an especially important issue in today's globalized, uncertain 
and knowledge driven business environment. In such environments, "association" with 
certain external organizations or players help to increase credibility and legitimacy in the 
business environment. Second, we operationalize the idea of dynamic identity using indirect 
measurement indicators - institutional indicators the market may be using to reduce such 
measurement problems, which help to legitimize organizations. 
Definin! the business environment 
- 
stakeholder diversity: 
According to Preston & Post (1975), there is a primary area of organizational 
involvement with society 
- 
transactional behavior which "arises directly from (the firm's) 
specialized functional role", and a secondary area of organizational involvement with society 
which includes "impacts and effects not intrinsic to the character of the organization but 
generated by its primary involvement activities" (1975: 10-11). Moreover firms are 
responsible for outcomes arising from both the primary and secondary category of 
involvement with society 
- 
the notion of public responsibility. 
Although firms are responsible for the effects or outcomes of their actions, the former 
are not necessarily under their direct control. A distinction must be made between outcomes 
of primary and secondary action in terms of them being under the control of the firm or not. 
A major consequence of this distinction is that controllable outcomes allow for corrective 
action if required, whereas less controllable outcomes have a quality of mystique and 
hopelessness in terms of corrective action. Thus, we can say that effects or outcomes of 
activities in the primary field are usually directly correlated to action in the field. For 
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example, one would expect an aircraft company, whose planes are revealed to have serious 
defects that render them highly prone to accident, to lose its customer base and go out of 
business if no corrective measures were taken. In this case, outsiders such as airline 
companies and ultimately passengers are directly affected by the firm's action, therefore 
identifying the stakeholders involved is relatively straightforward. 
Complications arise when, as suggested by Wood we consider the field of 
involvement expanded further into society, where "the reciprocal influences of business and 
society are so wide-ranging that companies may indeed be able to justify social involvements 
that seem far afield from their primary and secondary involvements" (1991b: 698). In this 
case it is evident that action in the primary and secondary fields of involvement with society 
can have ripple effects on multiple fields of involvement. But whereas in the primary filed of 
involvement there is a direct connection between cause and effect, in the area of secondary 
involvement cause and effect relationships are less salient and much more difficult to discern. 
Similarly, as we move further into multiple, ripple-effect fields of a firm's involvement with 
society, causality links between action and consequences become increasingly blurred, 
complex, entangled with a variety of social factors and consequently resistant to analysis. 
Secondary and multiple effects are not under the control of the firm because the processes of 
their occurrence involve streams of disparate outsiders, not necessarily directly related to the 
firm's primary activities, with a variety of interests that can be affected by indirect, complex 
and frequently unexpected consequences of a firm's action. Thus: 
Proposition 8.1: Actions in the primary but predominantly the secondary and 
multiple fields of a firm's involvement with society inadvertently invite a broad 
and relatively disparate group of stakeholders due to indirect and complex 
interactions. 
This broad area of a firm's involvement with society and the multiplicity of stakeholders is 
depicted in gray in Figure 8.1. Proposition 1 ties in with the notion of corporate social 
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responsibility (Davis, 1973; Carroll, 1979; Frederick, 1986) - that society expects and 
rewards proper business behavior, as well as functional theory and the principle of legitimacy 
(Preston & Post, 1975) 
- 
that firms play an institutional role in society and they are rewarded 
with legitimacy when their conduct is in harmony with the rest of society's institutions. 
Furthermore, it exposes the enormity and complexity of the phenomenon of stakeholder/firm 
interaction and its effect on business viability. The double-headed arrows in Figure 1 depict 
the complex social ties and interactions which bind firms with corporate social responsibility, 
but at the same time award legitimacy and can positively affect corporate performance. 
Dinancital 
Shareholders 
-º 
Corporate 
Performance 
Stakeholders 
Banks, 
Insurance firm 
Government ý-- 
Financial 
Markets 
Employees 
Source: Adapted from Choi, Lee & Kim, JIBS forthcoming 
Corporate 
Figure 8.1 : Shareholder versus stakeholder business systems 
Stakeholder governance and measurement costs: 
There has been significant interest in the notion of stakeholders, primarily since 
Freeman's (1984) seminal book, "Strategic management: A stakeholder approach", including 
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publications by Clarkson, 1991; Jones, 1995; Brenner & Cochran, 1991; Alkhafaji, 1989; Hill 
& Jones, 1992; Carroll, 1989; Goodpaster, 1991; Evan & Freeman, 1988, which either 
elaborate different aspects of stakeholder theory or combine it with corporate governance, 
ethics or agency theory. Because of the diversity of stakeholder/firm interests and 
interactions, there has also been an enormous amount of literature elaborating on more 
pragmatic definitions of a stakeholder and the development of tools for managing stakeholder 
relationships for the benefit of firm performance (Mallott, 1990; Preston & Sapienza, 1990; 
Polonsky, 1995; Gray, 1989; Post, Murray, Jr., Dickie, & Mahon, 1983), as well as on 
exploring the nature of the relationship between social and corporate performance (Cochran 
& Wood, 1984; Spencer & Taylor, 1987; Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; McGuire, 
Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). 
Although in the literature it is generally taken for granted that stakeholders are capable 
of measuring a firm's performance and accordingly adjust their attitudes, in reality it is not at 
all clear how stakeholders discern and value tangible, but more importantly, intangible and 
invisible assets. In other words, much of the existing research has eschewed from analyzing 
the issue of performance measurement, confident that this is transparent to stakeholders. 
Thus, what is fundamental to our analysis is the role of measurement costs (North, 1990) 
inadvertently arising from measurement problems which stem from the diversity of 
stakeholder interests. 
Apart from stakeholder systems, similar measurement difficulties arise in knowledge- 
based industries due to the inherent intangibility of product and service quality in these 
industries (Spender, 1997; Hosmer, 1995), although the major focus in this chapter is on such 
issues in stakeholder systems. Grant & Spender (1997) provide a comprehensive review of 
recent developments in knowledge based industries. Knowledge-based industries seem to be 
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increasingly entangled as firms continuously forge links with actors from a range of diverse 
industries. This leads to dilution of traditional industry boundaries and acceleration of the rate 
of change and innovation, resulting in an absolutely volatile and complex environment. Thus: 
Proposition 8.2: In stakeholder business systems as well as in knowledge- 
based industries, there are acute performance measurement problems which 
call, for a dynamic regime for systematic identification and legitimization. 
The duality of the circumstances under which measurement difficulties arise and the need for 
identification which becomes acute is shown in Figure 8.2. 
Bilateral exchange, 
dyads, Knowledge 
shareholder 
based 
industries business systems 
Multilateral exchange, 
networks, 
stakeholder 
business systems 
Figure 8.2: 
DYNAMIC 
IDENTITY 
The need for dynamic identity arises in stakeholder systems and knowledge-based 
industries 
Towards a dynamic identity system: 
In this chapter we seek to identify a dynamic regime to tackle the problem of 
performance measurement in complex socio-economic environments. Previous research on 
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organization reputation may be indicative of our approach; there have been suggestions that 
poor social performance can generate market fears and erode reputation, resulting in 
increased risk premiums and ultimately unfavorable financial performance (Cornell & 
Shapiro, 1987). Organizations need to "influence perceptions of who [they] 
... 
are and what 
[they] 
... 
are likely to do" (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996: 201). The effects of signals and 
information on corporate governance and accountability differ between the shareholder and 
stakeholder business systems (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Hill and Jones, 
1992; Freeman, 1984). The realities of today's complex business environment including the 
pressures from capital markets, principal-agent relationship, the importance of information 
flows warrant a re-examination of traditional models of corporate performance. 
But when one considers the abundance of signals in today's business environment 
traditional. "market signaling" becomes insufficient. The key research question then 
addresses the issue of additional factors - apart from signaling - which determine and 
contribute towards the identification of quality and market position in highly socially 
constructed market environments. If market signals and information (Schelling, 1960; 
Spence. 1973; Heil & Robertson, 1991) help to overcome uncertainty in general, an important 
issue is what type of market information influences stakeholder attitudes. Thus, stakeholder 
theory research needs to incorporate the difficulties that firms may face in defining social 
measures for performance (Swanson, 1995; Jones, 1995). 
Our aim is to develop a dynamic identity concept which, without being based on 
market signaling, takes into account the social and institutional indicators of performance 
(Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992). Our main thesis is that in knowledge based industries and in 
stakeholder business systems, the issue of "identity" emerges as a means of navigating 
through the uncharted waters of performance measurement. One can then summarize the 
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situation by tabulating the acuteness of the performance measurement problem and the 
consequent degree of the need for the concept of dynamic identity to be introduced in both 
the stakeholder and shareholder business systems and different industry types, as shown in 
Table 8.1. 
Knowledge-based Manufacturing 
industries) industries 
Stakeholder business 
system 4 3 
Shareholder business 
system 2 1 
Table 8.1: The need for dynamic identity 
From Table 8.1, one can see that measuring performance in manufacturing industries 
in shareholder business systems presents no particular problem since product quality and 
value are available, transparent and undisputed. Moving away from manufacturing industries 
in shareholder business systems and into stakeholder business systems, measurement 
difficulty progressively increases as the transparency of product quality and exchange value 
fades away and the respective complexity of stakeholder interaction increases. Then the 
necessity to introduce, operationalize and use a dynamic notion of dynamic identity becomes 
unavoidable. From the table, we can see that such issues are most important for stakeholder 
systems in knowledge based industries. 
The non-complex, mechanistic view of social phenomena treats issues of 
identification and legitimacy in a textbook fashion, for example, organizations have to 
monitor their environment, pick up signals from it and respond to them according to some 
formula which links action to desired effects. Accordingly, a variety of frameworks have been 
developed which seek to identify environmental contingency and suggest appropriate 
strategic action (Ackerman, 1975; Wilson, 1977; Fleming, 1981; Strand, 1983; Fahey & 
Narayanan, 1986). But the unsophistication of linear thinking is evident in the presumption 
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that better social monitoring is directly correlated with improved financial and social 
performance (Newgren, Rasher, LaRoe, & Szabo, 1985). There is a fundamental flaw in this 
approach, namely that it is assumed that firms have, in advance, relatively complete 
information about the outcome of their competitive environment, for example that the future 
is dominated by closed or contained change (Stacey, 1996). Naturally, this assumption runs 
contrary to Schumpeter's main thesis that firms are ineffective in anticipating future 
contingencies because the future is principally open-ended. 
Dynamic identity and institutional certification: 
In complex environments the co-evolving emergent behavior is characterized by 
multiplicity of causes, where direct causal links between intentions, decisions, and outcomes 
disappear, and long-term predictions become impossible (Stacey, 1996; Johnson & Burton, 
1994; Mintzberg & Waters, 1990). Due to the inherent uncertainty of complex environments, 
learning or complex adaptive models are needed based on iteration as the link to future 
outcomes (Gell-Mann, 1994; Kaufman, 1993; Macy, 1993). These models consist of 
processes and rules, "set[s] of heuristics, or rules of thumb, that perhaps can be explained 
(and perhaps justified) insofar as they economize on cognitive effort" (Orbell & Dawes, 
1991: 517), not choices or content. In fact, there is extensive evidence that economic 
outcomes are not driven by choices - such as utility maximization - but by rules and processes 
which can not be simply reduced to a simple utility maximization function (Hayek, 1967; 
Winter, 1998; Simon, 1992; Vanberg, 1994). These rules we will seek to uncover. In effect 
these rules limit the unpredictability of complex social behavior by limiting their range of 
variation, resulting in `quasi-stable' patterns of behavior 
- 
strange attractors- emerging inside 
the torrent of random behavior (Gell-Mann, 1994; Sanchez, 1997). We agree with Macy 
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(1997) that with the help of dynamic models, identity-based and interest-based theories of 
group behavior and solidarity can be integrated. 
When dealing with social effects on the economic environment we cannot avoid 
taking on board and expanding on Turner's argument that "identity is the cognitive 
mechanism which makes group behavior possible" (1982: 21). We adhere to Macy's 
reasoning that theories based on shared identity (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Collins, 1992; 
Oberschall & Kim, 1996) 
- 
the cohesive effects of similarity 
- 
are not adequate in enhancing 
"the capacity of interactants to act collectively in pursuit of common interests" (1997: 429). 
Actors polarize and group together via an emotion of shared identity emanating from salient 
attributes and characteristics. In this case any sense of self-interest - attainment of an 
objective - is lost and substituted by a motivation of pure public spirit, any attribution of 
purpose is lost (Macy, 1997). On the other hand, there is the self-interest paradigm which 
views group behavior - cooperation and exchange - emanating from a sense of public-spirit, 
interdependence and complementarity, an overlapping of self-interests (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978). Identification is thus defined as a process in which "one actor has adopted, or taken up, 
the other's interest" (Coleman, 1990: 158), by making a rational choice (Oberschall & Kim, 
1996) based on expected outcomes or utilities. 
In the business environment, tension between self-interest and collective interests is a 
fundamental problem for both these theories (Macy, 1993) because a group's collective 
behavior cannot be reasonably seen as stemming solely from one or the other. Unlike groups 
identified by explicit characteristics like gender or race, identification with social groups in 
the business world is much more complex (Grafstein, 1995) because there exist groups which 
do not have a single, externally recognized feature. Moreover, in evolutionary environments 
group identification is not automatic because new identities are constantly formed to serve 
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new purposes (Horowitz, 1985). Therefore, there exist indiscernible evolving socio-economic 
groups (Gartner & Segura, 1997) and we believe that, in business, social effects are expressed 
through and materialize via such groups. Our aim is to provide a framework which seeks to 
uncover this mantle of invisibility for the benefit of outsiders. Outsiders, being unidentified 
by the socio-economic environment, struggle against competitors who receive benefits 
through social interaction, so in a sense, social interaction works to the detriment of 
unidentified groups, for example, they cannot enter the virtuous circle that social effects can 
offer. 
As defined by Coleman (1990) and Granovetter (1985), actors in the market and 
within social structures are a synthesis of a network of constraint generating relationships and 
a network of real and imagined embedding relationships. We believe that this dual nature 
which helps determine an actor's identity is also linked to the idea of market signals 
(Schelling, 1969; Spence, 1973), which "... demonstrate to others the actor's intentions or 
abilities or some other characteristic about which the actor has private, unverifiable 
information. " (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 212). Thus, outsiders faced with this situation 
struggle for self-identification, but more importantly for institutional certification, social 
legitimization and reliable identification (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990). Uncovering the 
fundamental mechanisms of institutional certification, social legitimization and reliable 
identification can be to the benefit of newcomers, whose tacit qualities and characteristics 
have to be identified by the socio-economic environment in order to be selected from the 
unidentified population they come from (Smith, 1996; Gartner & Siverson, 1996) to enter the 
regime of favorable social effects. 
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Dynamic identity 
- 
Strategy by Association: 
Due to the diversity of stakeholder interests and the existence of measurement costs, 
"association" with external players can serve as cues to certifying and measuring the value 
and content of a firm's products or services. This idea overlaps with recent works such as 
Podolny (1993), Cadmic (1992), Haunschild (1994), Carter & Manaster (1990) which have 
recently developed further the earlier works of Simmel (1950), White (1970), Sorensen 
(1983), Bonacich (1987), Dutton & Jackson (1987), Jackson & Dutton (1988) to show that a 
firm's position in the social structure can in turn affect not only rewards, but can reduce the 
firm's ability to interact with firms with different social status. We believe that this basic idea 
of interdependence can be taken further. 
As we look at institutions and social indicators of performance and measurement, we 
need to appreciate the importance of association with players in the market and the social 
structure. Various works such as Haunschild (1994), Granovetter (1985), Podolny (1993), 
Burt (1992) have analyzed the importance of the role of social structure in market 
competition. Our article attempts to operationalize the nature of association and the 
communication of such associations or linkages. We try to operationalize the effects of 
associations and phenomena such as external commentary 
- 
favorable reviews in business 
publications - which create awareness used by companies in their overall strategy, or the role 
of invisible assets such as accumulated consumer information, brand name reputation (Itami & 
Roehl, 1987). But the existence or possession of such invisible assets is not always easily 
transformed into market information, and thus, external cues and intermediaries can play an 
important role in creating a value for such assets in the market place. Institutional factors 
complement existing information in the market, such as signaling, to illuminate the 
complexities of measurement. Although today's increasingly turbulent and uncertain 
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competitive environment has increased the importance of such external factors, the existing 
literature has not conceptually framed how such institutional factors can be analyzed. 
These institutional factors or external cues are synonymous to the concept of 
"indices". As defined by Jervis indices are " 
... 
statements or actions that carry some inherent 
evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably 
linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions. " (1985: 26). Based on the notion of indices, we 
can then construct the definition of dynamic identity as a compilation of certain such indices 
which help to identify a firm's invisible assets and performance. Our definition of dynamic 
identity is based on the following four indices or drivers of identity: Firstly, an organization's 
client base is a driver of quality; the position or status (Podolny, 1993; Frank & Cook, 1995) 
of the particular clients can in turn promote its ranking within the market place. Secondly, the 
ability and reputation for being innovative 
- 
developing new products, a dynamic corporate 
culture 
- 
is another type of index in the market place (Haunschild, 1994). Thirdly, an 
organization's networks, whether they be collaborators or competitors, provide some 
additional institutional certification in the market place. An example of this would be top 
ranked business schools being competitors but holding executive programmes or other 
conferences together in a network (D'Aveni, 1996). Fourthly, outside external sources of 
information, such as Standard and Poor indices in financial markets, consumer reports written 
by private organizations, business magazines and commentaries, all serve the function of 
institutional certification. Thus, we define dynamic identity as the following: 
Dynamic identity is a compilation of the following four types of indices: list of 
clients; reputation for successful innovation; network of partners or 
competitors; evaluation by external intermediaries. 
The four institutional drivers or indices define a firm's dynamic identity and certify its quality 
and status, providing an institutional measurement of performance. 
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An explanation for a firm's overall and continued market success or dominance in its 
industry needs to take into account these external factors. Moreover, stakeholder theories 
- 
which measure the performance of firms and their responsiveness to external constituencies 
such as customers, government, society (Jones, 1995) 
- 
also need to incorporate the role 
played by external drivers of institutional certification. Our framework also contributes 
towards further illustrating the behavioral research of Burt (1992), Feld (1981) and 
Granovetter (1985) on the importance of relationships within the social structure and how this 
influences competition. Stakeholders need to evaluate not only the competitiveness of the 
organization in the market, but also its position in the social structure and its relations with 
institutional certification. Therefore, the abstract economics based model of anonymous 
exchange and competition is only a beginning. Research in stakeholder theories succeeds in 
bringing together anonymous exchange and behavioral research 
- 
two major frameworks in 
management research - to complement each other's frameworks 
Dynamic Identity in Stakeholder systems & Knowledge Industries : 
Devlin & Rosenberg (1991) noted that understanding a phenomenon adds up to 
constructing a suitable metaphor or schema, and based on the schema generating a detailed 
but sufficiently abstract description of the phenomenon to override the limitations posed by 
the schema. In the same vein, we have constructed a schema which is capable of generating 
descriptions and meanings in the complex environments of stakeholders and knowledge 
based industries. Figure 8.3 illustrates our schema for stakeholder identification based on the 
notion of dynamic identity. 
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Figure 8.3: Stakeholders and indices: Indirect measurement 
It is a schema for generation and accrual of social capital (Granovetter, 1985; 
Coleman, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The schema utilizes a tagging mechanism to 
break down the apparent asymmetry and complexity of intangible knowledge, facilitate 
partner selection and the formation of aggregates (Holland, 1995). Stakeholders lacking these 
tagging characteristics will be harder to evaluate, minimizing the possibility of potential 
exchange. Borrowing Lane & Maxfield's terminology, one could say that our proposed model 
is an attempt to "generate insight into the agent-artifact space that the agent inhabits and into 
the way in which control is distributed through that space" (1996: 226). Therefore, actors who 
can identify themselves and others in terms of the four indices, possess the advantage of 
having a clear picture of their world and their position in it, and they also understand that they 
have to concentrate effort and resources in entering or moving within these indices. Also, 
Lane and Maxfield (1996) suggested that generative relationships which are an essential 
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strategic competence in complex environments can alter an actor's positional information and 
schemata. Rankings in terms of the four indices promotes generative relationships because it 
introduces a measure of heterogeneity between actors by separating them along the indices. 
A firm's dynamic identity is a metaphor for its quality and exchange potential and it is 
mediated as a meme (Dawkins, 1976), a cultural transmission. Given the environmental 
uncertainty proceeding with an exchange seems more like following a religious creed than an 
objective choice, and it depends on the frame of reference of the environment, background 
beliefs (Coveney & Highfield, 1995). Stakeholders need a yardstick to judge organizations, to 
transform their own and others' memes into scientific memes like mathematical models, 
which proliferate when their predictive or descriptive capacity is being continuously verified 
by scientific data. Identity, in the broad definition of the term, is a meme, a cultural 
transmission, because it relates directly to the socio-economic environment within which it 
evolves. "Dynamic identity", on the other hand, is a scientific meme because it offers the 
option of comparison with identity memes with other agents. 
The rules of dynamic identity are based on already existing outcomes 
- 
products of 
past stakeholder cognitive processes 
- 
and future outcomes "attract action via [iterative] 
gradient search, without the need for a map of the evolutionary landscape" (Macy, 1997: 
435). This is shown in Figure 3 with the introduction of single-headed arrows facing towards 
-corporate performance" instead of the double-headed once picturing complex and 
indiscernible interaction. The schema is completed with the introduction of a feedback loop 
which performs gradient search. Each time the process goes round one loop, the schema 
- 
as a 
sensemaking mechanism - creates cognitive structures in the stakeholders and determines 
their attitudes and actions, which in turn establish the emergent landscape for that loop. The 
iteration of the schema 
- 
the patterns, principles and rules that govern individual action and 
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interaction 
- 
generates an immense richness of outcomes (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992). As 
unexpected outcomes emerge, lessons of the past are learned allowing for future avoidance 
and alternative courses of action to be iteratively explored. Therefore, the quantitative 
measure of dynamic identity of a firm changes iteratively with consequent effects for 
performance evaluation. Firms achieving high measures in terms of the four drivers of 
dynamic identity will be selected and promoted by the stakeholders, and vice versa. 
Conclusions: 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, to focus on the importance of 
measurement costs and the problem of communicating identity, in stakeholder systems and 
knowledge based industries. Secondly, to provide a framework for overcoming the inherent 
ambiguity and increased measurement costs associated with stakeholder systems, founded on 
indirect measurement indicators, or "indices" which define dynamic identity. 
The role of institutional certification, external measurement of quality and assessment 
of value beyond general market information was treated as fundamental in stakeholder 
systems and knowledge-based industries, where there is high intangibility of value and 
content (Spender, 1997; Spender & Grant, 1997). Institutional certification, in terms of 
"dynamic identity", is defined by external indices: list of clients; reputation for successful 
innovation; networks of partners or competitors; evaluation by external intermediaries. Firms 
compete in the market against other firms; however, they also maintain long-term relations 
with these institutional certification mechanisms, which provide a system of indirect 
measurement of performance. We provide a framework for integrating these external 
measurement factors into stakeholder theory and identity theory (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, et al. 1997; Rowley, 1997; Jones, 
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1995; Wood, 1991 a, 1991 b). Moreover our framework is a dynamic one that seeks to uncover 
the rules, processes or principles for strategic organizing on which quasi-stability of future 
outcomes may be attributed, and thus contribute towards the survivability of firms in complex 
competitive environments such as stakeholder business systems and knowledge-based 
industries (Sanchez, 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past two decades there has been a fundamental transformation in the 
competitive space of international business. The competitive deregulation between 
countries, less protectionism, formation of regional trade blocs, structural changes in 
industries because of technological changes, excess capacity and customer 
expectations, environmental concerns, and inter-organizational collaborative 
arrangements, have either cumulatively or in subsets, had an impact on almost all the 
industries. Of all these changes, it is the concept of globalisation, which is primarily 
driven by the necessities and circumstances created by the reorganisation of the 
human condition through scientific technology, that is having impact world-wide. 
While the economic manifestations of globalisation include spatial reorganisation of 
production, the inter-penetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial 
markets, and the diffusion of consumer goods to distant countries, the rubric of 
globalisation includes political, cultural and ideological levels of analysis. The fallout 
has been that some of the collective wisdom of the past decades have been challenged 
and failed to withstand the onslaught of innovative developments in international 
business, leading to a major shift in the basis of competition. 
The distinctive feature of the trends in the recent past has been the dramatic 
rise of the "emerging markets" as attractive locations for the investments of the 
multinationals. But the investment pattern clearly indicates that the investments are 
skewed in favour of some "big" emerging markets and that the other countries with 
perceived potential have lagged behind. The investments in these developing 
countries falls into two main categories. First, in countries like China and India, most 
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of the investments flowing in are primarily meant to exploit the huge domestic 
market. On the other hand, places like Singapore, which despite its size attracts large 
investments, are looked upon as being a base for the catering to the demands of the 
international market. 
Given the dramatic rise in the number of developing countries that are trying 
to attract investments by following broadly similar economic policies, it is obvious 
that the factors that influence the investment decision of multinationals will not be 
restricted to the traditional elements of national attractiveness. Amongst the factors 
that are deemed as being critical by the multinationals is "industrial clustering", i. e. 
the geographical clustering of industries, especially in the high-technology sector, 
centred around a part of a country's science base, which leads to company growth and 
innovative success. For example the phenomenal growth of the software industry 
around Bangalore in India is attributed to the presence of research institutes and 
universities in the area. The momentum towards the globalisation of industries is 
emphasizing the growing significance of such locational differences in terms of 
particular abilities. 
The clustering of industries is one of the key factors that has led to the 
emergence of "poles of growth". These growth areas provide a locus of pooled talent 
and a environment that encourages the growth of industries that are critical to 
economic success in the coming millennium. The state has to play a critical role in 
adopting a holistic policy, encouraging universities, research centres and local 
authorities to co-ordinate their efforts with the firms so to create an environment that 
will attract investment and self-sustaining clusters of economic growth. 
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In light of these radical changes in the world economy, this thesis is an attempt 
to re-examine the concept of development and international business. We have argued 
that the existing frameworks, dominated by the neo-classical approach focusing 
primarily on the developed countries, are inadequate to help us understand both the 
growth and recent collapse of some of the emerging markets. This trend to re-examine 
existing frameworks is visible in development economics, where after a period when 
the debate was effectively polarised along ideological lines, the last decade has seen a 
renewed enthusiasm amongst social scientists to revisit the concept in light of some 
dramatic changes in the international political economy. Amongst these are the 
collapse of the most extreme forms of socialist states, a flourishing of some form of 
democracy, astonishing economic growth in South East Asia based on a non-liberal 
economic model and most importantly, the phenomenal impact of the rapid advances 
in information technology. In this context, the most significant issues in the debate 
about development are the emergence of some developing countries as significant 
players in the global economy, the belated acceptance of the role of the state in 
development (World Bank 1993,1997) and the role of knowledge in fostering and 
enhancing development (World Bank 1998). 
The thesis examines two aspects of development and international business 
- 
the role of financial capital allocation within the emerging market business system 
(Choi, et al. 1996) and the role of knowledge in the context of its distinctive features, 
i. e., intangible and inalienable, which influences the nature of exchange of goods in 
knowledge industries and thereby leads to clustering. The thesis is mainly conceptual 
in nature and given the very nature of the issues raised, exploratory and multi- 
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disciplinary. Amongst the reasons that India was chosen to illustrate the various 
issues were the fact that: 
9 India is one of the biggest emerging markets and critical to any debate in 
development economics and international business 
" 
India managed to be relatively unaffected during the recent crisis, begging the 
question as to whether its' institutions and organisations, and business system 
(especially of financial capital allocation) are different compared to those in other 
emerging markets 
" although India stands at the lower end of the human development index, it has 
emerged as one of the major players in the world software industry, with Bangalore 
emerging as one of the few cyber-cities in a developing country 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS: 
As suggested in the chapter 1, the main purpose of this thesis is to 
problematize the enduring value of existing views on development and international 
business, and to further explore an alternative perspective on development and 
international business systems. In doing so, we do not claim to have covered the vast 
array of diverse literature on the nature and impact of development, nor to have 
captured the infinitely complex details of economic and management issues. The very 
complexity of the issues raised and the fact that there is very little research, in 
comparative terms, on issues like finance and knowledge in emerging markets made 
the entire research effort difficult, but in our opinion rewarding. The problems 
associated with getting data from and on a country like India are well known and does 
not merit detailed comment. What we have done is to build on and refine existing 
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frameworks in the business systems approach to international competition (chapters 
2,3,4), analysed the peculiarities of the nature of exchange in knowledge industries 
which lead to clustering (chapters 5,6,7), and tried to bridge the two streams of 
research (especially relating to measurement costs in stakeholder systems and 
knowledge industries) by developing the concept of "dynamic" identity (chapter 8). 
More specifically we have: 
9 built on the framework developed by Choi (1996) of the "new" triad of business 
systems by using it to examine the different systems of financial capital allocation. 
This was then used to analyse both the success and recent failure of the Asian 
economies. 
" analysed the nature of exchange of knowledge goods, in the context of the 
intangible and inalienable qualities and provided alternative frameworks based on 
reciprocity and redistribution 
" attempted to integrate the expanding literature in economic geography and 
suggested that it needs to take into account issues of "labour mobility" to fully 
comprehend the relevance to international business research 
" 
developed the concept of "dynamic identity" which will help overcome the 
significant measurement problems to ascertain performance in stakeholder systems 
and knowledge industries using indirect measurement indicators or "indices", thus 
being useful in both the streams of research for this thesis. 
" refined and developed various frameworks which can serve as building blocks for a 
grounded theory on issues related to finance allocation and knowledge in 
development and international business 
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In the sections that follow, we will list out the contributions of each chapter in 
greater detail especially in the context of the lacunae in the extant research in 
international business and development economics. 
Chapter 2: Global Triad: National Business Systems Approach to Emerging 
Markets 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the role of political embeddedness 
in comparative business systems research and its potential implications for the 
governance systems of emerging economies. As analysed by North (1990,1994), the 
relationship between institutions and organisations need to be analysed as a whole in 
order to fully appreciate the complexities of successful economic performance. 
Traditional research has tended to generalise the success of mature economies in 
Western Europe and North America and what hints they can provide to new emerging 
and still developing economies. Chapter 2 developed the general frameworks of 
North (1990,1994) further, to show the difference between the Anglo-Saxon 
(individualist) and Communitarian (collectivist) business systems, within the 
successful mature economies of Western Europe and North America. We also took 
into account in our analysis, the role of "political embeddedness" or the interaction 
between economic and non-economic or non-market actors (Zubkin and DiMaggio 
1990; Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Choi 1994; Olson 1991,1992), in determining the 
success of national business systems. The Anglo-Saxon and Communitarian business 
systems have a different emphasis on the relationship between organisations, the 
relative importance of formal versus informal institutions, and the overall 
interconnections between organisations and institutions within a national business 
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system. In this sense, this has provided an evert more complex national objective for 
emerging business systems such as in Asia, that have tried to combine elements of 
both business systems. 
We believe our preliminary research and framework takes into account the 
reality of the local, non-economic (Whitley 1990; Olson 1991,1992; Choi 1994; 
Boddewyn 1988; Toyne 1988; Zubkin and DiMaggio 1990) forces that influence firm 
capabilities and behaviors. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conclude whether 
the Anglo-Saxon individualist system is always superior or inferior to the 
Communitarian collectivist system. Our purpose was to analyze their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, especially the relationship between institutions and 
organizations so that they can serve as potential guidelines for emerging economies 
that are in the process of establishing a governance system; emerging economies have 
a choice either between the two systems, or a combination of both systems. But such 
analysis also shows the crucial importance of analysis that goes beyond, pure market 
and economic factors, that takes into account the non-market actors and factors that 
influence the success of national business systems. Emerging market business 
systems add an additional generic complexity due to rapid growth, lack of various 
institutions, and the general level of uncertainty in their business environment. 
Chapter 3: Financial Capital Allocation and Development 
In chapter 3, we analyzed the Asian economic crisis through the role played 
by two major factors: "financial capital" allocation & "knowledge", using the 
framework of political embeddedness of institutions and organisations, explained in 
chapter 2. We believe that an interdisciplinary framework incorporating international 
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business, international economics and economic development can help to provide a 
more systematic understanding of not only past Asian economic success, but the 
present Asian economic crisis. The fundamental issue is that the national business 
systems (North 1990; Olson 1992) in Asia were phenomenally successful for decades 
and then dramatically problematic in 1997. There is a need to understand the factors 
for past success, and which of these factors, if any were responsible for the crisis 
which began in 1997. We developed a "double triad" framework, including 
international markets and domestic institutions to better incorporate Asia's emerging 
economies into the global competition frameworks. 
Firstly, we analysed the two systems of capital allocation and ownership that 
have been proven widely successful in the mature economies of the world. These two 
major business systems can also be fundamentally divided into shareholder and 
stakeholder systems of capital allocation and ownership structures (Roe 1994; 
Hirschman 1994; Freeman 1984; Albert 1991). The Asian economic crisis was 
greatly due to the fact that in many of the more emerging countries of Asia including 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, neither systems of external nor internal financial 
capital allocation had been fully developed. Thus, the "level" of financial institutions 
in the national business system (Levine 1997; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic 1996; 
Boyd & Smith 1996) is crucial to understanding the Asian crisis. 
Secondly, we focused on the importance of taking into account the nature of 
"knowledge" acquisition, diffusion and delivery in emerging economies. Despite the 
past economic success of emerging economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, international business research has not sufficiently analysed how such 
emergence environments differ from the maturity business environment of North 
220 
America and European Union; exceptions include Beamish (1988); Choi (1994); 
Inkpen & Beamish (1997); Landa (1994); Olson (1992). The balance among the 
three major parts of knowledge, acquisition, diffusion and delivery have changed. 
The strength of the collective, relationship and trust based national business systems 
in Asia were based on the " diffusion" and dissemination of externally created 
knowledge, usually from foreign countries such in North America and Western 
Europe. However, as the global business environment becomes increasingly 
dependent on creativity, R&D, technology, the so called, high-tech industrial milieu 
(Castells and Hall 1994), global competitiveness in knowledge resources has become 
more dependent on acquisition and delivery, rather than diffusion. In this sense, the 
knowledge allocation mechanism in Asia, based primarily on past diffusion has 
become no longer appropriate in today's global business environment. 
Although the Asian economic crisis has been widely debated and researched, 
the analysis has tended to be dominated by purely neoclassical economics thought 
(Krugman 1998). The approach in this chapter was to follow a broader, 
interdisciplinary approach including economic as well as international business and 
management frameworks. The "level" of emergence, of the financial institutions in 
Asia, and the ability to allocate or misallocate capital was a crucial factor in the crisis. 
Along with a greater global dependence on knowledge creation and knowledge based 
industries further added to the lack of maturity in Asian institutions. 
The purpose of section II in this chapter was to analyse fundamental issues 
that influence pre-negotiation beliefs, values, assumptions held by international 
business negotiators in Asian context from two broader analytical frameworks: 
institutional (North 1990,1991) and organizational (Schelling 1960,1966). We feel 
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that these two interconnected levels of analyses help to overcome the psychic distance 
(O'Grady & Lane 1996; Sohn 1994; Johanson & Vahlne 1977) towards Asia in 
setting the foundations of successful international negotiations. 
We analysed the question of whether the transactional aspects of negotiations 
could be the same in mature versus emerging market environments. In emerging 
business environments, the realities of uncertainty and high measurement and 
enforcement costs may require a mutual commitment (Schelling 1960,1966) type 
approach to international negotiations. This fundamentally differentiates the Asian 
environment from more mature business environments, where there are much lower 
uncertainty, measurement and enforcement costs (North 1990,1991). 
Chanter 4: Indian Political Economy and Financial Capital Allocation 
In chapter 4, we focused on the Indian political economy and the system of 
allocating financial capital in it, to try and explore as to how the domestic constraints 
of the institutions and organisations (North, 1990) shape the business system in any 
country, as explained in chapters 2 and 3. Given the complexity of India's 
development experience, it would be idle to pretend that everything it did was right 
but it would be naive to suggest that everything it did was wrong. From a long term 
perspective, when compared to most developing countries, the most important success 
was in creating a thriving political democracy with a mixed economy which provides 
a viable model for the countries that are making the transition from communism. The 
Indian experience clearly illustrates the possibility of succeeding in such a arduous 
venture and at the same time highlights the limitations and pitfalls of development. 
Chapter 4 has clearly highlighted the institutional constraints within which the Indian 
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economy works. From 1947 to 1991, although there was consensus about following a 
state market capitalist path, the pressures from various groups forced the various 
governments to choose the path of least resistance. This effectively diluted the impact 
of most policy initiatives - on the plus side it meant that the country avoided the 
excesses of other developing countries; on the other hand, political compromises 
meant that even measures that would be beneficial were watered down. After the 
economic crisis of 1991, initially there was enthusiasm for following a pluralistic 
neo-liberal economic path to development. But the perceived failure of these policies 
and the conflicting interests of domestic interest groups has led to the proposed 
adoption of a corporatist model of development. This confusion is partly a function of 
the extant political economy where there is a problem in resolving the view points of 
various pressure groups. These conflicts are best reflected in the financial system 
where there is a bank oriented stakeholder economy, which is trying to cohabit with a 
thriving share-market driven domestic industry. We have suggested that the mixed 
economy within a democratic framework has worked to the advantage of India during 
the recent crisis - the various institutions that have developed over the past have 
limited the excesses taking place, especially in the context of short term borrowing by 
the private sector (which has been one of the main factors leading to the crisis in the 
rest of Asia), free convertibility of the currency and excessive "crony" capitalism. 
Although it is the constraints imposed by the institutions and organisations within the 
political economy that has checked the pace of liberalisation, this ironically, has 
worked to India's advantage in the recent crisis, especially in relation to captial 
controls on foreign currency movements. Notwithstanding the fact that India was one 
of the "safe havens" during the crisis, there is a obviously a need to focus much more 
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on the building of institutions and greater transperancy within the business system, at 
the same time quickening the pace of liberalisation. This is especially true if India has 
to keep up with the rapid changes that are taking place within the global economy 
with knowledge industries emerging as one of the primary locomotives of economic 
development. 
Chapter 5: Knowledge based exchange: Inalienability and reciprocity 
Most of the vast past research on knowledge based competition has tended to 
rely primarily on transaction cost analysis, and to neglect the salient features of the 
nature of knowledge as an intangible resource and the difficulties of assessing its 
value. Recent exceptions include Grant (1996); Choi and Lee (1997); Spender (1996). 
We believe that the intangible nature of knowledge especially in today's constantly 
turbulent world, shifts the focus away from products or services being exchanged in 
the market, towards how the market "identifies" through external cues, certain firms 
and certifies their resources and value in the market; the identity of the actor in 
exchange in turn requires a more social, reciprocal and trust based analysis. 
In chapter 5, we clarified the distinction between intangible and inalienable. 
The market value of intangible assets can be known, through high measurement costs; 
inalienable assets, may not have a market value, and may have value only in 
organisation specific and situation specific contexts. Although existing research 
views the accumulation of knowledge as a positive attribute, the process of 
"exchange" whereby knowledge is acquired or lost is not sufficiently analysed. 
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There is a need to create frameworks for understanding exchange mechanisms for 
intangible and inalienable assets such as knowledge. 
We provided alternative frameworks based on reciprocity and redistribution, 
exchange systems traditionally more commonly associated with pre-modem societies 
(Mauls, 1955; Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 1978). However, these non-capitalist societies 
have traditionally developed exchange mechanisms for differentiating between 
commodities type assets, which are exchanged through the market, and inalienable 
assets such as knowledge, which are exchanged through reciprocal arrangements. 
These in turn may be the most effective exchange mechanism for intangible and 
inalienable assets such as, knowledge. 
Chapter 6: Economic geography and International Business 
In chapter 5, we had suggested that the nature of exchange of intangible and 
inalienable goods lead to clustering, so as to facilitate the exchange of tacit 
information, which is a critical factor in encouraging innnovation. In chapter 6, we 
advocate a greater mix of the research done in the new economic geography with 
international business research. Although there has been a certain interest within 
international business on the existence of clustering of industries [Porter 1990], the 
existence of such networks and clusters have not been fully integrated into the 
growing research in the new economic geography, which have begun to provide the 
underlying reasons for the process that such networks and clusters can help to create 
cities, countries and regions. The fact that a particular firm's location decision may in 
turn be determined by the location decisions of other firms, and the aggregated 
benefits of the location make it potentially a crucial area of international business 
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research. This is especially the case, because if indeed such geographical factors are 
driving foreign direct investment and firm decisions towards location and strategy, 
this has substantial implications for public policy and the role of the state towards 
such firm decisions [Lenway and Murtha 1991]. 
We applied this to the India to show that the potential increasing returns and 
agglomeration benefits of the economic integration need to take into account the 
realities of international business factors such as labour mobility, institutional myopia, 
political uncertainties. International business research has much to contribute to our 
better understanding of a rapidly integrating states at different levels of development 
in India. However, international business will need to incorporate a broader range of 
interdisciplinary frameworks from economics, psychology, sociology, law, in order to 
analyse all the complexities of integration. 
Chapter 7: Indian Software Industry: 
In chapter 7 we tried to apply some of the concepts and frameworks that we 
analysed in chapters 5 and 6 to study the evolution of the Indian software industry and 
the emergence of Bangalore as one of the top technopolis in the world. In the context 
of the Indian software industry, the fact that it was the only industry in the industrial 
sector in India that was predominantly export oriented was highlighted. In analysing 
the factors that led to the emergence of this sector, the role of the government in 
promoting centres of excellence in higher education, its industrial and technology 
policies was significant. In addition, the existence of a very large English speaking, 
relatively low wage, labour force is critical to the success of the industry. It is 
significant that the bulk of the work done by the industry is labour intensive and at the 
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lower end of the value chain. Any attempt to move up the value chain is plagued by a 
number of factors including limited availability of venture capital funds, the short- 
termist profit maximising approach of most Indian software firms and the lack of 
adequate infrastructure. 
Krugman (1991) has identified three factors behind industrial clustering. First, 
the pooling of a large number of firms of the same industry creates a pool of skilled 
workers. In industries with increasing returns, the economies of scale encourage the 
concentration of activities in one or a few places. Second, concentration of industries 
spawns a greater number of specialized local suppliers, thereby providing greater 
variety at lower cost. Third, in sectors where the flow of information is vital and is 
better over shorter distances, clustering has advantages in transmission of knowledge 
between firms. Thus, central to the logic of geographical clustering is the effort to 
maximize the benefits from knowledge externalities or spillovers; the sharing of 
knowledge with other bodies involved with R&D by a firm reflects R&D spillover, as 
the firm does not pay for that information in a market transaction. In such a cluster, 
the cost and the burdens of R&D, innovation is shared by networks of regional 
participants including the firms, suppliers, the regional work force, the universities 
and research institutes, and government bodies. In the context of Bangalore, the 
locational advantages of the city revolved around the availability of labour due to the 
vast number of institutes of technology, the pleasant climatic conditions, and the 
infrastructure in the city. In addition as the number of firms reached a critical mass, 
the employees of existing firms started new firms in the city leading to clustering. But 
it is clear that the phenomenal growth of the city will slow down as the very factors 
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that led to its' growth are today unable to meet the increasing demands of the 
industry. 
Chapter 8: Dynamic Identity: Stakeholder systems and knowledge industries 
In chapter 8, we tried to "marry" the two broad streams of research, i. e., 
financial capital allocation in different business systems and knowledge, by providing 
a framework that would be useful in both streams. The purpose of the chapter was 
twofold. Firstly, to focus on the importance of measurement costs and the problem of 
communicating identity, in stakeholder systems and knowledge based industries. 
Secondly, to provide a framework for overcoming the inherent ambiguity and 
increased measurement costs associated with stakeholder systems and knowledge- 
based industries, founded on indirect measurement indicators or "indices" which 
define dynamic identity. 
The role of institutional certification, external measurement of quality and 
assessment of value beyond general market information was treated as fundamental in 
stakeholder systems and knowledge-based industries, where there is high intangibility 
of value and content (Spender, 1997; Spender & Grant, 1997). Institutional 
certification, in terms of "dynamic identity", is defined by external indices: list of 
clients; reputation for successful innovation; networks of partners or competitors; 
evaluation by external intermediaries. Firms compete in the market against other 
firms; however, they also maintain long-term relations with these institutional 
certification mechanisms, which provide a system of indirect measurement of 
performance. We provide a framework for integrating these external measurement 
factors into stakeholder theory and identity theory (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; 
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Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, et al. 1997; Rowley, 1997; 
Jones, 1995; Wood, 1991a, 1991b). Moreover our framework is a dynamic one that 
seeks to uncover the rules, processes or principles for strategic organizing on which 
quasi-stability of future outcomes may be attributed, and thus contribute towards the 
survivability of firms in complex competitive environments such as stakeholder 
business systems and knowledge-based industries (Sanchez, 1997). 
SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 
As suggested earlier, overall we are largely in "virgin" territory as there is very 
little research that has been carried out in the field of finance and knowledge in 
emerging economies, especially within a comparative business system and there are a 
lot of areas in the research effort which need to be developed further. The research on 
the political embeddedness of business systems in chapter 2 could be developed in at 
least the following two ways. Firstly, there is a requirement for further elaboration of 
key concepts and for empirical works to test the validity of the typologies, especially 
between Anglo-Saxon and Communitarian business systems suggested in this chapter. 
It is possible that the Anglo-Saxon business system may be especially advantageous 
in certain industries, such as high technology, which have a high intangibility and 
need to raise capital rapidly factor; in the sense that we have shown how national 
institutions and the role of domestic stakeholders (Freeman 1984) can provide 
strategic constraints and advantages on firm performance in the global political 
economy. Secondly, this type of dual grouping of business systems could be the 
starting point of research on the Asian economic, business crisis. At present, the 
analysis of the Asian crisis has tended to focus on broad, macro-economic issues such 
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as exchange rates; comparative business system and governance approach could yield 
further insights into this continuing global problem. 
In chapter 3 on the Asian financial success and crisis, we analyzed the Asian 
economic crisis through the role played by two major factors: "knowledge" and 
"financial capital" allocation. We believe that an interdisciplinary framework 
incorporating international business, international economics and economic 
development can help to provide a more systematic understanding of not only past 
Asian economic success, but the present Asian economic crisis. In the context of the 
various issues raised in this chapter, there are a host of issues that warrant further 
research. First, there is a need to compare the Asian business systems that are 
presently in crisis, with those in less affected emerging business systems, such as in 
Eastern Europe, in order to compare and contrast the success and failure factors. 
Second, further empirical work and case studies on the nature of financial capital and 
knowledge creation and allocation in Asian business system is needed. Third, there is 
the need for an empirical study, testing the foundations of pre-negotiation frameworks 
in overcoming psychic distance to increase effective international negotiations in 
Asia. Fourth, further conceptual work is warranted in the area of which types of 
firms, or societies generally are most skilled or amenable to shareholder versus 
stakeholder systems, and their different approaches to international negotiations. The 
economic and business crisis in Asia today adds an additional urgency to such 
additional research agendas. 
In the context of the role of political embeddedness in shaping the business 
system and the nature of allocation of financial capital, a lot of empirical work needs 
to be carried out. First, there are very few studies that have looked at the business 
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system prevalent in India. To do this different aspects of the business system 
especially the role of various institutions and organisations and the links between 
them, needs to be researched in detail. The allocation of financial capital is only one 
of the aspects, albeit significant, of the business system. Even in this context the entire 
area of corporate governance and the various issues related to it is under-researched or 
non-existent. This chapter is just a beginning of this process and provides a broad 
overview of the issues that are relevant and need to be explored further. 
In the context of chapter 5 on knowledge based exchange, two areas warrant 
further research. Firstly, there is a need to further develop conceptually, our 
preliminary frameworks on the mechanisms and nature of effective exchange. Further 
research of informal, relationship type exchange without the extensive use of contract 
law, can be enhanced by studying the nature of exchange in premodern or 
noncapitalist societies (Mauss, 1955; Malinowski, 1966; Sahlins, 1972; Simmel, 
1978). Secondly, more in depth empirical work needs to be carried out in the 
effectiveness of various exchange mechanisms for the exchange of knowledge assets. 
Such empirical work needs to clearly distinguish exchange of alienable, commodities 
from exchange of inalienable knowledge type assets. 
In the context of chapter 6 regarding economic geography and international 
business there are two areas that warrant further research. Firstly, an empirical study 
of the role of different incentives offered by different states in India that have 
influenced the led to the clustering of specific industries. Secondly, there is a need to 
address the public policy and governmental issues concerning the benefits of 
agglomeration effects as advocated in the new economic geography research, and how 
in order to achieve these benefits, there is a need to take into account the other non- 
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economic factors such as institutional setting, social and psychological aspects of 
labor mobility; this chapter began elements of this process by applying the 
frameworks of the new economic geography and international business to the 
continuing geographic integration within the India. 
In chapter 7 we provided a broad overview of the Indian software sector and 
the factors that have led to the emergence of Bangalore as of the major cities for 
software development. Like the rest of Indian industry, there is a yet inadequate 
research of this industry and almost all the aspects of the industry need further 
research. The lack of research, as in the case of the overall Indian economy, is mainly 
a function of the problems encountered in collecting data. The culture of secrecy that 
pervades most aspects of Indian life makes it very difficult to get access to data, 
interviews especially when one has to meet tight deadlines. A bloated inefficient 
bureaucracy at almost all levels of the government believes that "information is 
power" and is thus reluctant to part with the same, however trivia or innocuous the 
information. In addition, in a large number of areas there is as yet inadequate original 
data available 
- 
they have not been collected in the first place and most of what passes 
of as data are estimates based on trends. We can only echo Herbert Spencer's thoughts 
that "the ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world 
with fools. " 
In the context of chapter 8, on the role of dynamic identity in stakeholder 
systems and knowledge industries, further research is warranted on the following 
issues. Firstly, there is a need to analyze in more depth the way organization value can 
be measured and how stakeholders can interact with the organizations involved in 
external certification, in facilitating such measurement. The shift of many of the 
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world's mature economies towards knowledge based industries, will make such 
research issues increasingly important. Secondly, there is a need to further research 
the dynamics of the relationship between market and social structure. The anonymous 
exchange of economics based analysis can serve as a starting point for analyzing 
competition; but the realities of social structure and indirect measurement drivers or 
indices need to be incorporated into stakeholder research. 
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APPENDIX 
I interviewed executives from the following computer companies and industry bodies 
in India in February 1998. 
Infosys Technologies 
Wipro Infotech 
Tata Consultancy Services 
AB Infosys 
Newgen Software Technologies 
Texas Instruments India 
Novell India 
National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) 
The executives were asked the following questions in semi-structured interviews, i. e., 
all the questions were covered but they were as starting points to get insight into the 
overall evolution of the industry, the strategic challenges facing the industry and the 
future for growth in the city of Bangalore. 
1. What is the nature of your organisation's involvement with the software industry 
in India? 
2. Where do your company's products and services fit in the overall value chain? 
3. Do you cater mainly to the domestic or foreign market? If the latter which are 
your biggest markets? 
4. If you are a multinational, what are the costs and benefits of investing in India 
compared to the other alternatives? 
5. What percentage of your company's revenues are generated by tackling the Y2K 
problem? 
6. What are your employee turnover statistics? How difficult is it to retain workers 
in the present environment? 
7. Where is the industry and your organisation headed? 
8. Which do you think are the best locations for investment in the software sector in 
India? 
9. Has the competition between cities given your organisation any concrete 
benefits? 
10. Are there any advantages from the clustering of the industry around Bangalore? 
11. Is Bangalore a victim of its own success and what needs to be done to maintain 
the momentum in terms of investments? 
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